JOURNAL
of
CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

VOLUME TWELVE APRIL, 1952 NUMBER ONE

L'UDOVIT ŠTUR AND RUSSIAN PANSLAVISM

by Michael B. Petrovich

I

THE first two political programs of Slavic unification to be published in Russia were written by non-Russians. The first was the seventeenth-century treatise *Razgovory ob vladatelstvu* (Discourses on Government) by Juraj Križanić which was published in two volumes in 1859-60.[1] The second work, written in the early 1850's, was L'udovít Štúr's *Das Slawenthum und die Welt der Zukunft* (Slavdom and the World of the Future). It was first published in Moscow in 1867 under the Russian title *Slavianstvo i mir budushchago.*

The first work is not the primary concern of this study.[2] It belongs to the history of modern Russian Panslavism only in so far as its publication stirred up further interest in the Panslavic cause. Nevertheless it must be said that Križanić's *Discourses* offer a most interesting, an almost bizarre parallel with Štúr's treatise. Both works called upon Russia to unite all the Slavs under the aegis of the tsar. Both thus hold a prominent place in the history of Russian Panslavism. Yet neither of these two works was written by a Russian. Križanić was a Croat, a South Slav; Štúr was a Slovak, a West Slav. In view of the predilection which Russian Panslavists had for Orthodoxy as the true "Slavic Church", it is particularly ironic that both authors were adherents of Western churches. Križanić was a Roman Catholic priest whose original purpose in coming to Muscovy was to effect a conciliation

1 This work is included in a collection of Križanić's writings edited by Professor Pëtr Aleksieevich Bezsonov and entitled *Russkoe gosudarstvo v polovinie XVII veka: rukopis' vremën tsaria Aleksieia Mikhailovicha*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1859-60). Bezsonov nowhere noted the author's name, it being apparently unknown to him at the time. It is especially unfortunate that this edition was printed in the Church Slavonic alphabet rather than Križanić's original Latin script. It is more than probable that the editor did not deem it proper, as a good Slavophile and Panslavist, to publish a Panslavic program originating in Russia in a Western alphabet.

2 See Michael B. Petrovich, "Juraj Križanić: A Precursor of Pan-Slavism," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, VI, Nos. 18-19 (December, 1947), pp. 75-92.

between Rome and the Russian Church. Štúr, like his famous compatriot, Ján Kollár, was a Lutheran. Neither Križanić nor Štúr wrote the works under discussion either in Russian or in their native tongue. The former wrote in a hybrid *lingua slavonica* of his own creation — a compromise between Church Slavonic, Russian and his Croatian kajkavian dialect. Štúr, again like Kollár, wrote his manuscript in German.

Both works were published for the first time in Russia and after the death of their authors — in Križanić's case some 175 years later, in Štúr's case eleven years later. Both manuscripts were brought to light by Russian scholars who were intimately connected with the Russian Panslavic movement. Professor Pëtr Aleksieevich Bezsonov published the first. The second was published in 1867 by Professor Vladimir Ivanovich Lamanskii, and again in 1909 by Professors Konstantin Iakovlevich Grot and Timothei Dmitrievich Florinskii.[3] Neither work was published in the author's native country until recently. A Croatian translation of Križanić's *Discourses* appeared only in 1947.[4] Štúr's work was not published in Slovakia until 1931, and then only in the German original.[5]

The works of both these men are milestones in Russian history. They were the first concrete proposals for a Slavic union under Russia's leadership which anyone had ever published openly in Russia. St. Petersburg was in no mood to offend its imperial neighbors so soon after the Crimean débâcle. Yet the role of Protector of the Slavs was finding an increasing appeal in some government circles as Russia gained strength in the 'sixties. Under such circumstances it is highly likely that the age of Križanić's work and the non-Russian authorship of both treatises appeared as extenuating circumstances in the eyes of a wary but venturesome government. It is also more than probable that the success with which these two publications broke the ice of censorship made it that much easier for Nikolai Iakovlevich Danilevskii's famous "Bible of Panslavism", *Rossiia i Evropa*, to appear in 1869 only two years after Štúr's book saw print.

---

[3] Vladimir Ivanovich Lamanskii (1833-1914), Russian historian and Slavic scholar; a leading Panslavic ideologist, founder, secretary and later president of the St. Petersburg Section of the Slavic Benevolent Committee; a leading participant in the Moscow Slav Congress of 1867; professor of Slavic studies at the University of St. Petersburg from 1865.

Konstantin Iakovlevich Grot (1853-1934), Russian Slavic scholar; professor at the University of Warsaw, 1883 to 1899; Director of Archives in the Ministry of the Imperial Court from 1905; member of the St. Petersburg Section of the Slavic Benevolent Committee.

Timothei Dmitrievich Florinskii (1854-1919), Russian Slavic scholar; professor at the University of Kiev; president of the Kiev Slavic Beneficial Committee for over twenty-five years.

[4] Križanić, Juraj, *Politika ili razgovori o vladalaštvu*, translated by Mate Malinar (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1947).

[5] Stúr, L'udevit, *Das Slawenthum und die Welt der Zukunft (Slovanstvo a svět budoucnosti)*, edited by Josef Jirásek (Bratislava, 1931).

There are even more valid reasons why Štúr's political testament holds a preeminent place in the history of particularly Russian Panslavism. Though written by a man who never laid eyes on Russia, this extraordinary work was closely bound with that country. There have been until this writing only three editions of Štúr's book. The first two — those of 1867 and 1909 — were both edited by Russian Panslavists, translated into the Russian language, and printed in Russia.[6] This means that Štúr's treatise lived an exclusively Russian life for some three quarters of a century. Being concerned here with Russian Panslavism proper rather than the Neo-Slavic movement which belonged to the pre-World War I period, this study will be confined to the first Russian edition.

There is ample evidence, both internal and explicit, that Štúr's program of Slavic unification attracted the Russian Panslavists because it was, in effect, their own program. It was no accident that the work was published precisely in the three months preceding the Moscow Slav Congress. The Russian government had expressly forbidden the Russian participants and hosts from taking any part in political discussions with their guests from abroad. Štúr's book was a godsend. What better way was there to let the other Slavic delegates know just where the Russian Panslavists stood? What more effective means was there of combatting Austroslavism, Polish Messianism, Kollár's "reciprocity", and Illyrianism than to confront the adherents of these regional tendencies with a frank appeal for Russian leadership which was written by a non-Russian Slav? As Lamanskii observed in his preface to the 1867 edition, "Though written eleven to twelve years ago, Štúr's work *Slavdom and the World of the Future* could hardly be more to the point than now."[7]

Finally, Štúr's work has earned a place in Russian history not only for the use to which it was put by Russian Panslavic circles. It has more than a right to be considered a predecessor of such remarkably similar Russian Panslavic programs as those by Danilevskii and General Rostislav Fadeiev.[8]

---

6 Shtur, Liudevit, "Slavianstvo i mir budushchago; Poslanie Slavianam s beregov Dunaia," translated from the German MS by V. I. Lamanskii, *Chteniia Imperatorskago Obshchestva Istorii i Drevnostei Rossiisskikh pri Moskovskom Universitetie, III.* Materialy slavianskie, Books 1-3 (Moscow, 1867), pp. 1-191. Hereafter referred to as *Slavianstvo* (1867).

Shtur, Liudevit, *Slavianstvo i mir budushchago,* edited by K. I. Grot and T. D. Florinskii, and published by the Obshchestvo Revnitelei Russkago Istoricheskago Prosvieshcheniia v pamiat' Imperatora Aleksandra III (St. Petersburg, 1909).

7 Lamanskii, V. I., "Predislovie," *Slavianstvo* (1867), ii.

8 Danilevskii, N. Ia., *Rossiia i Europa: uzgliad na kul'turnyia i politicheskiia otnosheniia slavianskago mira k germano-romanskomu* (St. Petersburg, 1871). Also other editons.

Fadeiev, R. A., *Mnenie o vostochnom voprosie* (St. Petersburg, 1870). There is an

It is more than probable that Štúr's outlook influenced V. I. Lamanskii's dissertation, *On the Historical Study of the Greco-Slavic World in Europe*, which appeared in 1870.[9]

II

That one of the strongest statements ever made for Russia's right to hegemony in the Slavic world should have come from a non-Orthodox West Slav requires some explanation. It is almost axiomatic in the general history of Panslavism that sympathy for Russia always loomed largest among those Slavs who were the most hard-pressed. The Slovaks were certainly among these in the mid-nineteenth century and before. Long bereft of their political rights by the Hungarians and subjected to the constant pressure of magyarization, it was natural for this small people living in the very heart of Slavdom to seek the protection of stronger Slavic neighbors. This need for help, their central position in what many believed to be the primeval home of the Slavic race, and the stubborn preservation of their own way of life gave the Slovaks a feeling of being Slavic that was hardly matched by any other Slavic people. As the Slovak scholar, Dr. Daniel Rapant, observed, "Slovakia has been called, and not without reason, the classic land of Slavic reciprocity, the Slavic idea . . . As in name, so in sentiment the Slovak never ceased being a Slav."[10]

L'udovít Štúr was born in 1815 in the Trenčín district of Slovakia of a pious Evangelical Lutheran family. His Protestant upbringing automatically gave him membership in the most active cultural and political element of the Slovak nation. His father was the director of a public school in Trenčín. L'udovít received his higher education in the Evangelical Lyceum of Bratislava (then Pozsony or Pressburg) and in 1838 at the University of Halle. There he not only came into contact with German romantic nationalism and philosophy, but he observed at first hand the cultural extinction of the Slavic minority on the German Elbe. He returned to his native land after two years in Germany to take a teaching post in his own district. As the result of his struggle against the magyarization policy of a local nobleman, Štúr soon lost his position. He then became editor of a nationalist Slovak newspaper entitled *Slovenskje Národnje Noviny* with *Orol Tatránski* as a literary supplement. He devoted himself entirely to journalism, liter-

English translation: Rostislav Fadeef, *Opinion on the Eastern Question*, translated by T. Michell, second edition (London, 1876).

[9] Lamanskii, V. I., *Ob istoricheskom izuchenii greko-slavianskago mira v Evrope* (St. Petersburg, 1870).

[10] Rapant, Daniel, "Štúrovci a Slovanstvo," *Slovanský Sborník*, Nos. 1-2 (Turč. Sv. Martin: Matica Slovenská, 1947), 22.

ature and politics. It was in this period that he became known as a passionate champion of the Slovak language at a time when Kollár's preference for Czech had no little popularity, especially among Protestant Slovaks.

Štúr attempted to beard the Magyar lion in his den by becoming a deputy to the Hungarian Parliament in 1847-48. He was soon forced to flee to the sanctuary of Vienna where he became acquainted with the leading Slavic figures of his day. He then took part in that great demonstration of popular protest at Liptovský sv. Mikuláš in May, 1848, as well as the first All-Slav Congress held in Prague the following month. The utter failure of both demonstrations brought Štúr to the conclusion that it was useless for his small nation to seek its own freedom alone or in the frame of Austroslavism. It was already in the Slovak tradition to look to Russia. True, not many Slovaks knew exactly what Russia was and what it stood for. They did know, however, that Russia was the biggest and most powerful Slavic state and that, best of all, it was next door. It was in a conflicting mood of helplessness and inversely high hopes in salvation from Slavic Russia that Štúr wrote his famous work. It was his last before his accidental death on January 12, 1856. Thus it may truly be considered his political testament.[11]

III

If, as someone once suggested, books have their own destiny, Štúr's last work certainly experienced a mysterious fate. Štúr himself never mentioned it in his correspondance. This is particularly surprising since Štúr frequently discussed his other works in his letters to friends. It has been suggested that Štúr really considered this work as an introduction to a larger history of the Slavs which he intended to write and which he last mentioned in a letter of June 5, 1855, six months before his death.[12] For the story of Štúr's book we must rely largely on anonymous marginal notes in Russian on the original manuscript copy and Professor Lamanskii's preface to the first edition in 1867. Not even the title-page of the manuscript was preserved so that one is forced to determine the date of the writing by other means.[13]

---

11 Mráz, Andrej, *L'udovít Štúr* (Bratislava, 1948), Chapter I *passim;* D. D., "Panslavizm i Liudevit Shtur," *Otechestvennyia Zapiski,* Vol. 173, No. 13 (1867), pp. 49-77; Tourtzer, H., *Louis Štúr et l'idée de l'indépendance slovaque 1815-1856* (Paris, 1913).

12 Tourtzer, H., *op. cit.,* pp. 230-231.

13 The Russian scholar, V. N. Korablev, offers evidence which favors the years 1854-1855 as the dates of Štúr's work. See his article, "Cheshkoe izdanie sochineniia Liudevita Shtura *Slavianstvo i mir budushchago,*" *Trudy Instituta Slavianovedeniia Akademii Nauk SSSR,* II (Leningrad, 1934), p. 409.

An anonymous Russian notation written in pencil and by a hand different from the original reads as follows:

> The title-page is lost: Das Slawenthum u. die Welt der Zukunft. This manuscript was given to me by Raevskii. The original is also with Raevskii; after his death it was obtained by Pomialovskii (prof.). Not long before his death Štúr presented one of these manuscripts or both to Raevskii.[14]

Directly underneath another hand had written, again in pencil and in Cyrillic, a fairly illegible note which makes mention of Lamanskii. Beneath this the first writer, most probably Lamanskii himself, noted in pencil:

> Whose note this is I do not know. Evidently some Czech obtained this manuscript from me or Pomialovskii to read it and wrote this here. For a time I. . .[15]

The sentence remained uncompleted. The following is the explanation which Lamanskii himself gave in his preface in the 1867 edition:

> The original of this work by the Slovak, L'udovít Štúr, which was written by him in the German language not long before his death, was given to me by friends of the deceased during my sojourn in Hungary in 1862. Soon thereafter I learned that there was a copy which had been corrected and copied in the clear by the author. Its possessor, or compatriot, one of Štúr's closest friends and one of our best acquainted men with contemporary Slavdom, had received this copy from the author himself. This friend of the deceased sent the manuscript to Russia for publication at the end of the 1850's, it appears, but received it back. Exchanging our manuscripts with the friend of the deceased, I sent this copy from Austria in 1863 to a certain editor. But again this time the manuscript lay around editorial offices for about two years without being looked at because of its frightening bulk, small handwriting and disagreeable Gothic script.[16]

Actually Lamanskii's manuscript was a clear copy and, as photographs of the original text in Jirásek's 1931 edition show, quite neat and legible to

---

[14] Jirásek, Josef, "Uvod," in *Das Slawenthum und die Welt der Zukunft* (Bratislava, 1931), p. 15, footnote 1.

Mikhail Thëdorovich Raevskii (1811-1884), for over forty years archpriest of the Russian Orthodox chapel to the Russian Embassy in Vienna; active agent of the Slavic Benevolent Committee of Moscow as middle-man in its relations with leading Slavic figures in the Habsburg lands whose acquaintance he cultivated.

Ivan Vasilievich Pomialovskii (1845-1906), professor at the University of St. Petersburg, philologist and archeologist.

[15] Korablev, V. N., *op. cit.*, p. 409. Korablev believes that certain grammatical errors in the Russian and orthographic characteristics would indicate that the author was a Lusatian Serb—either Jan E. Smoleŕ or his partner Pech. Note that Jirásek misquotes the note in his preface to the German edition of Štúr.

[16] Lamanskii, V. I., "Predislovie," *Slavianstvo* (1867), p. i.

anyone who could read the Gothic cursive script with any ease. That the very size of the manuscript looked forbidding, however, is quite true.

When the work failed to interest the Russian publisher whom he mentioned, Lamanskii then tried to have the German original published in the Leipzig *Zentralblatt für slavische Literatur und Bibliographie*, a journal which was receiving subsidies from the Slavic Benevolent Committees in Russia. It is known that the editor, Jan Smoleŕ, did have a copy of Štúr's manuscript in his home in Bautzen (Budyšin).[17] Whether he had received this copy directly from Štúr, who was a friend of his, or from Lamanskii is not known, though the latter alternative is the more probable. Smoleŕ wrote Lamanskii from Bautzen on April 8, 1866, that the text was too long. He informed Lamanskii that he had inquired among some Slovaks whether such a book would sell at even a thaler. They assured him that there would be few buyers at that price. Smoleŕ therefore rejected the manuscript. Lamanskii tried to interest Smoleŕ's firm in Leipzig again in 1870 but was refused a second time.[18]

Meanwhile the editor of the *Chteniia Imperatorskago Obshchestva Istorii i Drevnostei* (Papers of the Imperial Society of History and Antiquities), Professor O. M. Bodianskii, wrote Lamanskii on March 15, 1865, asking him to send Štúr's manuscript to him in Moscow inasmuch as a translator had been found.[19] He wrote again on September 1, 1866, requesting that the manuscript be sent as soon as possible that it might be published in time for the opening of the Moscow Ethnographic Exhibition and Slav Congress in April and May, 1867. By the time he received the manuscript, however, the translator was no longer available. So it was that Lamanskii set to work himself, with the help of several of his students, to complete the translation by the end of December, 1866. There were over 307 crammed pages of near folio size to do in only four months. The pressure under which the translation was done as well as the different numbers of translators involved naturally resulted in a text marred by errors and lapses. There is, however, little reason to accept charges that the errors were intentional and malicious.[20] The work was finally published in the *Chteniia*

17 Jan Arnošt Smoleŕ (1816-1884), known also by his German name, Johann Ernest Schmaler, and his Russian name, Ivan Ivanovich Smoliar; editor, publisher, author, and a leading figure in the cultural rebirth of the Lusatian Serbs; Panslavist, Russophile, participant in the Moscow Slav Congress of 1867.

18 Korablev, V. N., *op. cit.*, p. 406. Korablev cites the original manuscript in full.

19 Osip Maksimovich Bodianskii (1808-1876), professor of Slavic history and literature at the University of Moscow from 1842; editor of the *Chteniia Imperatorskago Obshchestva Istorii i Drevnostei* 1846-1848 and 1858-1877; a charter member of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee.

20 See Jirásek's preface to the 1931 edition, p. 4. In his book *Z podróży po kraju słowackim* (Lwów, 1876), the Polish scholar, Agaton Giller, charged on page 315 that

in three monthly installments, from January through March, 1867. A specially printed edition was presented to the foreign Slavic delegates to the Moscow Slav Congress in May, 1867.[21] What an eerie effect the work must have produced. It was as though Štúr was speaking from the grave to the congress itself! "It is high time, brethren, that we come to an understanding with one another!" the political testament began. What it offered toward that understanding provided the brethren with many lessons.

IV

Štúr set out to accomplish four basic tasks in his book: (1) to determine, largely by reviewing the Slavic past, whether the Slavs had a rôle of their own to fulfill in world history; (2) to describe the Slavic mission in universal history against the background of the cultural difference between Western and Eastern Europe; (3) to show what advantages the Slavs possessed by comparing their institutions, traditions and qualities with those of the West; and (4) to demonstrate that the Slavs could accomplish their mission only through political unification under Russian leadership.

The work itself is a romantic mélange of science and poetry presented in a vigorous style and an argumentation which is remarkably consequential even when mistaken. The author drew on history, philosophy, theology, literature, philology and folklore as well as a penetrating insight into contemporary political events in all Europe to lend substance to his case. It would be most difficult for any summary such as this to do justice to the author's vast array of information. A simple statement of his main arguments will suffice here.

Addressing himself to all his Slavic brethren, Štúr opened his "epistle from the shores of the Danube" with a jeremiad on the degradation of Slavdom, cruelly oppressed from without and senselessly disunited from within. It was a poignant picture which he painted, and one over which he

---

the Muscovites were guilty of falsification. The Slovene scholar, M. Murko, wrote the following note in his article, "Kollárová vzájemnost slovanská," *Sborník Kollárův* (Vienna, 1893), p. 226: "We doubt, however, that Štúr wrote his work as it is presented to us in the translation." Jirásek's painstaking edition of the German original in 1931 and his careful comparisons with both Russian translations have since dispelled charges against Lamanskii, at least other than the charge of carelessness. H. Tourtzer (Dr. H. Turcerová), the author of *Louis Štúr et l'idée de l'indépendance slovaque 1815-1856* (Paris, 1913) states on page 229 that Štúr was not an easy author to translate and that if there were errors in the Russian translation, "the fault is without doubt that of Štúr himself." See also Korablev, *op. cit.*, p. 410.

21 Korablev, V. N., *op. cit.*, p. 408. In his review of the 1909 Russian translation of Štúr's work, N. M. Petrovski also stated that the 1867 edition had been published not only in the *Chteniia* but in book form that same year. See his article, "Slavianstvo i mir budushchago," *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnago Prosvieshcheniia* (July, 1909), p. 194.

could truly lament, as he said, "like Isis weeping over the scattered bones of Osiris."

Whence this disunity among the Slavs? Štúr found his answer in the ancient particularism and statelessness of Slavic society. He condemned that traditional equality of small groups which had prompted Procopius to call the Slavs a democratic people. "Cease praising the democracy of the ancient Slavs," Štúr advised his fellow Slavs. "Do not shed tears over the suffering of our people which has been visited upon them by Asiatic barbaric hordes, but arm yourselves with just indignation against weakness, lack of wisdom, and the helplessness of our people! The democracy of the ancient Slavs to which Procopius pointed is nothing but the primitive, undeveloped infant stage of our people."[22] Here was a bid for modern political integration as opposed to backward localism. Štúr pointed to the Russian development of statehood through unification as a model for the other Slavs. He cited the Poles and the disintegrating effect of their *liberum veto* as the prime example of what evils the anarchy of particularism could impose. From this he drew a moral: the Russians were the only Slavic people that enjoyed independence because they were the only Slavic people to have created a modern state.

Did the Slavs have a mission of their own to fulfill in universal history? Štúr was certain that they did. He realized only too painfully that the Slavs were then hardly in any position to realize their historic vocation, but he was convinced that their day would surely come. That the Slavs found themselves in political and cultural bondage to the West was not entirely their fault, Štúr held, but a natural process in historical development. Slavic emancipation and self-realization would also be a natural process, and one which Štúr actually described in biological terms as in the following passage:

> Not everything grows with equal rapidity; not everything blooms at the same time in nature. Every creature, and likewise every people has its time under the sun. Thus the linden begins to blossom long after the oak has blossomed.[23]

The comparison was particularly apt in view of the fact that most Slavic peoples traditionally regarded the linden as their own special tree. In the conclusion of his treatise Štúr includes an even clearer reference to his quasi-biological view of cultural development. "In nature," he observed, "after every summer comes the fall and finally winter, and this phenomenon

22 Štúr, *Slavianstvo* (1867), p. 16.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 29. Compare with Herder's constant use of biological metaphors in his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* in which this "praeceptor Slavorum" describes the earth as "a garden of national blooms" and each nation as "a tree upon its own roots."

is also repeated in Universal History."[24] Like Hegel and the Russian Slavophiles, Štúr saw history as a progression of spent nations leaving the stage of action while new, young nations made their appearance.

If Štúr needed a guaranty that the Slavs were next in this line of succession, he found one in the decline of the West. He perceived in Western Europe nothing but dissolution as the result of inner tensions. On the one hand he beheld there a society which claimed allegiance to the ideals of liberty, fraternity and equality. Yet it was being rent asunder by the struggle of people against people, class against class, man against man. Štúr especially condemned the ruination of the peasantry, whom he idealized as the real guardians of true democracy and wholesome living, by a feudal landed aristocracy and a new urban capitalist class. In Western Europe, Štúr observed, all praised freedom; yet the poor man who shouted for freedom was really thinking of his daily bread while the rich man saw in freedom only his chance to amass riches. The author had only contempt for the self-styled democracies of the West in which parliaments represented only a small section of the populace. He decried the materialism of Western society and blamed it for the festering evils on which the equally materialistic ideologies of socialism and communism fed.

Western Europe was the prey not only of political and social dissolution, Štúr charged, but of moral decay as well. Schisms within the body of Western Christendom were serious enough signs of this decay, but far graver to Štúr was the schism between religion and life in general. Any society which claimed loyalty to one set of ideals and lived according to an opposite set was, he predicted, doomed to destruction. "And so there is in the West no point of support," he wrote, "no tranquillity. It is the war of all against all, a situation bordering on desperation."[25] Only England still had any strength, he admitted, and this thanks largely to its constitution. "But on the other hand," he remarked falling back on his Hegelian conception of history, "everything must have its end as well as its zenith. England has evidently passed the meridian of its glory and power."[26]

The Slavs were urged to draw at least two basic lessons from this apocalyptic vision of Western Europe's doom. First, there was little point for the Slavs to incorporate into their own society those very institutions which were contributing to the decline of the West. Second, it was futile for the Slavs to seek salvation from a West whose development had already passed its zenith and which was itself on the downward path. Where, then,

---

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 190.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 94.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

were the oppressed Slavs to find salvation? In themselves, Štúr replied, and especially in Russia. "There in the distant East, where the Slavic peoples have spread out so far," he pointed, "there is the people of the future!"[27]

The third part of Štúr's treatise offered a highly idealized portrait of the Slavs. The author's aim was to demonstrate what virtues the Slavs could find in their own society which would bring them to their ultimate triumph. He was as charitable toward his own people as he had been severe in his judgment of the West. To him the Slavs were the salt of the earth. They were naturally good of heart, humble, unassuming, patient, kind, democratic, persevering, tolerant, respectful of others — in general, the children of a benevolent nature. What faults they had were largely vices acquired from Western Europe. The Slavs never enslaved nor persecuted others for their faith. The Slavic community knew no beggars. Slavs loved their fellow-men and esteemed them for their qualities and not, as in the wicked West, for their possessions. Such were the advantages the Slavs had over the West, Štúr claimed, and no Slavic people had preserved these in such pure form as had the Russians. It was true, he conceded, that serfdom still marred the Russian scene, but he predicted the speedy end of that regrettable institution. Besides, he explained, its effects were mitigated by the preservation of the patriarchal spirit and a local autonomy in the peasant communes not to be found in the West.[28]

The fourth and final section of Štúr's work dealt specifically with the problems of Slavic political unification. Only united could the Slavs achieve their emancipation and the realization of their historic mission, he warned. How were they to unite? Štúr saw only three paths to consider: (1) a Slavic federation without Russia; (2) the transformation of Austria into a Slavic empire; and (3) union with Russia.[29]

A Slavic federation without Russia could be realized, he held, only as a union of republics. He presumed such a union would include Congress Poland, the Serbian Principality, the Slavs of the Ottoman Empire (Štúr includes the Albanians!), the German Slavs — the Lusatian Serbs and Poles of Poznań (Posen), and finally the whole conglomeration of Austrian Slavs: Czechs, Moravians, Silesians, Slovaks, Galicians, Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. Here were nineteen million people divided into nearly a dozen groups. Even if such a federation could ever come into being, Štúr predicted, it would almost certainly be doomed to failure. It would be rent by internal

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

[28] Štúr's idealization of Russia was so extreme as to embarrass the Russian Panslavists who, as good Slavophiles, were as vociferous as the censorship would allow in their condemnation of such evils as, for example, bureaucracy. In several of his editorial footnotes Lamanskii had occasion to allude to Štúr's ignorance of the Russian reality.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 133.

rivalries. Large non-Slavic elements within the union would present grave problems. The geographical separation of the Slavs by the Austrian-Hungarian-Rumanian wedge would actually divide the union physically into a central and south European part. Furthermore, serious religious differences separated the various Slavic groups. The Slavic lands were too unlike one another in their levels of education and cultural development. Linguistic difficulties could hardly be overcome in a union in which no single Slavic language could claim a clear majority or preeminence over the others. Finally, Štúr warned, Russia would surely oppose any republican Slavic federation on its own borders which not only excluded her but lay claim to portions of her empire.[30]

Štúr condemned the idea of an Austro-Slavic union as being an even more unthinkable alternative than the first. He saw no sense in trying to establish a Slavic union on a foreign base, and one which was rotting away at that. "Woe to you, O Slavs. Woe to you, O Slavic Austria," he cried. Who was there, he demanded, that could still believe in such an illusion?[31] Austria had lost its historic rôle. Its Germans looked to Frankfurt, its Italians to the Piedmont, its Rumanians to Bucharest, and its Magyars to themselves. He advised the Slavs to follow suit and to look to Russia. Nothing would remain of Austria, he predicted, and there would be none to shed a tear over its grave. Štúr saw in Windischgrätz's bombing of Prague in 1848 the final blow to the Austro-Slavic dream.[32]

The only course which Štúr offered the Slavs was union with Russia. He called upon his kinsmen to admit to themselves that without the Rus-

---

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 147. Nevertheless, the illusion did persist long after, especially among the Czechs. It received a serious set-back, however, with the *Ausgleich* of 1867 between the Austrians and Magyars. This was well illustrated by the change of heart experienced by Austroslavism's most distinguished exponent, the Czech historian and national leader, František Palacký. In 1848 he was credited with the famous dictum that if Austria did not exist, she would have had to be invented. Just before the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 Palacký warned, "The day Dualism is proclaimed will, by an invincible necessity of nature, likewise be the day Panslavism will be born in its least desirable form." When the much feared *Ausgleich* was consummated, his terse comment was, "We existed before Austria, and we shall exist after it."

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 147. Nevertheless, the illusion did persist long after, especially among the Czechs. It received a serious set-back, however, with the Ausgleich of 1867 between the Austrians and Magyars. This was well illustrated by the change of heart experienced by Austroslavism's most distinguished exponent, the Czech historian and national leader, František Palacký. In 1848 he was credited with the famous dictum that if Austria did not exist, she would have had to be invented. Just before the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 Palacký warned, "The day Dualism is proclaimed will, by an invincible necessity of nature, likewise be the day Panslavism will be born in its least desirable form." When the much feared *Ausgleich* was consummated his terse comment was, "We existed before Austria, and we shall exist after it."

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 146-157 *passim.*

sian empire they had no future, surrounded as they were by ancient foes. "Russia . . . is the prime mover and the leader of our national family," the Slovak author declared. "Let us go forth together, in the spirit of our people, under the leadership of our racial elder, given to us by History."[33]

Štúr mustered a whole battery of arguments to defend his proposal. Russia alone was powerful enough to counteract centrifugal tendencies among the separatist Slavs. "Russia has power, enormous power," he wrote, "and therefore the vocation and the right to put an end to all Slavic tendencies toward discord and to assume leadership of the whole Slavic family." Where but in Russia, he asked, was there an independent state mighty enough to form the basis of a Slavic union? "Our peoples are but fragments of a single nationality," the Slovak declared. "They can be reborn and united into a single whole only by a related benevolent and great power."[34] Most of the Slavs in this world were already in the Russian empire, Štúr argued — fifty-four out of a total of seventy-nine millions or three-fourths of the total Slavic population. Besides, most Slavs already had respect and love for Russia, Štúr claimed, especially the Orthodox Slavs of the Balkans. The only Slavs who hated Russia, he observed, were the Poles, and for them he had little sympathy. Štúr agreed with Napoleon's dictum, "Cette nation porte sa ruine dans son caractère." The Slovak author predicted that Poland would be broken by Russia's might if it persisted in being stubborn. He hoped that the Slavs would achieve their union with Poland among them, but if the Poles proved to be recalcitrant, he advised his fellow Slavs to achieve their aims despite Poland.[35]

Russia's very vastness stirred Štúr's Slavic pride. He was thrilled by the vision of a gigantic empire sprawling from the Carpathians of his own native land to the shores of the Pacific. Here was a region of untold natural wealth which a rapidly developing science and industry in Russia were only beginning to exploit. That this farflung empire, this first class Great Power, was actually Slavic was a thought which awed the Slovak. Russia's ability not only to create but to maintain its creation against foes through its own military power overwhelmed Štúr.

Only in a federation under Russia's leadership, he urged, could the Slavs safely resurrect their ancient institutions of communal government. Of all the Slavs it was the Russians who had kept the Slavic way of life in its purest form. Such a luxury appeared possible to him only in a strong monarchic state such as the Russian. Yet a monarchic government need not be one which stands over its people, he pointed out, but one which bases

33 *Ibid.*, p. 159.
34 *Ibid.*, pp. 143-144.
35 *Ibid.*, p. 165.

itself, as in old Russia, on a representative assembly such as the *duma*. As to the position of the federated nations within the Slavic union, Štúr wisely dodged the issue by writing, "We do not consider it necessary, and we even consider it as superfluous, to define prematurely the means of unification and degree of the reciprocal relations of the Slavs with Russia. The means and the degree of this unification will emerge from circumstances yet to come about."[36] He did, however, venture two proposals respecting religion and language which helped to indicate that the degree of unification which he envisioned would be close indeed.

The Protestant author offered signal proof of his devotion to the Slavic cause by advocating the "return" of all the Slavs to the bosom of "our, that is, the Greco-Slavic Church."[37] The Eastern Orthodox Church was once the common possession of all the Slavic people, he claimed, and their true inheritance through the Slavic apostles, Saints Cyril and Methodius. "O return to us once again, holy Church of our fathers," he invoked, "thou which didst grant unto our peoples the first benediction from the heights of Nitra, Velehrad and Vyšehrad!"[38]

He was no less devoted to his cause in the matter of language. He urged the adoption of Russian by all Slavs as a common literary language. The sacrifice Štúr was prepared to make can be judged adequately only in the light of his zealous championship of his own Slovak language as against Czech for his people. Indeed, it may be said that Štúr was himself the father of literary Slovak. Yet he regarded Slavic literary unification as being even more important. Old Slavonic was a dead language. As for Kollár's idea of four main Slavic literary languages joined in mutual intercourse, Štúr wrote, "Literary reciprocity among the Slavs is praiseworthy and deserving of every respect, but it is a weak support in need and can never penetrate deeply into the life of all our peoples." It seemed almost self-evident to Štúr that only the Great Russian language could serve as a suitable medium for all the Slavs. What, he asked scornfully, did Danish literature amount to when compared with the German? His recommendation of Russian as an all-Slavic literary language did not exclude the continued use of the other Slavic vernaculars for local purposes. Even

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 183. Evidently dissatisfied with Štúr's reluctance to declare himself on this point, Lamanskii ventured the following editorial comment: "Štúr does not say so directly, for he does not allow himself to go into any detail, but evidently he had in mind the image of a Slavic Union in which Russia would participate both as a member and as chairman—in a word, something such as Prussia is now going to be in the Northern Confederation or eventually in a Pan-German Union." See p. 175, footnote.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 183.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 187. The reference was to early Christian centers in the medieval Moravian Empire which Saints Cyril and Methodius, Greek monks, had converted to Christianity in the latter half of the ninth century.

here, however, Štúr urged the adoption of the Cyrillic alphabet by all the Slavic languages.[39]

Finally, how was this Russian-led Slavic union to come about? Štúr vaguely acknowledged that it could be realized only "under the pressure of grave political events." Meanwhile, he concluded, "it is useful at least to raise the question, to speak about this subject, and to prepare our minds for it."[40]

Whatever the fate of his proposed union, there was one thing of which Štúr was certain. Despite the zeal of his Panslavism, the author was prompted by the enlightened *Weltbürger* within him to conclude:

> Lift up your long fallen spirits, O Slavs, and with God's help take up the task boldly. All national pride is empty if it does not contain any deeper germ within itself. The main essence is, after all, contained in mankind itself, of which we are members together with all other peoples.[41]

However harsh Štúr was in evaluating Western civilization, he never envisaged its destruction by the future Slavic civilization. On the contrary, Štúr proudly predicted that just as the Slavic masses had once protected Europe from Turk and Tartar, so Slavic culture, once having come into its own, would serve Europe by lending new strength to a decaying civilization.

V

It is not difficult to see why the Russian Panslavists should have greeted L'udovít Štúr's message to the Slavs with such enthusiasm. Not only was his political program theirs, but it was founded on the same ideological credo.

Štúr's basic theses were remarkably similar to the most cherished tenets of Russian Slavophilism. Professor Anton S. Budilovich, an active Russian Panslavist, remarked in a lecture written in 1875, "Completely independently of one another, Russian Slavophiles and Slovak Panslavists arrived at the very same results, both philosophical and political. Reading the philosophical-political tracts of L'udovít Štúr, one can easily imagine in a moment of forgetfulness that one is reading the works of Khomiakov."[42]

Professor T. D. Florinskii, publisher of the second Russian edition of Štúr's work, repeated the same thought in his preface: "L'udovít Štúr is very close to the viewpoint of the Russian Slavophiles A. S. Khomiakov, M. P. Pogodin, the Kireievskii brothers, Aksakov and their successors," he

39 *Ibid.*, p. 189.
40 *Ibid.*, p. 190.
41 *Ibid.*, p. 191.
42 Budilovich, A. S., *Nieskol'ko zamiechanii ob izuchenii Slavianskago mira* (St. Petersburg, 1878), p. 15.

wrote, "and even more characteristic is the fact that these views, insofar as one can judge by known biographical data, arose in him independently, apart from any influence of Russian Slavophilism whatsoever."[43]

Both writers were undoubtedly correct in pointing to the similarity between Štúr's outlook and that of the Russian Slavophiles. That Štúr was not influenced by Russian Slavophilism, however, is a claim which needs revision in the light of later research. Today it is known that Štúr had connections with leading Russian scholars of Slavic studies and Panslavists. Both published works and private correspondance show that he had direct relations with M. P. Pogodin, O. M. Bodianskii, S. P. Shevyrëv, I. I. Sreznevskii, M. Th. Raevskii, and others.[44] J. M. Hurban, Štúr's compatriot, recorded that Štúr read articles by Russian Slavophiles, especially Khomiakov, with great interest. It is also known that when N. A. Rigelman, a leading Russian Panslavist, visited Štúr in Bratislava in 1845, he noticed many copies of Pogodin's newspaper, *Moskvitianin,* lying about. Štúr made particular mention of his admiration for some of Shevyrëv's articles.[45]

In the very text of *Slavianstvo i mir budushchago* Štúr referred to "learned works, excellent periodicals, for example *Moskvitianin* and others, the scholars and poets of Russia such as Karamzin, Derzhavin, Pushkin, Gogol, Shevyrëv and others . . ."[46] In his work he quoted in the Russian original the last verse of a fiery Panslavic ode by Bodianskii entitled "A Russian to His Brethren and Kinsmen" (*Russkii k bratiam svoim soplemennikam*):

> And from the Dvina to Ararat
> From Bering to the Ore Mountains
> Let brother joyfully embrace brother,
> Let us form a panslavic choir.[47]

---

[43] Shtur, Liudevit, *Slavianstvo i mir budushchago* (St. Petersburg, 1909), see preface.

[44] For both Russian and Western European influences on Štúr, see Rudo Brtaň's article, "Slovanstvo a svet budúcnosti," *Slovanský Sborník,* Nos. 1-2 (Turč. sv. Martin: Matica Slovenská, 1947), pp. 62-66. For Štúr's connections with Sreznevskii see Bogatyrëv, Pëtr, "Iz pisem Liudevita Shtura k Izmailu Sreznevskomu," *Slaviane,* No. 4 (April, 1944), 20-23.

[45] Jirásek, J., *op. cit.,* p. 8.

Nikolai Arkadievich Rigel'man (1817-1888), Russian writer, son of the famed eighteenth century historian; government official; president of the Kiev Section of the Slavic Benevolent Committee.

Stepan Petrovich Shevyrëv (1806-1864), professor of the history of Slavic literature at the University of Moscow; close friend and collaborator of M. P. Pogodin; author of articles against the Westernizers.

[46] Štúr, *Slavianstvo* (1867), p. 169.

[47] *Ibid.,* p. 157. See Jirásek's 1931 edition, footnote 655 on p. 190, for the history of this poem.

Other references in the text show that Štúr was also acquainted with two early poetic expressions of Russian Panslavic sentiment: Khomiakov's *Orël* (The Eagle) and Pushkin's *Klevetnikam Rossii* (To the Slanderers of Russia). It was the latter which ended with the troubling and oft-quoted query:

> Will the Slavic rills merge in the Russian sea,
> Or will it dry up? — That is the question.[48]

While today it can be stated that Štúr was influenced by the Russian Slavophiles and Panslavists, there is no need to push this assertion too far. After all, he was a child of the same intellectual clime in Europe. He, too, was the heir of Herder, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Like the Slavophiles, he was also a product of Romanticism and Hegelian philosophy.

Like Hegel's Russian admirers, Štúr based his entire outlook on the primacy of the Idea in man's development. "The greatest role of the spirit," he wrote in 1846, "is to come to know itself, with which the history of mankind has been occupied down to our times, for the spirit is the basis of everything in the world."[49] From this proceeded his belief that anything which possessed the potentiality for a separate existence ought to live its own life, to develop and to become conscious of its own individuality. Only through this realization of self could such an entity make its contribution in furthering the Universal Idea.

As a fervent champion of nationalism, Štúr applied this philosophy to the development of peoples. It was through peoples — ethnic groups with a common culture and tradition —, both Štúr and the Russian Slavophiles held, that the Universal Idea manifested itself and progressed.

Hegel's dialectical approach to historical development lay at the very basis of both Russian Slavophilism and Štúr's ideology. Their common vision of Slavdom taking its place in the succession of the bearers of the Idea was only going their German master one better. Both the Slavophiles and Štúr viewed "Romano-Germanic" Europe and "Greco-Slavic" Europe as thesis and antithesis. Both looked forward to a universal culture as the final synthesis.

If Štúr's ideology was identical with Russian Slavophilism, his political program was likewise that of Russian Panslavism. Indeed, a leading Russian Panslavist, Professor Anton Budilovich, saw "an indubitable and

---

48 Štúr, L'udevit, *Das Slawenthum und die Welt der Zukunft*, edited by Josef Jirásek (Bratislava, 1931), pp. 201 and 216. Note Štúr's use of the Latin alphabet in citing the Russian original.

49 Cited by Milan Pišút, "Štúrovo poňatie o slovanskej kultúry," *Slovanský Sborník*, Nos. 1-2 (Turč. sv. Martin: Matica Slovenská, 1947), p. 36 from Štúr's *Narečja slovenskuo*, pp. 19-20.

genetic bond between Štúr and Danilevskii."[50] One finds in the Slovak's political testament all of the most staunchly championed arguments of the most extreme Russian Panslavic element: the necessity of a monarchic Slavic union under Russian hegemony, united in the Orthodox Church and the Russian language.

VI

It was this complete agreement in their basic views and aspirations that caused the Russian Panslavists to use Štúr as a weapon against regional tendencies among the Slavs. These included Polish Messianism, Austroslavism, Yugoslav Illyrianism and, above all, Kollár's idea of "reciprocity". All of these movements denied, for one reason or another, what Štúr and the Russian Panslavists regarded as the keystone of a common Slavic structure — Russian hegemony.

Kollár's idea was regarded by the Russian Panslavists with special disapproval — probably because, as the least exclusive and least political of the Slavic movements, it had the best chance for any immediate success. Politically Kollár accepted the Austrian framework and renounced any political unification of the Slavs. In religion he advocated mutual toleration of all faiths among the Slavs. The very basis of his concept of reciprocity *(vzájemnost, Wechselseitigkeit)* demanded the equality of all members of the Slavic family rather than the hegemony of any one — not only in the matter of language but in every phase of national life.[51]

In his preface to the first edition of Štúr's work, Lamanskii made it abundantly clear that this publication was aimed primarily against Kollár's reciprocity. "In the history of so-called Panslavism," Lamanskii wrote of Štúr's book, "it assumes, by virtue of its contents and exposition, a far more honored place than the well-known brochure of that progenitor of modern Panslavism, also a Slovak, J. Kollár, which created such a stir in its own time in Central Europe . . . ."[52] Lamanskii explained further:

> The former uncompromising adherents of independence, not only in politics but in language, are little by little finally arriving at an awareness of

---

[50] Budilovich, Anton, "Ian Kollar i zapadnoe slavianofil'stvo," *Slavianskoe Obozrienie*, II (1894), p. 13.

[51] For the main criticisms levelled against Kollár by the Russian Panslavists, see D. D., "Panslavizm i Liudevit Shtur," *Otechestvennyia Zapiski*, vol. 172 (1867), pp. 565-580. A full statement of Kollár's views is contained in his famous work, *Ueber die literarische Wechselseitigkeit zwischen den verschiedenen Stämmen und Mundarten der slawischen Nation* (Budapest, 1837). A Russian translation appeared in *Otechestvennyia Zapiski* in 1839. An excellent modern edition in parallel German and Czech was published by Miloš Weingart: Jan Kollár, *Rozpravy o slovanské vzájemnosti* (Prague, 1929).

[52] Lamanskii, V. I., "Predislovie," *Slavianstvo* (1867), p. ii.

> the weakness of the Slavic nationalities taken separately and their definite incapability of preserving and safeguarding their national independence from the encroachment and aggression of the powerful non-Slavs without Russia, without adopting the Russian language as the common Slavic diplomatic tongue.[53]

History has since proved Lamanskii's analysis to be more a pious wish than a statement of fact. The non-Russian Slavs have consistently striven in the past century of their development to assert their own national individualities. Nevertheless, Štúr's epistle to the Slavs expresses a feeling of Slavic solidarity which, however intangible and manifold, remains a significant constant in East European relations.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

[53] *Ibid.*, p. iii.

THE ITALIAN ANTI-FASCIST EMIGRATION, 1922-1943

by Charles F. Delzell

It is undoubtedly true that the majority of the Italian population accepted with seeming indifference the Fascist dictatorship, but there was a minority of the Italian people, numerically small but steadfast in spirit, who refused to accept the restrictions imposed upon their liberty by the *Duce* of Fascism. Several thousand of these Italians went across the national frontiers into political exile; additional thousands were either jailed or interned within the country after the inauguration of the Fascist "exceptional laws." It has been estimated by a reputable observer, Professor Massimo Salvadori-Paleotti, that in spite of such repression possibly a quarter of a million people took part at one or another time in the underground anti-Fascist activities in Italy of either the democratic organizations or those of the Communist party.[1] In general, the anti-Fascist currents, both at home and abroad, drew their most energetic recruits from the ranks of progressive politicians, of educators, of intellectual youths, and of organized workers in the more industrialized zones of the Italian peninsula. The veterans of this clandestine struggle at home and abroad supplied much of the leadership of the remarkably effective war-time anti-Fascist and patriotic *Resistenza* that sprang up on a vast scale between 1943 and 1945 in those portions of Italy that lay under the military control of the Nazis and their neo-Fascist collaborators. They also formed an influential group among the new political and administrative *élite* who emerged after the overthrow of Fascism. Space in this article precludes a detailed discussion either of the clandestine anti-Fascist groups that arose within Italy after the inauguration of the totalitarian state or of the important intellectual and moral opposition to the Fascist régime rendered by Benedetto Croce and a small group of non-jurors in the Italian universities. In general, the scope of this article is restricted to the delineation of major trends in the anti-Fascist activities of some of the more influential political *émigré* groups in the period between the March on Rome and the *coup d'état* of July 25, 1943.

The political emigration, which was one of the most striking aspects of Italian history during the first years of the Fascist regime, may be conveniently divided into three broad phases.[2] During the first period, which

---

[1] Massimo Salvadori-Paleotti, "The Patriot Movement in Italy," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIV (1946), 539.

[2] The following statistics may be of some use in giving an impression of the fluctuations in emigration. It is, of course, impossible to determine statistically how many emigrants were motivated primarily by political factors and how many by economic con-

extended from 1922 through 1924, it would seem that most of the exodus was motivated by economic considerations just as it had been for many decades, but even in this initial period when Fascism had not yet assumed its dictatorial form, there were political overtones present in the emigration. Thousands of Italians who, without much interest in politics as such, sought employment in the labor-markets of France, Switzerland, and Belgium were steadily joined by large numbers of other workers, who were of socialistic and anarchistic outlook and who had taken a militant part in the labor strife in post-war Italy—particularly in the regions of Emilia, Romagna, and Tuscany. This latter group of workers, realizing after the victory of the Fascists that their own lives would be endangered should they remain in Italy, often sought sanctuary in France or in other foreign countries. Many of these refugees, however, were determined to continue abroad their "civil war" against the Fascists, with the result that a number of Italians who attempted to organize *fasci* in foreign countries found themselves in danger of assassination by the left-wing emigrants. Fascist propagandists quickly used the term, *fuoruscito,* to identify an Italian who left his native country for political or for semi-political motives, and the term, *fuoruscitismo,* to refer to the political emigration.[3] As used by the Fascists, both words connoted a large measure of contempt for the expatriates. The political emigrants, for their part, resented these epithets;

---

siderations. The figures are taken from the Istituto Centrale di Statistica, *Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1944-48, Serie V* (Rome, 1949), I, 49.

Year	*Emigration to France*	*Emigration to all Europe (incl. France)*	*Emigration to non-European Countries*
1921	44,782	84,328	116,963
1922	99,464	155,554	125,716
1923	167,982	205,273	184,684
1924	201,715	239,088	125,282
1925	145,529	177,558	101,873
1926	111,252	139,900	122,496
1927	52,784	86,247	132,687
1928	49,351	79,173	70,794
1929	51,001	88,054	61,777
1930	167,209	220,985	59,112
1931	74,115	125,079	40,781
1932	33,516	58,545	24,803
1933	35,745	60,736	22,328
1934	20,725	42,296	26,165
1935	11,666	30,579	26,829
1936	9,614	21,682	19,828
1937	14,717	29,670	30,275
1938	10,551	71,848	27,994
1939	2,015	56,625	16,198

[3] For a discussion of this subject, *cf. Dizionario di cultura politica* (Milan, 1946), p. 284. The terms were formed from the words *uscire* (to go out) and *fuori* (away; abroad).

they preferred to speak of themselves either as *émigrés* or as *emigranti,* for both of these words evoked memories of hallowed aspects of he *Risorgimento.* Although it would be an error to exaggerate the political character of the first phase of the emigration, it is interesting to note the variegated nature of some of the Italian-language political periodicals that were published in 1924 in Paris alone: *Voce socialista* (socialist); *Rivendicazione* (anarchist); *La Riscossa* and *Campane a stormo* (communist).[4] Elsewhere there were other anti-Fascist newspapers, some of which had been founded many years before by a previous generation of *émigrés*—for example, the anarchistic *Risveglio* of Geneva, *Adunata dei Refrattari e Martello* of New York, and the socialist papers, *La Parola* and *Corriere del Popolo,* published in New Pork and San Francisco respectively.[5]

One of the most noteworthy gestures of anti-Fascism in this period was performed not by a socialist nor by an anarchist but by one of Italy's most distinguished liberals, Count Carlo Sforza, a man of aristocratic background. Hardly a week after Mussolini had come to power in October 1922, Sforza, acting on his own volition, announced in Paris his resignation as Italian Ambassador to France.[6] Thus the diplomat who in the post-war years had revealed considerable skill in his negotiations with Yugoslavia over the Adriatic disputes can claim the distinction of being the first major official to resign a public office in protest against the new Fascist government. Sforza, however, did not become a political exile in 1922. Returning to Italy, where he was a member of the Senate, Sforza repeatedly denounced the régime of Mussolini from the Senate floor. After 1927 Sforza did become an expatriate, making his home in Belgium and in France until June 1940. Much of his time was spent in research, lecturing, and writing.[7] After the fall of France Sforza took refuge in the United States, where he was widely regarded as the most authoritative spokesman of the anti-Fascist emigration.

Sforza's protests against Fascism were followed in June 1924 by the departure from Italy of Francesco Saverio Nitti, a southern scholar of

---

[4] G. Salvi, "L'esodo degli italiani in Francia," *Almanacco Socialista per 1925* (Milan, 1924), pp. 199-211.

[5] Aldo Garosci, "Italia: L'emigrazione politica durante il fascismo," *Enciclopedia Italiana, Seconda Appendice, 1938-1948, I-Z* (Rome, 1949), p. 115. At the outset, the present writer acknowledges his indebtedness to the penetrating discussions of the emigration by Aldo Garosci, who was himself an expatriate and a member of the Justice and Liberty movement. Garosci's two-volume biography, *La Vita di Carlo Rosselli* (Rome, 1945), is a treasury of information on the activities of many of the emigrants.

[6] Carlo Sforza, *Pensiero e azione di una politica estera italiana* (Bari, 1924), pp. 281-283.

[7] Written during his absence from his homeland, *Contemporary Italy: Its Intellectual and Moral Origins* (New York, 1944) is the book by Sforza that is perhaps best known to foreign readers.

liberal yet somewhat radical tendencies, who had served as Premier in 1919-1920 and who had secured international publicity through his denunciations of the spirit of both the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. After suffering the humiliation of having his Rome residence sacked by Fascist hoodlums in November 1923, and lacking any police protection, Nitti sought a passport so that he and his family might leave the country. Six months passed before he received this document and could move to Zurich. Subsequently he made his home in Paris, which for almost two decades served as one of the most frequented meeting-places for a host of political refugees from Italy. In 1925 the ex-Premier threw aside all discretion, wrote a bitter letter to King Victor Emmanuel III in protest against the monarch's support of Mussolini, and began to engage energetically in a public campaign against the Fascist régime.[8] Although he served as a kind of "elder statesman" and was widely respected by most of the *émigrés,* Nitti remained apart from the political organizations that were eventually organized by the exiles in Paris. He felt that the programs of most of these societies leaned too far in the direction of a "planned economy"; moreover, he felt that the societies, which often excluded monarchists from their ranks, were inclined to be too intolerant. Nitti, who long before his expatriation had achieved scholarly recognition for his research in the fields of economics and political science, published abroad a series of noteworthy studies.[9] A few days after the *coup d'état* that unseated Mussolini on July 25, 1943, Nitti was arrested in Paris by the Nazis and was interned for the remainder of the war in various German concentration camps.[10]

The second phase of the emigration, lasting from early in 1925 until the autumn of 1926, took place during the period when Mussolini, step by step, was laying the groundwork for the transformation of Italy into a totalitarian state.[11] Prior to the imposition of the "exceptional decrees"

---

[8] Nitti's letter to the King is printed in Francesco Saverio Nitti, *Rivelazioni: Dramatis personae* (Naples, 1948), pp. 581-596.

[9] These include *Bolchévisme, fascisme, et démocratie* (Paris, 1925); *La Democrazia* (Paris, 1933); *L'inquiétude du monde* (Paris, 1934); and *La désagrégation de l'Europe* (Paris, 1938).

[10] An autobiographical discussion of Nitti's activities abroad is to be found in the preface to his *Meditazioni dell'Esilio* (Naples, 1947), pp. 5-47.

[11] The murder of Giacomo Matteotti, the leader of the revisionist Unitary Socialist party, on June 10, 1924, by Fascist hirelings had aroused a wave of resentment against Mussolini's government. Some 150 deputies, unable to secure a majority vote against the government—thanks to recent alterations in the electoral law that had resulted in a Fascist-controlled Chamber of Deputies—had retired from the usual legislative hall in Montecitorio Palace to a symbolic, but short-lived, "Aventine of their own conscience." There these latter-day Gracchans pursued a course which was probably too cautious, too passive, and too closely geared to a constitutional program. In vain they sought to per-

of November 1926, however, passports usually were not confiscated, so that this second phase of the emigration proceeded in more or less normal fashion. Whereas the majority of the population passively acquiesced in the government's actions during 1925 and 1926, a substantial number of prominent individuals decided that if they were to remain in Italy in silence, their continued presence might be misinterpreted as reflecting an implicit sanction by them of the nascent dictatorship. On the other hand, if they were to leave their country and move to the free soil of neighboring states, they might be able to carry on propaganda that would eventually open the eyes of Italians, as well as those of many foreigners, who in large measure credulously accepted at its face value the anti-bolshevist propaganda of Fascism, overlooking that it also was illiberal and anti-democratic. Among the numerous political personalities who fled from their homeland at this time was Giovanni Amendola, the democratic leader of the Aventinian coalition and the man who probably would have become Premier if the Aventinian movement had succeeded.[12] Another refugee was Piero Gobetti, the youthful editor of the radical Torinese *Rivoluzione liberale,* a review which sought to achieve some kind of synthesis of Crocean liberalism and Marxian socialism and which was one of the most stimulating and influential publications of a left-wing character in the post-war era.[13] Before their separate departures from Italy, both Amendola and Gobetti were beaten up repeatedly by Fascist *squadristi,* and in consequence they suffered injuries which greatly shortened their lives. Both men died in France within a few months after their arrival.[14] Gaetano Salvemini, Professor of Modern History at the University of Florence, also left Italy during this period. Like many of his colleagues, Salvemini had never confined his intellectual activities to the academic chair: as an editor of the pre-war review, *L'Unità,* and as a political leader, Salvemini had gained notoriety, especially for his espousal of a program for the economic improve-

---

suade the King to exercise his constitutional prerogative to dissolve parliament and the government. The harried Premier, meanwhile, recovered enough courage to make a ringing speech on January 3, 1925, in which he launched a counter-offensive against the Aventinians, declaring that "force is the only solution for this struggle." *Cf.* Benito Mussolini, *Scritti e discorsi* (Milan, 1934-1940), V, 13-15. The Aventine suffered one *débâcle* after another in 1925.

12 Renouncing the political convictions of his father, Amendola's son, Giorgio, joined the Italian Communist party and soon became one of its most effective youth leaders. *Cf.* Partito Comunista Italiano, *Giorgio Amendola* (Rome, 1947), pp. 1-15.

13 A very useful collection of many of Gobetti's articles has been published recently: Nino Valeri, ed., *Antologia della "Rivoluzione Liberale"* (Turin, 1948).

14 Both Gobetti's widow and son were active during the war-time patriotic Resistance in Piedmont from 1943 to 1945, and for a few months after the liberation, Signora Gobetti served as vice-mayor of Turin.

ment of the depressed zones of southern Italy.[15] Also numbered among the emigrants was Alberto Tarchiani, who for a time during the 1920's had been editor-in-chief of the Milan *Corriere della Sera,* and who after the eventual overthrow of Fascism became Free Italy's first diplomatic envoy to the United States. Palmiro Togliatti, who was one of the chief members of the Communist party directorate, evaded the Fascist police in 1926, stopped briefly in France, and thereafter proceeded to Moscow, where he was assigned important duties in the Comintern.[16] Of far more temperate political outlook were the Catholic *émigrés,* the most distinguished of whom was Don Luigi Sturzo. A progressive-minded Sicilian priest, Sturzo had founded the Catholic *Partito Popolare* ("Popular Party") soon after the war. Quickly becoming a *partito di massa,* Sturzo's movement played a leading *rôle* on the center of the Italian political stage until it withdrew, more or less voluntarily, to the wings in 1923, rather than oppose triumphant Fascism.[17] Another *Popolare* who chose exile was Giuseppe Donati, editor of the party's newspaper, *Il Popolo.* In vain, Donati had advocated the return of the Aventinians to the Chamber of Deputies and a trial before the High Court of Justice of the murderers of Matteotti.[18] Donati died in Paris in 1931 at the early age of forty-two; but Sturzo, who had already well surpassed the Biblically allotted span of three-score and ten years, was able in 1946 to return to his homeland, where he took up residence in a convent. Alcide DeGasperi's powerful Christian Democratic party, which is the post-World War II successor to Sturzo's *Partito Popolare,* looks upon Sturzo with considerable personal affection, but the Christian Democratic party is responsive only in limited measure to the somewhat leftist economic views of Sturzo.

During this second phase of the dispersion of the anti-Fascists an attempt was made by *Popolare* Giuseppe Donati and others to publish in Paris an Italian-language newspaper, *Corriere degli italiani.* Unfortunately for the *émigrés,* the enterprise was not very successful, as the newspaper's

---

15 At the University of Florence Salvemini gave encouragement to the publication of the anti-Fascist student paper, *Non mollare!* ("Don't give in!"), an enterprise which was identified especially with Carlo Rosselli. *Cf. infra.*

16 *Cf.* Mario Ciatta, *Palmiro Togliatti* (Rome, 1946), *passim.*

17 On the ill-fated *rôle* of Sturzo and the vicissitudes of his party, *cf.* Arturo Carlo Jemolo, *Chiesa e Stato in Italia durante gli ultimi cento anni* (Turin, 1948), Chapter VII; Daniel A. Binchy, *Church and State in Fascist Italy* (Oxford, 1941), pp. 147-166; and Stefano Jacini, *La Storia del Partito Popolare* (Milan, 1951), *passim.* Abroad, Sturzo wrote an imposing number of books, many of which were translated into English by Barbara Barclay Carter. *Italy and Fascismo* (New York, 1927), and *Italy and the Coming World* (New York, 1944) are perhaps the most well known.

18 Luigi Sturzo, "Il Partito Popolare: Note e ricordi," *Quaderni italiani, No. 2* (New York and Boston, August 1942), p. 30.

promoters did not have adequate sources of reliable information on events within Italy; and for its part, the Fascist press took delight in exposing any slight error of fact contained in the news reports of *Corriere degli italiani*. Moreover, as the *Corriere* lacked sufficient financial backing to enable it to maintain unhampered publication, the newspaper fell into the hands of new directors, who were much less capable than Donati. When the *Corriere* published an ill-considered article recommending the assassination of Mussolini, the French government ordered the paper to suspend its publication.[19] Undismayed by this journalistic misfortune, other warriors of the pen, such as Gaetano Salvemini, Luigi Sturzo, Francesco Luigi Ferrari, Silvio Trentin, and Alberto Cianca, denounced Mussolini's régime in numerous articles, books, and periodicals, which found their way to groups of intellectuals in Italy, encouraging them to resist Fascism.[20] These publications were even more effective abroad, where they enabled an increasing number of foreigners to comprehend the true nature of the dictatorship in Italy.

The most sensational action of the *émigrés* in this period was the recruiting in France of the Garibaldi Legions, armed bands composed mainly of working-class emigrants of anarchical, socialist, and communist orientations. The legionnaires were headed by Ricciotti and "Peppino" Garibaldi, grandsons of the nineteenth century liberator.[21] In this instance, Ricciotti was the more active leader of the enterprise. He contacted many of the Italian emigrants who in previous months had been active in the civil strife in Italy. By promising them that they would soon take part in a liberating expedition that would overthrow the Fascist régime, Garibaldi was able to induce hundreds of emigrants to join his legions. At first the French government placed no obstacles in the way of these recruitments; then suddenly in November 1926 the French police arrested Ricciotti Garibaldi. Revelations of a sensational nature soon made it clear that he had been subsidized to the amount of 645,000 lire by a Fascist police *questore* named Lapolla.[22] The fiasco of the Garibaldi Legions disillusioned many

---

19 Garosci, *La Vita di Carlo Rosselli*, I, 177-178.

20 *Cf.* Barbara Allason, *Memorie di un'antifascista, 1919-1940* (Florence, 1946), *passim*. An especially useful anthology of excerpts from the publications of some of the *émigrés* has been prepared by Frances Keene, ed., *Neither Liberty nor Bread* (New York, 1940).

21 A soldier in six wars, "Peppino" Garibaldi had been chief of staff to Francisco Madero during the Mexican revolution of 1910-11; in 1930 he was to lead three thousand Venezuelan rebels against dictator Cipriano Castro.

22 *Cf.* Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli*, I, 179-180. About the same time Ricciotti Garibaldi also plotted with Colonel Macià—who, later, under the Spanish Republic, became the first president of the Catalan *Generalidad*—a filibustering expedition into Catalonia. At the crucial moment Garibaldi betrayed and denounced that enterprise. In later years the Garibaldis returned to Italy; "Peppino" died in Rome in May 1950 at the age of seventy.

anti-Fascist emigrants about the possibility, or even the desirability, of encouraging direct action against Mussolini's dictatorship. Consequently, many emigrants henceforth turned their backs on Italian affairs and devoted themselves instead to the task of making a living in France. However, some *émigrés* continued to think in terms of armed raids and individual acts of violence against Fascist officials.

It was also during this second period of the emigration that Mussolini launched a determined campaign against Freemasonry, which, at least indirectly, had long been a significant force in the Italian bureaucracy. Although sadly weakened by internal schisms, Italian Freemasonry was usually anticlerical, and it maintained more or less close ties with lodges in other countries. Both of these considerations enabled Mussolini to count on considerable public support, especially from ecclesiastical and ultranationalistic groups, in his campaign against Freemasonry.[23] It was ironic that Mussolini should have harbored such a dislike for the Masons, as the record of their order during the years when Fascism was rising to power was hardly one of unfriendliness toward Fascism.[24] But Mussolini needed scapegoats to facilitate and to justify his organization of the totalitarian state, and Masonry, which was espoused by only a small, albeit vocal, minority of Italians, could easily be alleged to be guilty of all sorts of nefarious conspiracies. Not until Fascism had gained absolute control of the state did the Masons perceive their danger, and then it was too late. The great campaign of violence against the organization commenced in Florence in the autumn of 1925.[25] Soon the order was outlawed, and Grand Master Domizio Torrigiani of Florence was deported. Unwisely, Torrigiani later returned to Italy, whereupon he was arrested and confined on one of the prison islands.[26] Meanwhile the lodges dissolved their higher echelons in Italy; many Masons falsely denied any connection with their organiza-

---

23 *Cf.* G. A. Borgese, *Goliath: The March of Fascism* (New York, 1938), p. 277. Most Fascists, Catholics, and extreme Marxists opposed the Masonic order but for different reasons. Even the liberal, Benedetto Croce, was critical of the order.

24 Between 1919 and 1922 many Fascist groups were founded on the initiative of Masonic lodges, and the original "leftist" program of the Fascists in 1919 bore some similarities to the program of Italian Freemasonry. It also seems clear that a group of high Masons contributed 3,500,000 lire (about $130,000) toward the expenses of the March on Rome. *Cf.* Gaetano Salvemini, *The Fascist Dictatorship in Italy* (New York, 1927), pp. 129-130; and Eugenio Chiesa, *La Mano nel sacco* (Rome, 1925), p. 6.

25 Salvemini, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-130.

26 In 1930 a leader of the Italian Republican party, Eugenio Chiesa, became Grand Master of the *émigré* Masons. After Chiesa's death, Arturo Labriola, a leader of Italian syndicalist thought who was to make his peace with Fascism during the Ethiopian war, assumed the post. In a still later period Dr. Alessandro Tedeschi, a Jewish physician from Leghorn, became Grand Master. Tedeschi suffered persecution in France in 1940 at the hands of the Nazis. *Cf.* Nitti, *Rivelazioni*, pp. 435-443, and *passim*.

tion; but many others—and particularly those who were affiliated with the Mazzinian Republican party—emigrated to France. There they sought to reorganize the society and to keep it independent of both the French and English lodges. Despite the fact that individual Masons often displayed great personal courage, there does not appear to be much evidence that Italian Freemasonry, as an organization, played a leading *rôle* in the clandestine opposition to Fascism.[27] None the less, Fascist writers continued for almost two decades an unending stream of propaganda against Freemasonry, as if the outlawed Italian order represented the greatest danger to the régime.[28]

The third major phase of the anti-Fascist emigration began with the official announcement by the government in the autumn of 1926 of a series of draconian "exceptional decrees," which ended completely the possibility of legal internal political opposition and forced most of the principal officials of the opposition parties either to flee from the country or to risk being arrested.[29] As the government at the same time confiscated all passports that were then in circulation and set up a close patrol of the frontier, the political emigration henceforth was almost entirely clandestine in nature. Men of widely differing political viewpoints subordinated whatever personal jealousy or animosity that they might ordinarily have felt toward one another in order to assist their fellow expatriates. In the case of the Italian Socialist groups, the strategy that was followed involved the spiriting out of Italy of the older, more easily recognizable leaders; but the younger Socialists were often encouraged to remain behind, in the hope that they might organize underground resistance against Fascism. Many prominent Socialists escaped from Italy in romantic fashion. Filippo Turati, the septuagenarian leader of revisionary socialism, was evacuated by motorboat to Corsica, thanks to the help of Carlo Rosselli, Ferruccio Parri, and others. Claudio Treves, the Jewish political associate of Turati, escaped *via* Lake Como and Switzerland, as did Giuseppe Saragat, who was destined to become the ideological successor of both these men. Two other Socialists, Pietro Nenni and G. E. Modigliani, also made good their escapes over the mountains; the Republican party leaders, Eugenio Chiesa, Cipriano Facchinetti, and Raffaele Rosetti, did likewise.[30] One of the leaders of the left wing of the *Partito Popolare,* Avv. Francesco Luigi Ferrari of Modena,

---

[27] *Cf.* Nitti's considered judgment in *Rivelazioni,* p. 443.

[28] Mussolini was still denouncing the Freemasons in strident fashion when he wrote his final book: *Storia di un anno (Il Tempo del bastone e della carota)* (Verona, 1944).

[29] A series of attempts upon Mussolini's life provided the *Duce* with appropriate excuses for the "exceptional decrees."

[30] *Cf.* on this general subject Vera Modigliani, *Esilio* (Milan, 1946), pp. 31-74, and *passim;* also Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli,* I, 181, *et seq.*

fled to Belgium and eventually to Paris, where he founded and edited *Res Publica,* a politico-social review published in French that soon gained a worthy reputation.[31]

The leftist politicians encountered only limited success in reconstructing effectively their parties abroad. The pessimism and bitterness which many of them felt were made more painful by their dismay at the widespread friendliness and even admiration displayed by large numbers of foreigners toward Mussolini's totalitarian régime. Nevertheless, there were enough intransigent opponents of Fascism of either a moderate or of a left-of-center orientation who desired to consolidate their resources to make possible the formation in Paris in April 1927 of the *Concentrazione antifascista* ("Anti-Fascist Concentration"). The Communists—who at that time were not very numerous among the *émigrés*—refused to have any official connection with the *Concentrazione,* and for the most part the exiled representatives of the defunct Popular and Liberal groups also remained apart. The Concentration, therefore, was composed of the Maximalist Socialist party (*i.e.,* the more revolutionary-minded, but non-Communist faction of Italian Marxism); the revisionist Unitary Socialist party; the Republican party; members of the skeletal General Confederation of Labor, which had been reorganized abroad by its secretary, Bruno Buozzi; and members of the League of the Rights of Man, an anticlerical society headed by Luigi Campolonghi and linked with its French counterpart which sought to render assistance to the Italian refugees and to defend their rights before the French authorities. At first the Concentration pursued a prudent line of action which, in the main, was simply a reflection of the Aventinian program, for in the early phase of its existence the Concentration was dominated by democratic- and liberal-minded men who preferred to rely upon a constitutional method of opposition to Mussolini. They still hoped that the pre-Fascist type of parliamentary government might somehow be restored through constitutional means, and although they were not necessarily advocates of the monarchical system, they were reluctant to concede that the King might not in due course force the overthrow of Fascism. Probably it was this hope, feeble though it may have been, that explains the cautious tone of the early articles in the weekly newspaper of the Anti-Fascist Concentration, *La Libertà,* the first issue of which, edited by Claudio Treves, appeared May 1, 1927.[32] Within the Concentration, however, there was also present a more radical wing of anti-Fascism, made up of men who, for the most part, were very doubtful if any resolute action against Fascism would ever be taken by Victor Emmanuel III. Moreover,

31 Sturzo, "Il Partito Popolare: Note e ricordi," *loc. cit.,* pp. 30-31.

32 *Cf.* Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli,* I, 181-182.

many members of this group did not desire to restore the pre-Fascist, Giolittian type of political and economic organization; rather they sought to achieve a more "progressive," socialistic form of state and economic organization, as well as the abolition of the monarchy. Belonging to this latter school of thought was Pietro Nenni, who was named the first Secretary-General of the Anti-Fascist Concentration. Nenni, who was endowed with a fiery temperament that was not uncommon for one of Romagnole heredity, had one overriding purpose: to reunite along essentially maximalist and revolutionary principles the Italian Socialist movement, as he felt that the post-war schisms in this movement had been an important factor in making possible the rise to power of Fascism.[33]

Nenni persistently sought to bring the Concentration around to his views, and the course of events favored his program. In 1928 the Fascist Grand Council, without any apparent opposition from King Victor Emmanuel III, supererogated the sovereign's nominal right to name a successor to the Head of the Government, and the Grand Council even asserted the right to determine the nature of the monarchical succession.[34] This action at last made it clear to most of the *émigrés* that they could no longer look for any political support from the House of Savoy. Consequently, the Anti-Fascist Concentration assumed an openly republican stand. In 1930 Nenni's efforts to reunite the maximalist and revisionist wings of the Socialist movement were crowned with success, the party's new "charter of unity" calling for a more or less revisionist type of economic program but for a maximalist and revolutionary program of political action.[35] As a result of their amalgamation, the Socialists exercised greater control over the program of the Anti-Fascist Concentration than they had before.[36]

In general, it can be said that the Concentration helped to clear the atmosphere of the confusion that had enveloped the emigrants during their first months in France, and it afforded them a sounding-board for discussion of many of the fundamental political and economic problems confronting Italy. Although the Concentration had little direct communication with the clandestine groups in Italy, it did provide aid to certain Socialists, such as Fernando DeRosa and Sandro Pertini, who repeatedly

---

33 For Nenni's own discussion of the splits in the Italian Socialist party after the First World War, *cf.* his *Storia di quattro anni, 1919-1922* (Milan, 1946), *passim.*

34 Herman Finer, *Mussolini's Italy* (New York, 1935), pp. 278-285.

35 A tiny group of unreconciled maximalists remained separate and published intermittently the old Socialist newspaper, *Avanti!* The journalistic organ of the united Socialists henceforth was *Nuovo Avanti!,* edited in Paris by Nenni and others.

36 *Cf.* Angelica Balabanoff, *Ricordi di una socialista* (Rome, 1946), pp. 358-363; Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli,* I, 232; Carmelo Puglionisi, *Sciacalli, Storia dei fuorusciti* (Rome, 1948), pp. 96-97; and Wayland Hilton-Young, *The Italian Left: A Short History of Political Socialism in Italy* (London, 1949), p. 156.

sneaked across the frontier for the purpose of strengthening the echelons of their party in Italy.[37] There is little doubt that the Concentration was able to conduct some rather effective propaganda among Italian tourists who visited France and then returned to their Fascist homeland. To a limited degree, at least, the Concentration enticed some of the more radical veterans of the post-war civil strife away from communism, and it probably facilitated their training in democratic modes of action.[38] Lastly, the Concentration sought to restrain—and, in doing so, it met with fairly good success—some of the more exuberant *fuorusciti* from engaging in futile assassinations of Fascist officials abroad.[39]

Whatever financial subsidization the Concentration enjoyed came, for the most part, from foreign working-class groups, such as the New York Lady Garmentworkers Union, the Italian Society of Winterthur in Switzerland, a number of labor organizations in France, and from the International Transport Federation. In addition to the limited funds that it received from these sources, the Concentration obtained some income from the sale of its newspaper and from voluntary contributions by the emigrants. The Concentration, however, never had money to spare, as most of the emigrants had to earn their living by arduous means in a period of increasing economic difficulties. Only a very few of the emigrants—for example, Carlo Rosselli and Eugenio Chiesa—were able to get their private savings out of Italy in any substantial amount.[40]

In 1929 and in the early 1930's a steady stream of anti-Fascist intellectuals left their native land for political reasons;[41] but the most sensational single event was the daring escape from the prison island of Lipari

---

37 Modigliani, *Esilio,* pp. 193-194, *et seq.*

38 *Cf.* Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli,* I, 182-183.

39 The number of *attentats* committed abroad by anti-Fascists was not inconsiderable; but equally numerous were the arrests and harassments of the *émigrés* that resulted from the activities of Mussolini's *agents provocateurs,* who time after time penetrated the political organizations of the emigrants. An incomplete list of *attentats* against Fascist officials abroad is to be found in Ion S. Munro, *Through Fascism to World Power: A History of the Revolution in Italy* (London, 1933), pp. 200-203.

40 Garosci, "Italia: L'Emigrazione politica durante il fascismo," *Enciclopedia Italiana, Seconda Appendice, 1938-1948, I-Z,* p. 115.

41 For example, Guglielmo Ferrero managed to find refuge in Switzerland, where the University of Geneva appointed him Professor of Modern History. At Geneva Ferrero not only inspired admiration for Italian scholarship, but also maintained his home as a center of hospitality for all Italians in exile. Ferrero remained in Switzerland until his sudden death in August 1940. About the same time that Ferrero left Italy, other noted scholars and artists, including Giuseppe A. Borgese, Max Ascoli, Lionello Venturi, and Arturo Toscanini, severed their ties with their homeland and went to the United States and to Latin America to continue their anti-Fascist campaigns. *Cf.* Sforza, *Contemporary Italy,* pp. 329-330.

in 1929 of three outstanding political figures.[42] The first of these was Carlo Rosselli, thirty-year-old descendant of an Italian Jewish family which during the *Risorgimento* had rendered economic assistance to the republican cause of Mazzini.[43] As a student at the University of Florence, Rosselli had gained considerable notoriety for his courageous publication in 1925 of the clandestine anti-Fascist paper, *Non mollare!* ("Don't give in!").[44] The next year he had collaborated with Pietro Nenni in Milan in the publication of *Quarto Stato* ("Fourth Estate"), a short-lived socialist review which advocated a political program that was based primarily on insurrection and an economic program that was founded on principles of reformist socialism.[45] As has previously been noted, Rosselli assisted Filippo Turati to escape by motorboat to Corsica in December 1926. Unwisely, Rosselli returned to the Italian mainland, whereupon he was promptly arrested.[46] Confined on Lipari for two years, Rosselli passed his time writing *Socialismo liberale,* a tract which represented a significant milestone in his intellectual development. The other members of the escaping trio from Lipari were Emilio Lussu, a Sardinian radical who formerly had been a member of Parliament, and Francesco Fausto Nitti, a nephew of the former Prime Minister.

Upon their safe arrival in Paris in 1929, these men, with the assistance of a few other *émigrés* who had preceded them there, organized a "supra-party" current which they christened *Giustizia e Libertà* ("Justice and Liberty"). This movement sought to combine in its somewhat abstract program the most useful aspects of revisionist socialism and traditional liberalim—the relative emphasis on the one or the other varying substantially from time to time.[47] In some respects Justice and Liberty was the most significant anti-Fascist clandestine movement, as it served as a leaven for many of the older groups. Rosselli, who was certainly brilliant though somewhat erratic, represented the socialistic and, at times, almost anarchistic proclivity in Justice and Liberty. Lussu, a Sardinian firebrand, spoke up for the intransigent advocates of republicanism and of regional self-government.[48] Nitti, as well as Tarchiani, the one-time editor of *Corriere della Sera,* reflected the more orthodox democratic and liberal tendencies within the movement. All of the directors were influential on the course of

[42] Regarding the escape, *cf.* Carlo Rosselli, *Scritti politici e autobiografici* (Naples, 1944); Emilio Lussu, "The Flight from Lipari," *Atlantic Monthly,* CL (July 1930); and F. F. Nitti, *Flucht* (Potsdam, n.d.); and Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli,* I, 159-172.

[43] Garosci, *op. cit.,* I, 11, *et seq.*

[44] *Ibid.,* I, 53-54; *cf.* also *supra,* n. 15.

[45] *Ibid.,* I, 72.

[46] Ferruccio Parri, a Milanese republican, helped Rosselli in the enterprise. Although he was subjected to much harassment, Parri remained in Italy. He took a very active part in the Resistance during World War II, and served for a few months as Premier in 1945.

Justice and Liberty, but Rosselli doubtless exerted the greatest degree of control over the movement, for in a very real sense it was his personal fortune that subsidized the organization. In the first year or two of its existence, Rosselli kept his movement distinct from those Italian political parties which, at least in his estimation, had become permanently vitiated by their *rôles* during the Aventinian *débâcle*. In its early phase, too, Justice and Liberty did not shrink from engaging in acts of physical violence against its Fascist enemies, and it sponsored numerous daring airplane flights over Italian cities for the purpose of dropping anti-Fascist leaflets and awakening the population from its political torpor. In this manner, the *Giellisti*—as members of *Giustizia e Libertà* were called, because of the pronunciation of the initials, "G.L."—captured the imagination of many somnolent anti-Fascists and won for themselves a kind of heroic reputation. In July 1930, for example, Justice and Liberty subsidized the flight over Milan of Giovanni Bassanesi, who was at that time president of the Italian League of the Rights of Man. Bassanesi was not a trained aviator, and his small craft was not designed for such a hazardous flight. None the less, he managed to surmount the Alps and to circle over Milan for twenty minutes, dropping manifestos in broad daylight. On the return trip Bassanesi crashed in the Swiss Alps, whereupon he was arrested temporarily by the Swiss police. In view of his aerial mishaps, it was hardly surprising that Bassanesi subsequently became mentally unbalanced.[49]

By 1930 Justice and Liberty had established numerous clandestine groups in Italy, especially in the northern cities. Undoubtedly, the most

[47] Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli*, I, 198, *et seq.*

[48] After his arrival in Paris, Lussu published numerous political tracts against Fascism, the first of them appearing in 1929 under the title, *La Catena* [republished in Rome, 1945].

[49] *Cf.* Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli*, I, 212-215, and *passim*. A somewhat analogous episode occurred the following year when the newly organized, pro-monarchical, but anti-Fascist clandestine *Alleanza Nazionale* ("National Alliance") promoted a flight over Rome by the gifted 29-year-old poet, Lauro DeBosis. DeBosis, who had won the Olympic Prize for Poetry at Amsterdam in 1928 for his lyrical drama, *Icaro*, and who had taught at Harvard University one summer, spent a few weeks learning how to pilot an airplane. After having "soloed" about five hours, DeBosis on October 3, 1931, flew from Marseilles to Rome, but on his return trip he apparently crashed in the sea near Corsica. Before the flight, and in anticipation of his failure to return, DeBosis wrote in French *The Story of My Death*, subsequently translated into English and published by the Oxford University Press in 1933. A foreign journalist in Rome described DeBosis' audacious flight over the capital in these words:

> He reached Rome at 8 P.M. He remained about half an hour over the city; . . . he flew very low over the streets, and in places it seemed as if snow had fallen, so thickly were the leaflets strewn. He dropped them into the laps of spectators at an open-air cinema, and among the tables of cafés in the squares. One spectator recounted that the plane seemed to be mounting the Spanish Steps. . . .

Quoted in Sforza, *Contemporary Italy*, pp. 326-327.

important center was Milan, thanks to yeoman work there by Ferruccio Parri, Riccardo Bauer, and Ernesto Rossi. Hoping to take advantage of the current economic distress, these men endeavored to organize a popular demonstration against Fascist tax collectors. Unduly optimistic, they believed that such agitation would win the sympathy of all classes of Italians and would result perhaps in a mass movement to overthrow the totalitarian régime. With the help of several chemists they prepared incendiary bombs, which were to be planted in government tax offices; but, as was almost always the case with such schemes, the Fascist police soon learned of the plot and arrested some twenty-four of the Milanese *Giellisti*.[50] After the suppression of the Milanese group, the *Giellisti* in Turin became the most active directors of clandestine resistance to Fascism in Italy. Most of the Torinese leaders considered isolated acts of violence to be futile, and insisted rather on the necessity of slow but continuous subversion of Fascism from within.[51]

It was freely conceded by almost all the *émigrés* that Justice and Liberty by 1931 had organized more effective underground groups than had any of the other anti-Fascist movements. Confident of its own strength, Justice and Liberty began to regard the Anti-Fascist Concentration in Paris with greater equanimity and moderated the tone of its criticism of the traditional parties. In fact in 1931 Justice and Liberty's leaders perceived that certain advantages might be derived if they were to affiliate with the Concentration—the principal benefit for the *Giellisti* being the opportunity for them to contribute articles to the Concentration's widely read newspaper, *La Libertà*. Consequently, Rosselli led his group into that bloc of *émigré* political parties.[52] The Concentration welcomed the entry of Justice and Liberty and accorded it almost *carte blanche* authority to direct clandestine anti-Fascist activities in Italy; in return, Justice and Liberty promised to dissolve most of its own independent organizations in France and to allow the Concentration to direct over-all anti-Fascist strategy outside of Italy.[53] The "honeymoon" era quickly ended, however. The tiny but venerable Republican party, whose Mazzinian program in some respects had been copied by Rosselli's group, became particularly jealous of Justice and Liberty. As was often the case in the era of *fuoruscitismo*, exaggerated sensitivities and suspicions were rampant among factions which, in reality, had much in common. Unquestionably, though, the Republicans had some

---

50 Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli*, I, 215-223.

51 *Cf.* the discussion by Garosci, who was a member of the Torinese group, in *ibid.*, I, 195-230.

52 *Ibid.*, I, 243, *et seq.*

53 Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli*, I, 245, and *passim.*

cause for grievance, as Justice and Liberty did not live up completely to the agreement that it had struck with the Concentration, whereby the latter was to have full authority over the supervision of anti-Fascist activities abroad. As a result of the disharmony, the Republicans withdrew from the Concentration in March 1932, but re-entered it a year later.[54]

By that date the Concentration had entered its final crisis. Much of the blame for the promotion of discord within the *bloc* must be assigned to the bickering of the Republicans and *Giellisti,* but there were other factors that also contributed to the fatal weakening of the Concentration. For example, the Socialist party, which had been reconsolidated in 1930 and which had formed the backbone of the Anti-Fascist Concentration, was itself in critical condition by 1933. Filippo Turati, the honored leader of Italian revisionary Marxism, died on May 29, 1932, and his colleague, Claudio Treves, died on June 19, 1933.[55] Unlike the more orthodox Marxists, both of these men had favored friendly and close collaboration with other democratic but non-socialist groups. After their deaths, Pietro Nenni, who was a much more unpredictable and volatile sort of Marxist, emerged as the leader of the unified Italian Socialist party. In the period from 1932 to 1934 Nenni slowly reversed many of the basic policies of Turati and Treves, and thus fanned the smouldering embers of disunity in the Concentration. Nenni believed in short-term support of the Concentration by the Socialists, but he did not necessarily favor permanent collaboration with the Republicans, the *Giellisti,* and the League of the Rights of Man. Moreover, Nenni was anxious to bring about a *rapprochement* between the Socialists and the Communists, a policy which by no means met with the immediate favor of other members of the Concentration. Perhaps of even more importance in causing the disintegration of the Concentration was the contemporary international situation. Fascism in its militant aspects was no longer restricted to the Italian peninsula. By 1934 forces of a fascistic nature were on the offensive all over Europe: Hitler had won power in Germany; Social Democracy had suffered severe setbacks in Austria, France, and some other countries; Mussolini was preparing his plans to expand Italy's colonial empire in Africa. Judging itself inadequate to coordinate the international aspects of the enlarged struggle against fascistic forces,

---

54 *Ibid.,* I, 260-263. Some of the jealousy between the *Giellisti* and members of the older parties was increased when Justice and Liberty undertook the publication of several distinguished pamphlets of a serious nature: *Quaderni di Giustizia e Libertà* (Brussels and Paris, 1932-1935). An Italian-language newspaper, *Giustizia e Libertà.* was published in Paris from 1934 until 1937.

55 For a serviceable biography of Turati, *cf.* Giovanni Mariotti, *Filippo Turati* (Florence, 1946).

the faction-ridden Italian Anti-Fascist Concentration dissolved itself on May 5, 1934.[56]

Until 1934 the Italian Communists, like their cousins elsewhere, declined to collaborate with other anti-Fascist parties, and the Communist "line" called for the smearing of such groups with the opprobrious label, "Social-Fascist collaborators." By 1934, however, the Communists all over the world belatedly began to realize the advantages to be gained from alliances with democratic—and particularly with socialist—forces in the struggle against the expanding Fascist and Nazi movements. The era of the Popular Front was at hand.

As an official party, Italian Communism dated its birth in January 1921, when it split away from the Italian Socialist party at the latter's Seventeenth Congress held at Leghorn. The Italian Communists adhered wholeheartedly to the "twenty-one points" that the Third International in Moscow had prescribed for membership therein.[57] The principal founder of the Italian Communist party was the Torinese intellectual, Antonio Gramsci, who eventually displaced such important early rivals as the Neapolitan, Amedeo Bordiga, and the Romagnole, Nicola Bombacci. Gramsci was born in 1891 in Sardinia of a poor farming family. He joined the Socialist movement on the island when he was less than twenty years of age; shortly thereafter he moved to Turin, where he proceeded to work his way through the university. After being graduated with distinction, Gramsci spent the war years as a socialist organizer in Turin, popularizing among the factory workers the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." As soon as he heard the news of the successful October Revolution in Russia, he undertook the organization in the Fiat plants in Turin of *consigli di fabbrica* (factory councils). More or less analogous to the Russian *soviets,* these *consigli* were designed to represent on a proportional basis the various departments within the factory and to serve as agencies which would parallel and rival the traditional political institutions of Italy. Gramsci believed that these factory councils, when properly linked together over the whole

---

[56] Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli,* II, 42-47. A few days after the dissolution of the Concentration, Justice and Liberty started to publish its own newspaper in Paris.

[57] Among the useful sources that may be consulted on the rise of the Italian Communist party, *cf.* Roberto Michels, *Storia critica del movimento socialista italiano* (Florence, 1926); Giacomo Perticone, *Storia del socialismo* (Rome, 1945); Rinaldo Rigola, *Storia del movimento operaio italiano* (Milan, 1947); Leo Valiani, *Storia del socialismo nel secolo xx° (1900-1944), saggio critico* (Florence, 1945); Federico Ricci [pseudonym for Leo Valiani], "I Movimenti proletari in Italia," *Quaderni Italiani* (Boston-New York, August 1942), pp. 7-25; Aldo Garosci's chapter on the Italian Communist party in Mario Einaudi, ed., *Communism in Western Europe* (Ithaca, 1951); Panfilo Gentile, *Cinquanta anni di socialismo in Italia* (Milan, 1948); and Wayland Hilton-Young, *The Italian Left: A Short History of Political Socialism in Italy* (London, 1949).

country, would serve as the means for the revolutionary seizure of power.[58] With the assistance of Angelo Tasca, Palmiro Togliatti, Umberto Terracini, and others, Gramsci founded in Turin in May 1919 the influential newspaper, *Ordine nuovo* ("New Order"), which immediately provided the impetus for an important political movement bearing the same title. It was primarily the *Ordinovisti* who formed the distinct Communist party at the Leghorn congress in 1921.

By 1924 the Communist party began to establish roots in southern Italy, but its principal strongholds remained the industrial zones of northwestern Italy and the regions of Tuscany and Emilia. The party came increasingly to be organized on a cellular basis among factories and occupational groups, in much the same fashion as its Russian prototype, but the Italian Communists were slower to organize the peasantry than were their Russian tutors. After the election of April 1924 the party held eighteen seats in Parliament, and following the assassination of Matteotti, these eighteen Communists joined the parliamentary anti-Fascist *bloc,* but only for a brief period. On June 15, 1924, the executive committee of the party called for a general strike and for a "single front" to be made up of all anti-Fascists.[59] But when this plan was rejected a few days later by the other anti-Fascists, the Communists returned to the floor of Parliament, where they smugly denounced both Fascism and the impotent liberal and socialist opposition. Although Communists subsequently boasted that they alone after the Matteotti assassination had preached revolutionary action, they well knew that they did not exercise sufficient influence over the mass of the population to permit them to embark successfully on such a program.[60]

In early 1925 while the Fascist offensive against the opposition parties neared its climax, the increasingly powerful Gramsci faction within the Communist party conducted its own attack against Bordiga and Bombacci. Among other things, Gramsci's followers accused Bordiga and Bombacci of being more interested in expansive world revolution than in the immediate problem of strengthening the cellular organization of the Italian Communist party in the factories.[61] The real core of the intraparty dispute,

58 On the factory councils, *cf.* especially Federico Ricci [pseudonym for Leo Valiani], "I consigli dei lavoratori," *Quaderni Italiani No. 3* (Boston-New York, April 1943), pp. 202-204; Pierlandi, "Esperienze di Commissioni di fabbrica in Italia," *Quaderni Italiani No. 3,* pp. 213-221; and Palmiro Togliatti, *Gramsci* (Rome, 1948), *passim.*

59 Partito Comunista Italiano, *Per la Libertà e l'indipendenza d'Italia: Relazione della Direzione del Partito Comunista Italiano al V° Congresso* (Rome, 1945), pp. 1-4.

60 *Cf.* Giuseppe Turcato, *"Il Partito Comunista Italiano,"* in Giovanni Gambarin, ed., *I Partiti dell'Italia nuova* (Venice, 1945), p. 31.

61 The "errors" of *Bordighismo,* as the "heresy" was termed, were eight in number. They are listed in Giulio Trevisani, ed., *Piccola Enciclopedia del Socialismo e del Comunismo (2nd ed.)* (Rome, 1948), p. 35.

however, lay in the fact that Bordiga had opposed the party's servile acceptance of the Comintern's twenty-one points. Bordiga could not reconcile himself to the notion that the Italian party must blindly take its orders from Moscow.[62] Whatever the merits of the charges and countercharges, the Gramsci faction was able to appoint an enlarged executive committee of the party in 1925, which ratified a report containing denunciations of the "narrow sectarian" and "Trotskyist" heretics.[63] After some eleven months of debate in the party cells, the Communist leaders decided to hold a secret congress outside Fascist Italy for the purpose of settling the political fate of the accused. Almost all of the delegates to this congress, which met in Lyons in January 1926, had to depart from and return to Italy undercover. The Lyons congress promptly expelled Bordiga from the party central committee, and at the same time it recognized Antonio Gramsci as the undisputed party leader.[64]

The enactment by Fascist authorities in November 1926 of the "exceptional decrees" made possible the prompt arrests of thousands of Italian Communists, including Gramsci, Terracini, Scoccimarro, and many other party officials. A series of trials in 1928 resulted in long terms of imprisonment for most of these men and in the temporary collapse of the Communist underground apparatus in Italy. In prison Gramsci's health was seriously undermined by his treatment during the first months, but his spirit was never broken. During some of the years of his confinement he had to be hospitalized, and thanks either to the indifference or to the inefficiency of his guards, he was often able to obtain and read a large number of books on a wide range of subjects. Gramsci even found time to write several philosophical and political essays, the most important of which was an attempt to reconcile the philosophy of Benedetto Croce with that of Karl Marx.[65] By an ironic twist of fate, on April 27, 1937—just a few hours before his scheduled release from prison—Gramsci died from the effects of uremic poisoning, which had been caused or at least aggravated

---

62 *Cf.* Ricci, "I movimenti proletari in Italia," *loc. cit.*, pp. 17-22.

63 The report was prepared by Mauro Scoccimarro, who was one of Gramsci's principal lieutenants and who was also Italian representative in the Comintern.

64 *Relazione della Direzione del P.C.I. al V° Congresso,* pp. 1-7. Although Bordiga remained a party member until 1929 he no longer exercised any power. Bordiga stayed in Italy, and after 1943 he openly led a small Trotskyist faction in Naples. Bombacci in later years not only moved out of Communist ranks, but became a Fascist hierarch. Along with Mussolini he met his death at the hands of the partisans near Lake Como in April 1945.

65 By devious means, Gramsci was able to transmit his many pages of notes to members of the party, who faithfully preserved and published them in Turin in 1948 under the title: *Il Materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce.* Croce, not unexpectedly,

by the prison environment.[66] After 1937 Palmiro Togliatti, who had been the *de facto* party head during Gramsci's imprisonment, assumed full leadership of the underground party, but Togliatti, of course, had to remain outside Italy from 1926 until 1944.

Following the arrests and conviction of most of the principal Communist leaders by the Fascist authorities in 1928, the Communist movement in Italy had reached its lowest ebb. In France the Italian working-class emigrants who were of communistic orientation usually inserted themselves as "Italian language groups" within the French Communist party. A "foreign committee" was organized in Paris to maintain a channel of communication with Communist parties elsewhere in Europe, and most of the literature that was distributed through the few surviving Communist cells in Italy was printed in Paris. In that city Communist *émigrés* published in 1928 the first issue of the "theoretical" journal, *Stato operaio* ("Workers' State"), which continued to appear without interruption until August 1939; somewhat later the Italian party published the newspaper, *Vita operaia* ("Workers' Life") in Paris. In addition to these, the Communists printed numerous pamphlets and broadsides which the party members distributed as best they could in Italy; but this activity was not as effective as it ought to be, for in a reprimand from the Twelfth Plenum of the Comintern's Executive Committee, the Italian Communist party was exhorted to:

> . . . Come out from underground by developing the mass struggle against the Fascist dictatorship on the basis of the defense of the everyday interests of the toilers, taking advantage of Fascist meetings, organizing impromptu meetings in the factories, penetrating into the Fascist trade unions, cultural and cooperative organizations, preparing and carrying on strikes and demonstrations . . . Mass illegal work must be increased to the maximum extent.[67]

The Italians tried to carry out this order, but to a great extent, as

---

has declined to agree with the validity of Gramsci's contentions. Nevertheless, Gramsci's essays are important and represent a significant contribution to Marxist literature. In addition to the title cited, five or six other books by Gramsci have been published posthumously. In all of them there is strong evidence of the traditionally powerful humanistic influence of Italian scholarship. For this reason, some contemporary observers, including Count Sforza, have wondered whether Gramsci, if he had been permitted to live beyond the era of Fascism, might not in time have repeated the kind of intellectual evolution that detached from extreme Marxism such Italians as Antonio Labriola, Benedetto Croce, and Ignazio Silone. (*Cf., e.g.,* Sforza, *Contemporary Italy,* p. 330.) Obviously, this must remain in the realm of speculation; certainly Gramsci could hardly have been expected to desert Marxism during the years when he was one of the most prominent victims of Fascist persecution.

66 *Cf.* Togliatti, *Gramsci,* p. 58; L. Lombardo—Radice and G. Carbone, *Vita di Antonio Gramsci* (Rome, 1951), pp. 231-233, *et seq.* It is likely that the Fascist leaders would have preferred to let Gramsci die a free man.

67 Quoted in Martin Ebon, *World Communism Today* (New York, 1948), p. 233.

both Togliatti and Georgi Dimitrov acknowledge, they "did not immediately understand all these tasks. [The party] failed to change its slogans, its methods of work and forms of organization with the necessary rapidity. This tardiness was utilized by Fascism and cost the party heavy losses."[68]

Without much concern for the facts, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928 facilely lumped together Fascism and Social Democracy, more or less equating them, at least for propaganda purposes.[69] This distortion of the realities was not approved by a few Italian Communists, who perhaps understood the true nature of Fascism better than did their distant Russian preceptors. In any event, in 1929 and 1930 several Italian Communists became thoroughly skeptical of the wisdom of Moscow's attitude toward the non-communist yet anti-Fascist groups. Among the hitherto loyal comrades who voiced such doubts were Angelo Tasca, who had helped Gramsci found *Ordine nuovo,* and Ignazio Silone, who was soon to achieve world-wide fame as a novelist. After his breach with Communism Tasca adopted the pseudonym, "Angelo Rossi," and devoted himself to historical research on the subjects of Fascism and of Communism.[70] After they had turned in their Communist party cards, both Silone ane Tasca transferred their allegiance to revisionary socialism.[71]

Early in 1934 the Communist party began to alter its position of implacable hostility to the other anti-Fascist groups. The abortive *coup d'état* undertaken by various right-wing groups in France in February of that year helped lead to a reversal of party policy. The French Communists evidently made the first move in the direction of *rapprochement* with the Socialists. Soon thereafter, Italian Communist *émigrés* sent a message to Italian Socialists in which they proposed the erection of a "common front" against Fascism. At last, on August 17, 1934—three months after the dissolution of the Anti-Fascist Concentration—representatives of the Italian Socialist and Communist parties signed their first pact for unity of action. The preamble of the agreement read:

> . . . On the broad level of principles and of judgments regarding the international situation, there remain between the two [parties] fundamental dif-

---

68 *Cf.* Georgi Dimitrov, "The Tenth Anniversary of *Stato Operaio,*" in *The United Front, the Struggle against Fascism and War* (New York, 1938), pp. 221-222; and Togliatti, *Gramsci,* p. 54.

69 Regarding the Comintern Congress, *cf.* Franz Borkenau, *World Communism: A History of the Communist International* (New York, 1939), Chapter 20; Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin, A Political Biography* (New York, 1949), pp. 402-405; and Ebon, *World Communism Today,* pp. 20-22.

70 He has written, *e.g., The Rise of Italian Fascism, 1918-1922* (London, 1938), and *Physiologie du Parti Comuniste français* (Paris, 1948).

71 *Cf.* Silone's own explanation in his essay contained in Richard Crossman, ed., *The God that Failed* (New York, 1949), p. 101.

ferences as to doctrine, methods, and tactics, which are a barrier to a general political front . . . and organic fusion.[72]

Neither party, therefore, renounced its basic principles, but an understanding was reached on secondary matters, and henceforth Communist elements remained in the vanguard of the new "front" organizations that began to sprout up. Although many Socialists remained suspicious of the sincerity of the Communists' collaboration, most groups found mutual advantages to be derived from the united front against the common enemy, and Pietro Nenni was even enthusiastic over the prospects of close cooperation with the Communists.[73]

Following the outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian war, the Socialist-Communist *bloc* promoted a congress of the Second International at Brussels on October 12-13, 1935, to denounce Fascist aggression. The congress won the adherence of most Italian Republican party *émigrés*. moderate anarchists, Freemasons, and the non-party members of the League of the Rights of Man, all of whom accepted the platform of the congress which favored the imposition of economic sanctions against Italy by the League of Nations.[74] A telegram which the congress sent to Edouard Beneš at Geneva demanded that the president of the League Council undertake a program of sanctions.[75] It is certainly debatable whether the policy of sanctions adopted by the League helped the anti-Fascist cause. It is possible that the intensified nationalistic fervor which was aroused in Italy by this foreign intervention made it easier for Mussolini and Ciano to link Rome and Berlin in the Axis in 1936.[76] In any event, Italy went ahead with the war against Ethiopia.

---

72 Quoted in Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli,* II, 111.

73 In August 1935 the Seventh Congress of the Comintern gave its approval to the "twist in the line" which the French and Italian parties had already effected. At that congress Dimitrov again criticized the Italian Communists for not having more successfully infiltrated the various Fascist "mass organizations." *Cf.* Dimitrov, *The United Front,* pp. 47-53.

74 Justice and Liberty did not take as clearcut a position on the matter of sanctions as did the other anti-Fascist groups. Rosselli indicated that he was not personally opposed to sanctions, but he voiced grave doubts as to whether such a program was really desired by revolutionary groups in Italy. Garosci, *op. cit.,* II, 124-130.

75 The telegram was signed by Communist Egidio Gennari, Socialist G. E. Modigliani, and League of the Rights of Man President Luigi Campolonghi. At the time of the Brussels congress the Italian Communists decided to dispatch to Africa several youth leaders to organize sabotage within the Italian armed forces. *Cf.* Partito Comunista Italiano, *Velio Spano* (Rome, 1947), pp. 1-15.

76 Regarding the formation of the Axis, *cf.* Mario Toscano, *Le origini del patto d'acciaio* (Florence, 1948), and Elizabeth Wiskemann, *The Rome-Berlin Axis* (Oxford, 1949). It is worthy of note that the patriotic emotions evoked among the overwhelming majority of Italians by the Ethiopian war caused several erstwhile anti-Fascists, including the syndicalist Arturo Labriola, to make their peace with Fascism and to return to their homeland.

Two months after the end of the Ethiopian war another conflict broke out, a war that was to be even more serious than the one in Africa. Spanish military and reactionary groups revolted on July 18, 1936, against the constituted government of the Spanish Republic, and within a few weeks the rebels were assured of military support from Mussolini, and, on a much smaller scale, from Hitler. Appeals by the Spanish Republican government to the League of Nations brought little in the way of comfort. During the first couple of months when the Spanish Republican government was headed by a liberal republican, Jose Giral, the "line" of the French and of the Italian Communist groups did not call for all-out support of Madrid, but only for the forwarding of medicine and supplies to the Spanish Loyalists.[77] However, after the formation of the left-wing Socialist government of Largo Caballero in September 1936, the European Communists offered full-scale military assistance to it.[78] Even prior to September 1936, though, thousands of anti-Fascist volunteers, coming from many countries and representing almost every shade of political belief, had begun to cross the Pyrenees in order to fight alongside the Loyalists. As the number of foreign volunteers in Spain rapidly increased, it became imperative to organize them into regular units and to select a supreme commander. Thus in September 1936 the Italian Socialists and Communists in Paris called a meeting of various anti-Fascist organizations to decide upon a commander for the Italian contingent, who would possess military capacity and political popularity. For reasons of international politics, the Communists at this time were not anxious to exaggerate their own *rôle* in the intervention. Consequently, a Communist delegate suggested that Randolfo Pacciardi, a prominent Republican party *émigré,* be appointed military commander of the nascent Italian contingent.[79] The appointment of a Republican to a post of leadership in the military organization of the Popular Front would have the effect of emphasizing the reality and the seriousness of that Front. The representatives of Justice and Liberty at the Paris meeting declined to consolidate their own military groups in Spain with those of the Popular Front, because the latter were concerned primarily with the defense of the embattled socialistic Madrid government of Largo Caballero, whereas Justice and Liberty was more closely identified

---

77 Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli,* II, 163.

78 In the spring of 1936 *Pravda* had hailed Largo Caballero as the "Spanish Lenin." Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish Labyrinth* (New York, 1943), p. 303.

79 Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli,* II, 203. After his departure from Italy in the 1920's Pacciardi had been active politically among the Italian emigrant workers in Alsace-Lorraine.

with the anarcho-syndicalist groups of Catalonia who had little love for the Madrid government.[80]

In October 1936 a further step was taken by the Communists, when they drew up the definitive organizational pattern of the so-called "international brigades." Among the most authoritative Italian Communists who participated in these decisions were Luigi Longo and Giuseppe Di Vittorio. The "international brigades" were composed of officers and soldiers who came from a great many countries and who were predominantly workers, artisans, and farmers. Probably not more than one-fifth of them had ever seen military service before. Most of them were over thirty years of age, intelligent, quick to learn new skills and languages, and filled with an abundance of determination. Alongside the military commandant of each brigade was a political commissar, whose tasks included the political indoctrination of the soldiers, the spreading of propaganda, and often the surveillance of the military leaders. Most of the political commissars were members of the Communist party, as that party sensed the vital importance of this post faster than did the other political groups.[81] Throughout the war the echelons remained "fluid"; commissars sometimes became military commanders, while sergeants were often promoted overnight to officer status, and *vice versa*.[82] It has been estimated that, all told, about 22,200 members of the "international brigades" fought in Spain.[83] The First International Brigade was made up of three battalions, one of which was composed of Italians and Frenchmen. This battalion fought in the epic defense of Madrid in 1936-1937. The Second International Brigade also included an Italian battalion, the "Garibaldi," led by Pacciardi. Luigi Longo served as political commissar of the entire Second Brigade after February 1937.[84] Pacciardi's "Garibaldi battalion" had its baptism of fire on November 13, 1936, at Cerro de los Angeles near Madrid, and in March 1937 it took part in the famous battle at Guadalajara, where it won a victory over Italian Fascist troops who had been despatched to Spain by Mussolini to help Franco's insurgents. After April 1937 the "Garibaldi battalion"

80 A primary source of information on Italian participation on the side of the Loyalists in the Spanish Civil War is *Quaderni italiani No. 3* (Boston, April 1943), almost the entire issue being dedicated to a study of the subject. Included are lists of the volunteers who lost their lives in the conflict.

81 Randolfo Pacciardi, "Quando si sta con i comunisti," in Rome *La Voce Repubblicana* (March 27, 1949); *cf.* also Julio Alvarez del Vayo, *Freedom's Battle* (New York, 1946), pp. 124-129.

82 *Cf.* Randolfo Pacciardi, *Il Battaglione Garibaldi: Volontari italiani nella Spagna repubblicana* (Rome, 1945), *passim,* and Luigi Longo, *Un Popolo alla macchia* (Verona, 1947), pp. 24-28.

83 Salvador de Madariaga, *Spain* (New York, 1943), p. 386.

84 Lesser "commissars" included Giuseppe DiVittorio, Pietro Nenni, Francesco Leone, Ilio Barontini, and several others.

was augmented by the addition to it of several Spanish units, and the name of the contingent was changed to "Garibaldi brigade."[85]

Prior to the arrival of the "international brigades," members of Justice and Liberty, as well as various Italian Trotskyist and anarchist groups, were fighting in Catalonia in collaboration with the anarcho-syndicalist elements of the Catalan *Confederación Nacional de Trabajo.* This Italian "column" was composed of about one hundred fifty men and was under the joint leadership of Carlo Rosselli and Mario Angeloni, the latter an ex-cavalry captain and member of the Republican party.[86] The column possessed four brand-new machine-guns, which it had stolen, and twenty-four magnificent mules.[87] At Monte Pelato, south of Huesca, the column won a notable vistory only forty days after the outbreak of the war; however, in so doing it lost one-tenth of its members on the field of battle. After the arrival of the international brigades, Rosselli's group suffered numerous desertions, and in order to retain control over his unit, Rosselli tried to introduce greater military discipline by the utilization of "political commissars." Notwithstanding, the military successes of Rosselli and his associates in Catalonia declined during the ensuing months. Following the curious *coup d'état* in Barcelona in May 1937, which marked the end of anarcho-syndicalist prevalence in Catalonia and the substitution therefor of Popular Front domination, it became almost impossible for Rosselli to continue military operations separately from the Popular Front.[88] In any event, Rosselli needed to recuperate from sickness, and he departed for France in the early summer of 1937.

At the resort of Bagnoles, Carlo Rosselli was joined by his brother, Nello, a noted historian, who had remained in Italy during most of the Fascist dictatorship. On June 10, 1937, the two brothers were murdered near the resort. Investigations completed after the overthrow of Fascism demonstrated clearly that Mussolini had been very much annoyed by Rosselli's years of clandestine opposition, and that the *Duce* had feared that Rosselli might somehow launch a military offensive against the Italian government. The assassination plot was worked out by Italian Fascist agents and French *Cagoulards* after they had received general orders on the subject from Foreign Minister Count Ciano, orders which were transmitted

---

85 Pacciardi, *Il Battaglione Garibaldi, passim.*

86 Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli,* II, 174-176. Angeloni lost his life in the Spanish Civil War.

87 Umberto Calosso, *The Twenty-Year Struggle in Italy against Fascism* (London, 1944), p. 39.

88 Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli,* II, 162, *et seq.* In the bitter street fighting in Barcelona one of the most outstanding Italian anarchists of this century, Camillo Berneri, was assassinated—apparently by Communists. *Cf.* A. Fochi Berneri, *Con tè, figlio mio!* (Parma, 1948), *passim.*

through the Italian Army's Counter Intelligence Service (S.I.M.).[89] The crowd which attended the funeral of the two Rosselli brothers in Paris was numbered in the tens of thousands.[90] Only the assassination of Giacomo Matteotti in 1924 had aroused greater chagrin among the Italian anti-Fascists than this crime.

Meanwhile, the military activities of the international brigades in Spain gradually subsided. The Spanish Loyalists, with the approval of the Soviet government, hoped that if the international brigades could be made less obvious, it might be possible for the Loyalists to persuade General Franco to repudiate the foreign Fascist "volunteers" who were aiding the insurgents. Thus in September 1938 Premier Negrín announced that, forthwith, all non-Spanish combatants taking part in the struggle on the Loyalist side would be withdrawn.[91] By January and February 1939 many of the components of the international brigades were interned temporarily, but often with considerable hardship, in camps in France and in Algeria.[92] Eventually, the majority of the anti-Fascist volunteers returned to their points of origin.[93]

All told, some 5,000 Italian volunteers had fought in Spain on the side of the Loyalists, and, of these, six or seven hundred had been killed, and perhaps two thousand had been wounded.[94] Most of the volunteers had been imbued with great idealism; they had viewed the Spanish conflict as a necessary phase of the worldwide struggle against fascistic forces, and more particularly as the first military battle against Italian Fascism. Carlo Rosselli's slogan, "Today in Spain, tomorrow in Italy!" (*"Oggi in Spagna,*

---

89 Gaetano Salvemini, "L'Affare Rosselli," in Rome *Il Mondo,* III (1951), June 16, 23, 30, 1951. *Cf.* also Garosci, *op. cit.,* II, 283.

90 Paris *Giustizia e Libertà,* June 25, 1937.

91 Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941* (London, 1947-49), II, 28-38.

92 New York *Times* correspondent Herbert L. Matthews has described the withdrawal of the international brigades in his book, *The Education of a Correspondent* (New York, 1946), pp. 140-142 and 181-192.

93 Palmiro Togliatti, at that time Secretary of the Mediterranean Section of the Comintern, was in Spain during much of the civil war. After the collapse of anti-Franco resistance in Catalonia in January 1939, Togliatti flew to Madrid. He arrived there at the moment Loyalist General Casado led a military *coup d'état* (March 5, 1939) against the Negrín government, as a necessary preparatory step to signing an armistice with the Franco forces. Togliatti was arrested by General Casado, and the Italian narrowly escaped execution at the hands of his erstwhile comrades, it appears. When the Communists in Madrid learned of Casado's military *coup,* they rose in fierce opposition to the peace move; some nine thousand people were killed in this civil war within a civil war. Togliatti managed to escape to Algeria and later to France, where he was interned for a few weeks by French authorities. Fortunately for Togliatti, the French police did not know his true identity. *Cf.* Ciatta, *Palmiro Togliatti,* p. 45.

94 *Cf.* statistics cited in *Quaderni italiani No. 3* (Boston-New York, April 1943), p. 139, and in Longo, *Un Popolo alla macchia,* p. 26.

domani in Italia!") had epitomized the hopes of most of the volunteers. Generally speaking, the Spanish Civil War created more unity among the Italian anti-Fascist groups than they had ever enjoyed before. Although the opposition forces did not abandon entirely a tortuous, conspiratorial system of operation, they began to make use as well of more open methods, which often were more effective. Moreover, the Spanish war provided the Italian anti-Fascists with invaluable lessons in guerrilla warfare. It was hardly a coincidence, therefore, that Luigi Longo, one of the foremost Communist political commissars during the Spanish war, should become the politico-military leader of the Italian Communist partisans in the northern Italian Resistance after September 1943.

Not all the Italian *émigrés* looked upon the Spanish Civil War as a conflict that ought to be won decisively by one side or the other. Men of the older generation, such as Luigi Sturzo in London, perceived the fearful possibility that the Spanish war might lead to a Second World War, with immeasurable sacrifices of human life and property. Sturzo hoped that such an enlarged conflict could be prevented if the English and French governments undertook a determined attempt to conciliate the opposing groups in Spain. To this end, Sturzo, with the assistance of Mr. Wickham Steed, promoted the British Committee for Civil and Religious Peace in Spain. This committee coordinated its work with similar Spanish and French agencies and produced a project which Lord Cecil and the Archbishop of Canterbury presented to Neville Chamberlain in 1938, with the hope that he, in turn, would seek Mussolini's support for it. But the labors of Don Sturzo and his associates came to naught, for Mr. Chamberlain declined to intervene, inasmuch as he did not wish "to raise any controversial topic."[95]

In France during the period of the Spanish conflict, the *bloc* of Italian Communist and Socialist *émigrés* continued to expand. In a congress held in Lyons, March 28-29, 1937, the so-called Italian Single Front (*Fronte Unico*) was transformed into a Popular Union of Italian Emigrants (*Unione popolare degli emigrati italiani*). The Communists and left-wing Socialists controlled this Union, but they encouraged broad mass participation therein, so that eventually the Popular Union attracted some 70,000 adherents.[96] The Popular Union, which was headed by Romano Cocchi—who was later to be a vicitim of the Nazis at Buchenwald—endeavored to look after the welfare of its members, in much the same manner as in previous years the League of the Rights of Man had patronized the repub-

[95] *Cf.* the information revealed by Sturzo's English translator and friend, Barbara Barclay Carter, in her *Italy Speaks* (London, 1947), pp. 42-43.

[96] Paolo Vittorelli, *Dal fascismo alla rivoluzione: Storia della caduta del fascismo* (Cairo, 1945), p. 331.

lican and anticlerical *émigrés*. The daily newspaper, *Voce degli italiani*, edited in Paris by Giuseppe DiVittorio after his return from Spain, served as the organ of the Popular Union until the latter's collapse in August 1939. During much of the period from 1936 until 1939, it should be noted, other Italian-language newspapers, published by several of the emigrant groups, continued to appear in Paris—for example, *Nuovo Avanti!*, *Giustizia e Libertà*, and *Giovine Italia*, the last-named paper reflecting primarily the viewpoint of the traditional Republican *émigrés*.[97]

There is no doubt that the assassination of Carlo Rosselli in June 1937 marked a definite ebb in the strength of the Justice and Liberty movement. Emilio Lussu, a man of distinctly radical outlook, emerged as the leading *Giellista* after Rosselli's death. Lussu toyed with the idea of striking an accord with the Socialists, in order to increase the strength of Justice and Liberty, and also in order to wean the Socialists away from the Communists. His strategy did not succeed; the majority of the Socialists remained true to their close pact of unity with the Communists. Consequently, Lussu was forced to cultivate such relatively small currents as the Trotskyists and Fernando Schiavetti's left-wing Socialist-Republican Action (*Azione repubblicana socialista*). Lussu wanted this combination to retain Justice and Liberty's dynamic program, but he declared that the final goal must be "socialism," which he differentiated from "Marxism."[98] Insofar as Lussu believed in an "improvised" proletarian insurrection, he differed certainly from the orthodox Marxists. An admirer of Lussu has conceded that if one could often truthfully describe Carlo Rosselli as being essentially an impractical "visionary," one might well consider Lussu to be a complete "romanticist."[99] Closely associated with Lussu in the last phase of Justice and Liberty's existence was Professor Silvio Trentin, a native of Venice, one-time member of Parliament, and a scholar in the field of jurisprudence. Trentin ranks among the foremost Italians who were able at least partially to awaken many foreign intellectuals to an understanding of the true nature of Fascism.[100] Although the post-Rossellian, more socialistically oriented Justice and Liberty tried in every way to strengthen its contacts with the younger generation in Fascist Italy—especially through the efforts of such men as Franco Venturi and Paolo Vittorelli—it did not entirely

---

97 Garosci, "Italia: L'emigrazione politica italiana durante il fascismo," *Enciclopedia Italiana, Seconda Appendice, 1938-1948, I-Z*, p. 116.

98 Garosci, *Vita di Carlo Rosselli*, II, 247.

99 Leo Valiani, "Partito d'Azione e Giellismo," *Nuovi Quaderni di Giustizia e Libertà*, III, No. 9 (May-June, 1946), p. 10.

100 Among Trentin's numerous books on Fascism are *Les transformations récentes du droit public italien* (Paris, 1929); *L'antidémocratie* (Paris, 1930); *Aux sources du fascisme* (Paris, 1931); and *Le fascisme à Genève* (Paris, 1932).

succeed. This was partly because the groups within Italy were reluctant to enter into all the risks that conspiratorial contacts with the *émigrés* necessitated, and partly because the internal groups preferred to weaken the Fascist régime by "boring from within," subverting its mass organizations, and attacking its psychological bases, so that at the critical moment Fascism would be forced to reveal to the world that its "monolithic" structure was nothing but a hollow shell.

Thanks to the Popular Front, the Communists and the other forces of Italian anti-Fascism enjoyed five years of relative unity from 1934 until August 23, 1939. On the latter date the unity was destroyed by the unexpected announcement to the world by the Soviet and Nazi governments that their Foreign Ministers had signed a pact of neutrality and non-aggression. Meekly obeying the new party "line," which had been devised without their consultation, the Italian Communists stopped virtually all of their criticisms of Hitler's régime and instead trained their propaganda guns against the bourgeois capitalist states. The immediate reaction of Italian Socialist leader, Pietro Nenni, to the announcement of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was an editorial in the Paris *Nuovo Avanti!* that gave vent to his anger with the Communists for having linked themselves with Nazi Germany; but a few days later, Nenni apparently decided not to make a complete break with the Communists, whom he had courted for so many years.[101] Nenni's ambiguous position aroused great hostility from such right-wing Socialists as Giuseppe Saragat and Angelo Tasca, who accused Nenni of having betrayed both socialism and democracy, and who demanded that Nenni resign his posts as party secretary and newspaper editor. As it was impossible to assemble a full party congress at the time, the anti-Nenni forces in the autumn of 1939 summoned a meeting of Italian Socialists who resided in or near Paris. Nenni probably would have been expelled from the party by the actions of this group, had it not been for the intercession of the aged reformist leader, G. E. Modigliani, who feared that Nenni might be arrested by the French authorities if any additional publicity were given to the dispute.[102] Nenni finally resigned his posts as party secretary and editor of *Nuovo Avanti!*[103] In 1941 he suffered the misfortune to be arrested by agents of the Vichy government, who turned him over to the Germans. After an odyssey through Nazi prisons, Nenni was

---

101 Pietro Nenni, "Alleanza Social-comunista," *Mercurio,* I, No. 3(Rome, 1945), p. 17.

102 Puglionisi, *Sciacalli: Storia dei fuorusciti,* pp. 137-139.

103 Modigliani, *Esilio,* pp. 305-306. After Nenni's resignation, Modigliani, Saragat, Tasca, Morgari, Buozzi, and Faravelli became the principal directors of the Socialist party abroad.

sent to Italy, where he remained incarcerated until the Badoglio government released him in August 1943.[104]

During the period of Soviet benevolent neutrality toward Nazi Germany, the Italian Communists in some measure suspended their traditional anti-Fascist fulminations, but they continued to maintain close contacts with their clandestine cells in Italy. Receiving instructions from Togliatti to adjust itself to the new international dispensation, the Italian Communist party set up in France a "foreign office" under the direction of Umberto Massola, Celeste Negarville, and others. The "foreign office" undertook a threefold program: intensification of efforts to secure dependable people for work in Italy; publication of *Lettere di Spartaco* ("Letters from Spartacus") to explain the problems arising from the war and to lay down the party "line"; and assignment of party leaders to strategic locations, so that at the auspicious moment they might be able to enter Italy without delay. Two party leaders—one of whom was a member of the "foreign office"—were stationed in neutral countries adjacent to Italy, whence they might enter the peninsula. Immediately after Mussolini's declaration of war on June 10, 1940, a group of Italian Communists did enter Italy, where they launched a manifesto calling for the union of all Italians against Mussolini's war.[105] For the most part, however, the leaders of Italian Communism languished in *confino* during the period from 1939 until the summer of 1943, the noted prison island of Ventotene near Naples serving as a kind of "capital" of the Communist underground. Together with Luigi Longo on this island were the Communists Giuseppe Di Vittorio, Pietro Secchia, Mauro Scoccimarro, Girolamo LiCausi, Umberto Terracini, Giovanni Roveda, and others.[106]

As soon as it was clear that Italy did not intend, in 1939 at least, to enter the world conflict, Daladier's government in France—apparently in the hope that Mussolini would be appeased thereby—ordered the suspension of the Italian anti-Fascist press in France, and forbade virtually all organized activity on the part of the Italian political *émigrés*.[107] French police arrested and interned most of the known Italian Communists, as well as numerous other radicals whose political views were not always too apparent, but who for purposes of the police records could be classified as "anarchists." However, in the late spring of 1940, not long before the

104 Pietro Nenni, *Pagine di diario* (Cernusco sul Naviglio, 1947), *passim.*

105 *Relazione della Direzione del Partito Comunista Italiano al V° Congresso*, p. 13.

106 Longo, *Un Popolo alla macchia*, pp. 37-39. Indeed, the island could be termed the "capital" of almost all of the clandestine political parties, for it welcomed to its shores hundreds of political prisoners. *Cf.* Alberto Jacometti, *Ventotene* (Verona, 1946), *passim.*

107 Vittorelli, *Dal fascismo alla rivoluzione*, p. 333.

fall of France, the new government of Reynaud ameliorated the somewhat cavalier treatment that had been meted out to some of the Italian emigrants. In part, Count Carlo Sforza was instrumental in bringing about the change in attitude; in June the veteran *émigré* diplomat succeeded in persuading the French government to accept in its army contingents of Italian emigrants, who would fight against the Germans, provided that they could serve under their own flag. These Italian residents of France would not be required, however, to fight against Fascist Italy.[108] It is also worthy of note that a couple of weeks before Mussolini's declaration of war, Sforza wrote, in vain, a letter to King Victor Emmanuel III, pleading with the monarch to refuse to sign the *Duce's* war order.[109]

The Nazi occupation of Paris in June 1940 served as the *coup de grâce* to the Italian *émigrés,* whose coordinated activities abroad henceforth were negligible. Although several influential leaders, including Carlo Sforza, Alberto Tarchiani, Alberto Cianca, Randolfo Pacciardi, and Emilio Lussu, were able to escape from France to Britain, or to the United States, or to Latin America, the vast majority of Italian political refugees had to remain in France. Some of them, like Silvio Trentin, participated in the French *Résistance,* but many were arrested by the Vichy government and were sent back to Fascist Italy.[110]

The Nazi invasion of the U.S.S.R. in the summer of 1941 brought the Italian Communists once again wholeheartedly into the anti-Fascist fray. Their previous hesitancies and inconsistencies vanished when they learned from Moscow that the war was no longer a conflict between rival imperialist *blocs,* but truly a great patriotic conflict of "democratic" states against aggressive Nazism and Fascism. Moscow's "line" was altered so that instead of emphasizing excessively the ideological struggle, it would concentrate its attention on glorifying the nationalistic struggle of the various Communist parties; and, eventually, the Comintern was dissolved so that greater unity might be effected between the western Allies and the Soviet Union for the duration of the war. In July 1941 the Italian Communist party declared that its aims were to overthrow the Fascist government; to form a popular government, which would at once conclude an armistice with the Soviet Union and with England; to re-establish constitutional liberties; to release political prisoners; to arrest Fascist hierarchs;

---

108 Count Carlo Sforza, *L'Italia dal 1914 quale io la vidi* (Rome, 1944), p. 200. *Cf.* also Modigliani, *Esilio,* p. 284.

109 Sforza, *op. cit.,* pp. 193-197.

110 Particularly useful and interesting for this period are the memoirs of the wife of Emilio Lussu: Joyce Salvadori Lussu, *Fronti e frontiere* (Bergamo, 1945), *passim.*

and to confiscate the war-time profits of the Fascists.[111] The slogan of Italian Communism became "Peace, Independence, and Liberty!" (*"Pace, Indipendenza, e Libertà!"*); the revolution was invoked in the name of "democracy" rather than in the name of "proletarian dictatorship." From Moscow Togliatti spoke over the radio thrice weekly to Italians, thousands of whom secretly listened to his broadcasts—as they did also to the liberal and democratic propaganda sent out by the B.B.C.[112] In Toulouse, which after the Nazi occupation of Paris became one of the most popular places of "refuge" for the Italian *émigrés*, a pact was signed in October 1941 by Communists, Socialists, and *Giellisti*, whereby a "Committee of Action for the Union of the Italian People" was created.[113] This committee called for immediate peace by Italy, the "abdication" of Mussolini, and the restoration of popular liberties. Simultaneously, top leaders of the Communist party were despatched to Italy to lay the groundwork for disruptive strikes in many of the war industries.[114]

In the years from 1940 to 1943 the *émigrés* were especially active in the western hemisphere, where they launched a continuous stream of propaganda to the Allied Powers, imploring the latter not to confound Italy with its transitory Fascist régime.[115] Late in 1941 in New York Count Carlo Sforza published an important eight-point program for post-Fascist Italy.[116] The essential points in Sforza's program were adopted unanimously by several thousand delegates to a Pan-American Congress of Free Italians, which met in Montevideo on August 17, 1942. The Montevideo congress recommended that as soon as Italy was liberated it should elect at once a constituent assembly, which would draft a new constitution to replace the Savoyard *Statuto*. Other important recommendations were that Italy should replace the monarchy with a "democratic and social republic"; that Italians abroad should form an "Italian National Council," whose purpose would be to coordinate the struggle against Fascism and to represent the Free Italians before the United Nations; that Count Sforza, as the "spiritual

111 *Relazione della Direzione del P. C. I. al V° Congresso*, p. 14.

112 His war-time broadcasts are printed in Palmiro Togliatti, *Discorsi agli italiani* (Rome, 1945).

113 Emilio Sereni and Giuseppe Dozza signed on behalf of the Communists; Pietro Nenni and Giuseppe Saragat acted for the Socialists; Silvio Trentin and F. Fausto Nitti signed for the *Giellisti*. *Cf.* Longo, *Un Popolo alla macchia*, p. 30.

114 *Ibid.*, p. 30, *et seq.*

115 Prior to 1940, of course, there had been conspicuous activity by many anti-Fascist *émigrés* in the United States, especially along the Atlantic seaboard. Many intellectuals came to the United States at the time the Fascist régime insisted that all educators must take an oath of loyalty not only to the nation but also to the régime; others came at the time (1938) the Fascists introduced anti-Semitic restrictions.

116 It is printed in Sforza, *L'Italia dal 1914 al 1944 quale io la vidi*, pp. 175-176.

head of the Italian anti-Fascists," should be charged with the task of directing this proposed council; and finally, that Randolfo Pacciardi, in view of his military experience gained in the Spanish Civil War, should try to organize military units which might be permitted to fight as distinct entities on the Allied side against Fascist Italy.[117] For various reasons, the last-named point was impossible to carry out, but the organization of the Italian National Council was effected at once, and it received the support of the Allied Powers. Meanwhile, in the United States various Mazzini Societies were either organized or expanded by *émigré* groups of republican orientation.[118] In Latin America, as well as in England and in the Middle East, other republican groups, known as *Italia libera* ("Free Italy"), were created; and in Mexico an essentially Communist *Alleanza Garibaldi* ("Garibaldi Alliance"), directed by Mario Montagnana and Francesco Frola, was promoted.[119] The latter engaged in numerous polemics with the Mazzini and *Italia libera* groups. None of the groups mentioned was, of course, able to carry on the type of clandestine activity within Italy which had often been feasible when the *émigrés* lived in adjacent France. Only the small nuclei of anti-Fascist emigrants who continued to reside in Lugano and other Swiss cities during the Second World War could engage at times in such perilous tasks.[120]

During their exile many of the *émigrés* inevitably had become separated from the realities of life within Fascist Italy—a fact upon which Fascist propangandists loved to dilate. Despite the obvious exaggerations contained in this type of Fascist propaganda, there remained considerable truth to the charge. Thus, when many of the emigrants returned to Italy after the Allied invasion in 1943, they found that it was somewhat difficult for them, in numerous instances, to re-establish quickly *rapport* with millions

---

117 Quoted in Sforza, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-188.

118 The New York City Mazzini Society in March 1942 undertook the publication of a weekly—subsequently it became bi-weekly—newspaper, *Nazioni Unite* ("United Nations"), which carried articles written by many distinguished Italians abroad. It was also during 1942 and 1943 that Bruno Zevi, Aldo Garosci, Enzo Tagliacozzo, and Renato Poggioli published their serious and informative *Quaderni Italiani* in New York and Boston.

119 Garosci, "Italia: L'emigrazione politica italiana durante il fascismo," *Enciclopedia Italiana, Seconda Appendice, 1938-1948, I-Z*, p. 116

120 There was, incidentally, a new phase of political emigration from Italy to Switzerland after the Germans took over military control of northern Italy in September 1943. These new refugees inspired an intense educational campaign against Fascism, maintained contacts with political *émigrés* from other countries, and nurtured the idea of a post-war federal union of European states. Moreover, they contributed a great deal of physical and moral assistance to the Italian fighters in the climactic phase of the anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi *Resistenza* after September 1943.

of Italians who had not shared their experiences in the political wilderness. Moreover, during the absence of the *fuorusciti* a new generation of younger politicians had emerged from the travail of the internal resistance to the Fascist régime, and the returning politicos were often forced to readjust their programs to compete with these home-trained politicians.[121] While they had been abroad the *émigrés* had devoted much of their time to endless and at times sterile theoretical examinations of the bases of their positions; in a real sense, many of them had ceased to be politicians and had become merely political theorists. It was remarked by some cynics, and not without substantial truth, that the political *émigrés* were like an army staff which has no foot-soldiers. It is occasionally difficult for the foreign observer to repress a smile when he considers how naive were some of the revolutionary programs of action that the *émigrés* confidently drew up—often under the surveillance of Fascist agents. But the work of those political leaders who chose to take up residence temporarily abroad, rather than remain in Italy under the oppression of totalitarianism, was by no means in vain. At a time when many people in the western democracies had persuaded themselves that the Fascist leaders of Italy were, after all, decent and respectable upholders of bourgeois and anti-bolshevist ideals, the *émigrés* stubbornly denied such assertions. Slowly, but very slowly, the expatriates began to convince numerous foreign intellectuals, as well as people in ordinary walks of life, of the substantial truth of their descriptions of the Fascist régime. By ordering the brutal assassination of the Rossellis in June 1937, Mussolini's régime itself revealed to the world how sordid Fascism was. It is true that the *émigrés* can claim only limited and indirect credit for bringing about the overthrow of Mussolini's dictatorship on July 25, 1943; for, at least in its immediate sense, that *coup d'état* was the direct outgrowth of the disastrous course of Italy's participation in the Second World War alongside Nazi Germany. That disaster had at last convinced many Italian army leaders, certain dissident Fascist hierarchs, and several ranking members of the royal household—including the aged monarch who had ushered Mussolini into office some twenty years before—that a change in government was absolutely imperative, and that this action must come "from above," and speedily, if the monarchical institution were to outlive its doomed

---

121 Returning members of the Justice and Liberty movement who affiliated with the new Action party—which had its origin in Italy during the war and whose program was in many respects comparable with that of Justice and Liberty—often were faced with such difficulties. *Cf.*, regarding this problem, the memoirs of Leo Valiani, *Tutte le strade conducono a Roma* (Florence, 1947), Chapter 1 and *passim*.

Fascist partner.[122] Nevertheless, as a result of their persistent campaign, the *émigrés,* aided by their clandestine associates within Italy, had promoted a significant undercurrent of criticism of the Fascist régime, an undercurrent which was present in all levels of society, but which cannot be measured with statistical accuracy. That undercurrent grew into a torrent, it is almost universally conceded, as the war dragged on through one setback after another for Mussolini's armed forces. Evidence of the popular unrest was demonstrated clearly in the spring of 1943, when a series of widespread factory strikes in northern Italy temporarily disrupted war production and revealed how insecure the grip of Fascism over the people had become.[123] By July of 1943 almost no one in Italy seriously believed that Mussolini could remain in power much longer.[124]

The political emigrants who returned to Italy after 1943 and those who emerged from the shadows within the country may not always have acquired from their years spent in exile, or in jail, or in retirement, the best kind of training for efficient and democratic governmental administration; but such training was not all that post-Fascist Italy needed in her first months of freedom, because, as Professor Max Ascoli has noted with keen insight:

> Sometimes in the life of a nation there are brief moments when moral character becomes the only qualification for political leadership, as the Resistance proved.[125]

It was this realization by the Italian people—intuitive, partial, and transitory though it may have been—that helped make possible the entry into public life of an eminent company of men and women whose moral fibre had been tested in the war-time Resistance. Perhaps it was also this realiza-

---

122 A discussion of the *coup d'état* lies outside the scope of this article. Perhaps the best introduction to the voluminous literature on the subject is the readable study by Paolo Monelli, *Roma, 1943* (5th ed.) (Verona, 1948).

123 There was a close correlation between the incidence of factory strikes in northern Italy in this period and the clandestine activities of Communist, Socialist, and Action party leaders. *Cf.* Longo, *Un Popolo alia macchia,* pp. 39-41; *Relazione della Direzione del P. C. I. al V° Congresso,* p. 19; Partito Comunista Italiano, *Umberto Massola* (Rome, 1947), *passim;* Monelli, *Roma,* 1943 (5th ed.), pp. 59-60, and *passim;* and Umberto Massola, *Marzo 1943 ore 10* (Rome, 1950), *passim.*

124 Mussolini himself frankly conceded during the course of the fateful and final session of the Fascist Grand Council on July 24, 1943, "At this moment I am easily the most disliked and, in fact, hated man in Italy." Benito Mussolini, *The Fall of Mussolini* (New York, 1948), p. 56. (This book is the English translation of the *Duce*'s curious, final book, which was published in northern Italy during the brief and turbulent existence of the Fascist Social Republic as *Storia di un anno (Il Tempo del bastone e della carota)* (Verona, 1944).

125 Max Ascoli, "The Mussolini Story," in his preface to the English edition of Benito Mussolini, *The Fall of Mussolini,* p. 22.

tion that facilitated the return to more or less active political life of a considerable number of the survivors of the anti-Fascist emigration, men of such widely differing political outlook as, for example, Carlo Sforza, Randolfo Pacciardi, Francesco Saverio Nitti, Luigi Sturzo, Giuseppe Saragat, Ignazio Silone, Paolo Treves, Emilio Lussu, Pietro Nenni, Sandro Pertini, Emilio Sereni, and Palmiro Togliatti.

FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE SATELLITE STATES

by P. B. Steanu

THE PURPOSE of the present analysis is to find out whether or not there is generally a constitutional life in the Moscow-controlled states. All these states have a written constitution and yet the issue is strongly controversial. Whereas the dominant opinion in the Western world is that a constitution in the Russian orbit is no more than a piece of paper, the communists allege that their constitution is the most democratic, and what is more, the only democratic one in the whole world. To be sure, from the communists such an allegation is more a propaganda slogan than something to be taken seriously. More concern should be given to the fact that such propaganda is succeeding in gaining many believers in the Western world. The explanation for it is that some scientists, guided by a merely abstract study of a Communist constitution, completely neglect to take into consideration how the constitution works and how it is applied in practice. Constitutions, like men, cannot be discerned without unlocking their background. To get a clear and objective answer to the question, we intend to pay special attention to both doctrinal attributes and practical effects of it.

Our study deals with the constitution of the satellite states in general, though reference is made only to the text of the Rumanian constitution. This method is practicable for our purposes, because all the satellite constitutions are shaped after the pattern of the Soviet Constitution of 1936, drawn up according to the same scheme with only unimportant deviations concerning some matters of detail. Thus, none of the constitutions has a special national character or any noticeable connections with the past. The constitutions of Czechoslovakia and Poland certainly made the largest concessions toward Western ideology, yet not to the extent of changing the totalitarian character of the state and the basic principle of party dictatorship. For this reason, we believe that, for our purposes, it is possible to place these two states in the same category with the other satellites.

Besides using the text of the Rumanian constitution, we intend to point as far as necessary to the correlative provisions of the Soviet Constitution, the source of all cardinal issues, which gives us the best interpretations in case of any doubt.

The present analysis does not aim to give a complete picture of the constitutions under observation, but rather intends to deal only with essential issues which characterize the whole system. Also omitted are all the questions concerning the federal system in Soviet Russia and Yugoslavia as lying

beyond our purposes. The basic text on constitutional law, used for this discussion, is from Amos T. Peaslee's collection, *Constitutions of Nations.*[1]

To begin with, one has to bear in mind that the meaning of constitution according to the communist doctrine differs basically from the Western conception. The latter is based on the sovereignty of the people and considers the constitution as a social contract, a foundation upon which the state is built. Consequently, the constitution has the role of regulating the further development of the state and stands above governmental powers. According to the definition of C. F. Strong, the constitution "is a collection of principles according to which the powers of the government, the rights of the governed and the relations between the two are justified."[2]

Theoretically, the communist doctrine accepts the sovereignty of the people in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But considering that the communist party is the only organized political force of the proletariat, substantially the dictatorship of the proletariat means the dictatorship of the party. Therefore in the communist system the sovereignty is shifted from the people (proletariat) to the party.[3] In accordance with this shift, the communist doctrine repudiates the Western idea of a constitution regulating governmental power. On the contrary, it teaches that the constitution is subordinated to governmental power, because law is considered only as a "political measure," as an expression of the will of the rulers. In contrast to the Western idea of constitutionalism, the communist constitution does not serve as a guiding principle for the future, but rather as a confirmation of what has already been achieved.[4] One could say that the communist constitution is not the foundation, but only the stage used for the building of the state, which has always been adapted according to the progress made in building.

C. F. Strong, in his book mentioned above, comes to the conclusion that mainly "two elements distinguished it (the Soviet system) from the constitutional state as we know it; first a political dictatorship through the dominance of a single party to the exclusion of all others, and secondly, a totalitarian system which used the political machine to control and direct every aspect of economic, social and religious life" (p. 45).[5]

---

1 The Rumford Press, Concord, N. H., 1950.

2 Strong, C. F., *Modern Political Constitutions*, Sedgwick and Jackson, Ltd. (London, 1950). See also Samuel L. Sharp, *New Constitutions in the Soviet Sphere* (Washington, D. C., 1950).

3 Neumann, Robert G., *European and Comparative Government* (New York, 1951), p. 501.

4 Nicholas Murray Butler in preface to the 1936 Soviet Constitution, International Conciliation No. 32, Feb. 1937.

5 For more details concerning Communist Constitutionalism, see Julian Towster: *Political Power in the U.S.S.R.* (New York, 1948), Chap. I, II.

General Principles

The first chapter of the Rumanian constitution deals with the form of government and the sources of soverignty of the state. The revolutionary character of the popular republic is emphasized in Article 2 through the following statement: "The People's Republic of Rumania was created in the struggle waged by the people headed by the working class, against fascism, reaction and imperialism." Let us remember that the Rumanian people and army fought on the side of Hitler and turned against him only after being defeated by Russia and obliged to do so by the terms of the armistice treaty. Considering this historical fact and noting that labor at that time was unorganized, representing no political force at all, one can say that the statement, as cited above, is in fact untrue. It should also be remarked that the text differentiates the people from the working class, aiming to justify the latter's exclusive domination.

Corresponding provisions of the Soviet constitution say that the Republic is "a socialist state of workers and peasants" and its power is "a result of the overthrow of the landlords and capitalists and the conquest of the dictatorship of the proletariat." (Article 2). Comparing the two provisions, it becomes evident that the Soviet Constitution already marks the realization of a socialist state, whereas the satellite constitution is still on the way to it.

On principle, all the power of the state emanates from and belongs to the people. The people exercise their power through representative organs elected by a universal, direct and secret suffrage. The elected representatives are accountable to the people and can be recalled by the people who elected them. Theoretically, this principle conforms with the sovereignty of the people as practiced in Western democracies ("government of the people, by the people, for the people"). The trouble is only that in reality the sovereignty is exercised by the party as shown above. The representatives of the proletariat are not freely elected and are not free to make their political decisions. It is true that the government of a satellite state is normally a coalition with other puppet parties and that in Soviet Russia non-party members like representatives of trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations or cultural societies, can be (at least theoretically) elected, but even those outside the party are subordinated to the strong party discipline. These practices are also accepted principles of the communist doctrine. Julian Towster, in *Political Power in the U.S.S.R.*, cites the text of several decisions of party congresses and statements of party theorists in support of this conception.[6]

[6] See *op. cit.*, pp. 125, 178, 193.

Private Property

The manner in which the Rumanian constitution solves the problem of private property is very instructive. In principle "private property and the right of inheritance are acknowledged and guaranteed by law" (Article 8), but there are so many restrictions and so many possibilities for the state to frustrate this right that after a two and a half years' practice (except in the agricultural field) only a few, insignificant remnants of such property are noticeable; moreover, it is expected that even these traces will shrink up to the limit permitted in the U.S.S.R. In the agricultural field the procedure and stage of nationalization is quite different; we shall discuss it later.

As to industrial production, the first category of restrictions concerns the means of production. In principle, the means of production are in the possession of the whole people and belong to the state. The Soviet system, after having definitely liquidated the capitalistic economy, rigidly carried through the application of this principle. But the Rumanian constitution in the meantime allows cooperative organizations, private, physical or judicial persons, to have such means of production in their possession (Article 4). Yet the provision is nothing but an enunciation of a principle without any real content. First of all, important categories of the "means" are exempted from this concession, because according to Article 6 "all mineral resources, mines, forests, waters, sources of natural powers, communication lines by rail, land, water, and seas, post, telegraph, telephone and radio belong to the state." All such resources (which were previously in private hands) have already become the property of the state. As for the rest, Articles 10 and 11 entitle the state to make expropriations "for reasons of public utility"; and "when required in the general interest, the means of production, banks and insurance companies . . . *may become state property*", i.e. without expropriation procedure. Based on these provisions, the state took over all industrial enterprises in June 1948[7] and later in November 1948 all privately owned city and town houses except one-family houses, all health institutions, hospitals, sanatoriums, pharmacies, laboratories, drug and cosmetic factories, the film industry and distribution.[8]

In their ultimate result these measures effected a situation almost identical with that in the Soviet Union. The constitution of the U.S.S.R. recognizes exclusively "the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the instrument and means of production." Private property in this

---

[7] Steanu, P. B., "Nationalization of Rumanian Industry," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XI (1951), 47ff.

[8] Roberts, Henry L., *Rumania* (New Haven, 1951), pp. 321f.

system is limited to "the incomes and savings from work, to their (the toilers') dwelling houses and subsidiary home enterprises, to the articles of domestic economy and articles of personal use and convenience, as well as to the right of citizens to inherit personal property." (Article 10).

As for distribution, "the internal and foreign trade is regulated and controlled by the state and it is carried out through the state, private and commercial enterprises" (Article 14). Thus private commerce is theoretically not excluded, yet scarcely existent because the state has monopolized all foreign trade and distributes all imported goods and all products of nationalized industry through its own sales organizations. For this purpose many of the stores were taken over by the state and most of the rest of the commercial enterprises were forced out of business because of the state's competition and because of the complete lack of supply.

Land is the principal means of agricultural production and belongs to the category of goods, which, according to Article 6 of the Rumanian constitution in principle, are unconditional properties of the state. The U.S.S.R. constitution, being based on this principle, ranges land among the other means of production as state property (Article 6), but the Rumanian constitution, in accordance with the actual stage of collectivization, adopted special regulations. The history of the Russian revolution teaches us how difficult the way to collectivization of land is. Only the perseverance and ruthlessness of the mighty Stalin were able to save the bolshevik agrarplan from a complete failure. No wonder that the very young bolshevik régime in Rumania could not master the problem and that the new constitution had to content itself with a provisional solution, which endeavors to keep the way open toward collectivism. The basic rule is that the land belongs to those who work it. . That means the end of a rental system and, at least in principle, the promotion of the agricultural proletariat to small landholders. The radical land reform carried through by the Groza government in 1945 in an almost arbitrary way, took over 1,443,911 ha. (1 hectare = 0.0039 sq. mile) of land from big and middle farmers which survived the land reform of 1923 and distributed 1,057,674 hectares to agrarian proletarians, striving to bring the property of small landholders to the minimum of 5 hectares.[9] Although, at that time this reform pursued political rather than social aims, it can be regarded as a planned preparation for the constitutional provisions mentioned above.

Further development toward socialization is promoted first of all by the provision that the state *protects* the property of peasant *labor,* not of peasant land (Article 14). The difference between this provision and that

[9] Roberts, *op. cit.,* pp. 292-299.

of Article 9, concerning private property in general, is striking. The intention and trend toward complete collectivization is expressed in the same Article 14 which continues: "The state . . . encourages and supports the rural cooperative associations"; "in order to stimulate the rise of agriculture it can create agricultural enterprises owned by itself." In addition it should be mentioned that according to Article 15 the state directs and plans the whole national economy, including agriculture. This provision deprives the not as yet collectivized farmer of his right to determine what to grow and how to grow it. He has no right of free disposition of his crops and can sell on the free market only what remains after he has delivered the prescribed quota for public consumption. Of course, the distribution of agrarian products is in the hands of a monopolized public organization by definitive elimination of any private commercial enterprise. Based upon such legal dispositions and encouraged by the strong pressure of the party, efforts have been made steadily for the sake of creating collective farms (Kolkhozy) and state farms after Russian pattern (see Articles 6-7 of the Soviet Constitution). But until now there has been little result because of the persistent individualistic mentality of the Rumanian peasant. Seemingly, the state is not yet determined to apply force openly.[10]

After a thorough examination of all provisions dealing with private property, we get the impression that the statement of this right in the constitution serves merely propaganda purposes. Let us take an example. Article 10 of the Rumanian Constitution provides that expropriations should be made only "under payment of rightful compensation." In spite of this provision, the whole of industry, banks, a great part of commercial enterprises, houses, sanatoriums, recreation, homes, etc. were expropriated without the payment of any indemnification.

Civil Liberties

Abstractly, the Rumanian constitution guarantees all rights and liberties generally developed in a democratic system. But everywhere, when such liberties and the dictatorship of the party come into collision, the constitution provides for corrective measures which make the liberties illusory. The supreme guarantee of civil liberties is the equality before the law that means equal protection of law without any exception or discrimination as

10 As early as March 1949 the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party issued regulations "preparing conditions for the socialistic transformation of agriculture." The result of the efforts made up to this time is deplorable. Collective farms represent but 2.8 per cent of the total number of individual holdings and but one seventy-third of the entire agricultural land. (*Information Bulletin* of the Rumanian National Committee, No. 32, Washington, D. C.).

expressed in Article 16. The leading civil right is the right to work, an achievement proudly emphasized by the communist propaganda. According to Article 19, "the state gradually insures this right by the planned organization and development of the national economy." Obviously such a right cannot be guaranteed except in a strongly planned and directed economy. That is the reason why the constitution promises to assure this right in such vague terms as cited above. Practically, this regulation forces the worker to accept this right in exchange for the liberty of choosing or changing the location and kind of his work.[11] The other restriction of this right not provided in the constitution is that former capitalist owners and other "class enemies" are excluded from this benefit as a consequence of the proletarian character of the state. The constitution also insures the right to leisure by regulating working hours, by paid vacations, by organizing rest homes, sanatoriums, clubs parks, sport grounds and other similar institutions (Article 19), again exclusively for the laborers.

The U.S.S.R. constitution contains similar descriptions in Articles 118-119 and gives a more precise definition of the right to work, which textually means "to receive guaranteed work with payment for their toil in accordance with its quality and quantity."

The right to education is guaranteed; the state organizes and develops the compulsory elementary and the vocational and technical education free of charge. The constitution does not mention anything about secondary schools and universities. The reason for this is that in Rumania, as generally in all Central and Eastern European states, the secondary schools generally and the universities without any exception, were public institutions of the state or of the different churches. Considering that the new constitution in Article 27 abolishes the right of the churches or of any religious denomination to open or maintain institutions of general education, the whole educational system became completely nationalized and placed under strong party control. Comparing these provisions with the corresponding text of the Soviet Constitution, we find no principal differences; technically, the U.S.S.R. constitution (Article 121) emphasizes more clearly that education in all stages is free of charge and that the citizens have the right to be instructed in their native language.

Beyond any doubt, higher education is made available only for the youth of proletarian origin; the doors of higher educational institutions, vocational school or technical training opportunities are closed for bourgeois descendants or even for students whose family is not 100 per cent reliable

---

[11] Neumann, Robert G., *op. cit.*, pp. 541, 553.

—in the U.S.S.R. as well as in the satellite states. The facts are notorious; the daily press and special reports furnish us abundant evidence.[12]

The totalitarian character of the state is emphasized in Articles 23 and 25 which put art, science and public health under total state control. In order to encourage and support the development of science and art, the state (and nobody else) organizes research institutes, libraries, printing houses, theatres, museums and music academies. All enterprises of publishing, of import and export of books and publications of any kind, the entire interior commerce in such products is organized and controlled by the party.[13]

The care of public health is of course a primordial duty of a socialist state. According to the constitution the state complies with this duty "by creating and developing health services and by encouraging and protecting physical training." All civil servants and employees of private enterprises (the latter already belong to the past) benefit by the privilege of "social protection and medical care in cases of sickness, accidents and disabilities . . . as well as maintenance in old age." No doubt, the provisions are in principle salutary; objection can be made only with regard to the restriction that subjects of the former bourgeoisie, who were not accepted as civil servants, are excluded from the benefits. In practice, there are many shortcomings, especially as to the supply of drugs and medicines, for which a great need is noticeable. It should be mentioned that the provisions with which Article 25 is concerned, are paraphrased from Article 120 of the Soviet Constitution.

The state further guarantees the freedom of conscience and of religious worship. The constitution does not speak of freedom of religion but only of "religious worship." To understand the difference we have to trace back to the source of this provision, which is Article 124 of the Soviet Constitution containing the following disposition: "Freedom of service of religious cults and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is acknowledged for all citizens." It is characteristic that the constitution emphasizes the right of *anti*-religious propaganda, but is deeply silent about *pro*-religious propaganda. Such a one-sided measure is able to destroy practically any freedom of religion. It is true, the Rumanian constitution does not speak about the right of anti-religious propaganda, but it is likewise true that the practice follows the same line in both countries. Combining the freedom of religious

12 *The Perversion of Education in Rumania* published by the Rumanian National Committee, Washington, D. C., 1950, pp. 49, 82.

13 For more details see: *Suppression of Human Rights in Rumania,* published by the same Committee, pp. 99-121.

worship with the right of anti-religious propaganda, one can say that freedom of religion in the Soviet system is a problem of political tactic. When party interests demand it, the government takes a friendly trend toward religion, but if need dictates, strong anti-religious propaganda is launched. In this way the constitutional provisions did not prevent the complete annihilation of the Rumanian Greek-Catholic (Uniate) church and the persecution of all churches opposing the party domination, especially of the Roman-Catholic Church.[14]

Article 28 of the Rumanian constitution deals with individual liberty instituted merely as a façade without real content, because the "habeas corpus" as formulated in that article offers no serious guarantee, since not only the courts or judicial authorities, but also the public prosecutor and other investigative organs can legally issue warrants. As we shall see later, the public prosecutor is the head of a separate body of prosecution and punishment of crimes and not an impartial judicial magistrate. The best evidence for such a skeptical judgment is that the Soviet constitution, more advanced from the point of view of socialization, does not mention individual freedom and "secures" only the "inviolability of persons."

An integral part of individual freedom is the inviolability of domicile inscribed in Article 29 of the Rumanian Constitution. But in spite of these constitutional rights it happens very frequently that police appear at night in private homes and search through the whole house under very different pretexts and without any written warrants.

Soon after the promulgation of the new constitution during the months of May and June 1948, between forty and fifty thousand persons were arrested in Rumania, many of them held in jail without trial.[15] In a report to the Central and Eastern European Conference, the number of persons deported from the satellite states was placed at eight millions.[16]

Other important civil liberties guaranteed by the constitution are: freedom of the press, of speech, of assembly, of mass meetings, of street processions and demonstrations (Article 31); the right of association and organization (Article 32). But all such rights are counterbalanced by provisions which make them ineffective. The second paragraph of Article 31 reads: "The exercising of these rights is ensured by the fact that the means of printing, the paper, and the meeting halls are placed at the disposal of the working people," which in communist terminology means that all the means and opportunities needed for exercising these liberties are available

---

14 *Persecution of Religion in Rumania,* published by the Rumanian National Committee, Washington, D. C., 1949.

15 *Suppression of Human Rights in Rumania,* p. 55.

16 *New York Times,* December 7, 1951, p. 15.

only for the party. On the other hand, the text of Article 32 concerning the right of association and organization contains the condition that the rights are granted only "if the aims pursued are not directed against the democratic order established by the constitution," which will say that any association and organization is possible only under party control and on the party line. This deduction is also justified by the following paragraph which reads: "Any association of fascist or anti-democratic character is forbidden and punished by law." Everybody knows very well that in the communist language every deviation from the party program is qualified as fascist and anti-democratic. All these restrictions are nothing but consequent applications of the communist doctrine that constitutional rights and liberties are created for the "working class" only, and not at all for "class enemies" (which means opponents of the dictatorial system).[17]

If there would remain any doubt concerning the assertion that in the communist system civil liberties are subordinated to party interests and dependent upon them, Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution gives us a further convincing proof. We have to go back to this source because the Rumanian Constitution contains no provisions concerning political parties. Article 126, dealing with the right of public, professional, cooperative, youth, sport, etc. organizations, of cultural and scientific societies, says textually: ". . . and the most active and conscious citizens from the ranks of the working class and other strata of toilers are united in the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) which is the vanguard of the toilers in their struggle for the strengthening and development of the socialist order and represents the directing kernel of all organizations of toilers both public and State."[18] Moreover, concerning the other civil rights, the Soviet Constitution applies the following stereotype reservation: "In accordance with the interests of the toilers and with the object of the development of organized self expression and political activity of the popular masses . . ." or ". . . in the object of strengthening the socialist system . . ."

Legislative Power

The supreme organ of state authority and the exclusive legislative organ is the Great National Assembly of the Peoples' Republic of Rumania, elected by universal suffrage for four years. The assembly elects the Presidium, declares war and concludes peace, grants amnesties (Article 37-39). Theoretically, the Great National Assembly composed by the representatives of the people should be the bearer of the national sovereignty.

17 Neumann, Robert G., *op. cit.*, pp. 550-551.

18 For more details see Julian Towster, *op. cit.*, chaps. VI, VII, VIII.

There is no such power as the head of the State in a parliamentary system who could dissolve the assembly. The Great National Assembly should be the peak of the pyramid, the Presidium, the entire executive and administrative apparatus, and indirectly even the judicial power being subordinated to it. Political science qualifies such a structure as "assembly government," the original model of which is to be found in the first constitution of the French Revolution of 1789. But it is easily understandable that such a large corporate body (the Supreme Soviet has 682 members, the Supreme Soviet of the Nationalities 657 members, whereas the Rumanian Great National Assembly has 414 members) is too heavy and incapable of governing. It is also lacking in readiness, because it cannot be permanently held in session. So for instance, the Supreme Soviet is only in session twice a year for about one week at a time. Such are the reasons why the system of assembly government always offers a challenging opportunity for strong groups or personalities to seize the whole power. Assembly government is the breeder of dictatorship and it is no wonder that the first experiment with it led to the Napoleonic caesarism. The case of the communist ruled countries is quite different. The communists aimed at dictatorship and intentionally chose the assembly government as the most convenient façade for it. Such being the situation, non-communist political scientists unanimously agree on stating that the seat of sovereignty is not within the assembly. They disagree only upon the question whether the Party or the Council of Ministers is the real possessor of sovereign state power. It is beyond our purposes to discuss this problem, but taking into consideration that according to the communist doctrine and practice, only the Party has the exclusive policy-making power, while the ministers are primarily technical experts in their special branches, it can be said that the sovereignty is within the party.

The Presidium of the Great National Assembly is composed of one president, three vice presidents, and fourteen mmbers. Besides the sphere of activity normally attributed to the head of the state, the Presidium interprets the laws, issues decrees, designates military and civil servants. When the assembly is not in session, the Presidium is substituted for the Assembly in declaring a state of war and mobilization (Articles 40-45). The correlative institutions of the Soviet Constitution are the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. They are endowed with the same sphere of activity as shown above yet with the difference that, according to the federalist structure of the Union, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. consists of two Chambers, the Soviet of the Union elected nationwide in election districts, and the Soviet of Nation-

alities elected by the component republics of the Union. The Presidium is elected in a joint meeting of the two chambers (Articles 33-35, 48).

The Executive

The highest executive and administrative organ is the government composed of the president of the council of ministers (Prime Minister), one or more vice presidents and the ministers, who together form the council of ministers (Article 66). The Prime Minister and the ministers are appointed and can be dismissed at any time by the Assembly to which they are accountable. They are not necessarily members of the Assembly, but at any rate are entitled to participate in the sessions (Articles 66-69).

The Council of Ministers in the Soviet Constitution is organized on the same principles with a deviation resulting from the federalist character of the state. The Soviet Union comprehends two kinds of republics: the so-called Union Republics and the Autonomous Republics. Correspondingly, there are two kinds of Ministries, all Union and Union Republican Ministries with spheres of activities expanding to the whole Union or those only of the Union Republics. Another difference is that in Soviet Russia the Chairman of the State Planning Commission and of the Arts Committee are members of the Council of Ministers (Article 70).

The conclusions drawn in the previous section dealing with the legislative give us sufficient elucidation with regard to the constitutional functions of the executive. Considered from the outside, the Council of Ministers appears to be a mighty factor, but this appearance is deceiving. One should not forget that "ministers are theoretically appointed by and responsible to the supreme soviet, but in actuality they are appointed by and removed by the Politburo to whose policies they are completely subservient and sensitive."[19]

Judicial Power

The judicial power is organized into two distinct branches, the Courts and the so-called "parchet," an investigation and prosecution agency.

The Supreme Court controls the whole jurisdictional activity of the country. Its presidents and members are appointed by the Presidium. It is significant that all courts, except the Supreme Court, are composed of popular assessors with one career judge as counsellor at law. But these assessors must not be mistaken for the jurors in our judicial system. First of all, jurors decide only questions of fact, the application of law being reserved exclusively for the judge. The assessors, on the contrary, decide both

19 Neumann, Robert G., *op. cit.*, p. 539.

questions of fact and of law. And what is yet more important in the totalitarian state, justice is only an instrument of the dictatorship, its main goal being not legality or justice, but the defense of the state's power. Consequently, only party members or reliable followers can be elected as assessors. The same principles are applicable to the selection of career judges.[20]

The investigation and prosecution branch (parchet) is headed by the public prosecutor appointed by the Presidium. The public prosecutor supervises the prosecution of crimes, especially against the public order, democratic liberties, economic interests, national independence and sovereignty of the state (Articles 95, 96). Such things as separation of powers, independence of justice, power of the Supreme Court to check the constitutionality of law are unknown in a totalitarian system. In the democratic system judges are independent with tenure for lifetime and removable only through impeachment; in the soviet system judges are dependent and removable.

The soviet judicial organization shows two essential differences. First, that the judges are elected, especially members of the Supreme Court and Special Courts of the U.S.S.R. by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., and the judges of the lower courts by the corresponding local soviets (Articles 105-109). The second cardinal difference is that the Prosecutor General of the U.S.S.R. is invested with the power to supervise and control "the strict observance of the law by all ministries and institutions subordinated to them as well as by officials and citizens of the U.S.S.R. generally" (Article 113). That means that the whole administrative body is put under the control of the investigation and prosecution authority. Although the Rumanian constitution contains no similar provision, the practice proves that the system is the same and that even Prime Minister Petre Groza is steadily watched and controlled by the Secret Police.[21]

Conclusions

This short survey of fundamental principles governing the communist constitutional laws and of techniques as to how legal dispositions were applied in practice, might convince us that constitutionalism, as perceived in democratic systems, is non-existent in communist ruled countries. Constitutionalism means limitation of state power in order to secure the freedom of the citizens and the reign of justice. The power of a totalitarian state has no such limits and citizens of such states have even no life of their own, they can exist and act only as links in the all embracing mechanism of the

[20] *Suppression of Human Rights in Rumania*, pp. 75, 93, 94. Julian Towster, *op. cit.*, 302-304. Reuben H. Markham, *Rumania under the Soviet Yoke* (Boston: Meador Publishing Co., 1949), Chap. XXIV.

[21] *New York Times*, July 11, 1951, p. 1.

state. Consequently, the democratic conceptions of civil rights and liberties, of constitutional guarantees are incompatible with the totalitarian system. As it has been repeatedly pointed out in the present outline, provisions of the satellite constitutions concerning private property, individual freedom and civil rights are bound to veil the real situation and only serve propaganda purposes. The communist régime could not help using such misleading methods in countries where the overwhelming majority is hostile to its ideology and to its methods.

As to the question whether the constitution in the communist system is nothing but a piece of paper, the judgment seems to be somewhat one-sided. Put into the framework of the totalitarian state, the constitution is a useful instrument in the hands of the dictatorship not only as a governmental mechanism, but also as a psychological means. Only the denomination "constitution" is disturbing to Western observers.

AMHERST, MASSACHUSETTS

REVIEW NOTE

THE CHAPTER ON RUSSO-GERMAN RELATIONS IN VOLUME IV OF *DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 1918-1945*

by Gerhard L. Weinberg

THE IMPORTANCE of Russo-German relations between the two World Wars will, no doubt, direct the attention of historians to the available documentation on that subject which is now, and will probably long remain, of predominantly German origin. The chapter in Volume IV of the *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945,* Series D,[1] which is devoted to Russo-German relations, covers the period from Munich to the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939. It is, therefore, of particular interest to those studying the evolution of the foreign policies of these two powers in the period immediately preceding World War II.

The material on Russo-German relations in this period which has been available hitherto is very scanty and fragmentary. The State Department's *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941* begins with the middle of April, 1939. Some information about the Russo-German economic negotiations may be gleaned from the transcript of the so-called Ministries Case at Nuremberg.[2] There are some relevant documents in the third volume of the third series of the British documents and more in the fourth.[3] A number of other minor items will be cited in the text of this note, but on the whole the field has been open for the appearance of a complete edition of the German documents.

The documents of the German Foreign Office and Embassy in Moscow for this period of Russo-German relations appear to have been for the most part available to the editors. An editorial job commensurate with the importance of the subject could therefore have been expected. Unfortunately such a piece of work has not been produced.

The documents published in this chapter cover thirty-one pages out of a total of seven hundred and twelve—only the section on German-Vatican relations is shorter.[4] This strange compression has led to the omis-

---

1 Edited by Bernadotte E. Schmitt and others (Washington, 1951) (hereafter cited as *GD* IV).

2 See for example, Testimony of Schnurre, United States, Military Tribunal IV, "United States v. Ernst von Weizsäcker *et alii*," German Transcript of Proceedings, p. 19154.

3 Woodward, E. L., and Butler, R. (eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939,* Series III (London, 1950-51) (hereafter cited as *BD*), Vols. III and IV.

4 The baffling new system used for the first time in the Analytical List of Contents—a weird mixture of chronological and chapter order—will not be discussed here as it detracts equally from all parts of the volume.

sion of even the main political reports of the German Ambassador.[5] It may also be responsible for some of the other peculiarities of this chapter.

The student familiar with what is known about German-Russian relations in this period is likely to be surprised by a number of things. Erich Kordt, formerly chief of the office of the German Foreign Minister, mentions an agreement of October, 1938, arrived at with Hitler's consent between Schulenburg, the German Ambassador, and Litvinov, the Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, for the elimination of personal attacks in the press of each country on the leaders of the other.[6] There is no reference to this in the volume under study. It is possible that Kordt is mistaken or that really nothing was found, but there is a similar problem in December, 1938, which cannot be disposed of so easily.

The main topic in the chapter under consideration is that of Russo-German economic relations. The German-Russian agreement covering trade and payments which was in effect at that time was due to expire on December 31, 1938. It was the suggestion of Schulenburg that the negotiations for the extension of this agreement to the coming year should be used as the occasion for raising other questions, particularly a new and extended credit agreement.[7] This suggestion was supported by the head of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Office in a memorandum to the Foreign Minister dated November 4, 1938.[8] Apparently Foreign Minister Ribbentrop concurred, for a series of inter-ministerial conferences was held, culminating in one on December 1, 1938, at which it was agreed "that on the occasion of those talks on the extension of the economic agreement we should sound out the Russians about a new credit on goods."[9] The document following the one of December 1 just quoted is a memorandum on a conference in Berlin on December 22, 1938, at which the new German credit proposals were discussed.[10] The extension of the trade and payments agreement—which was to provide the occasion for first raising these new proposals—seems to have vanished into thin air in the meantime, and the reader is left wondering whether it has lapsed, has been extended, or has been replaced by something else. No document on this subject is printed and no footnote has been inserted to clarify the matter or to indi-

---

5 E.g. that of November 11, 1938 (*GD* IV, 609, n. 1). Even the existence of others which must have been found—either as texts or references—is not indicated.

6 Erich Kordt, *Wahn und Wirkichkeit*, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart, 1948), p. 157, n. 2.

7 Memorandum of Schulenburg, 26 Oct. 1938, *GD* IV, 607; cf. Tippelskirch to Schliep, 3 Oct. 1938, *ibid.*, pp. 603-04; Tippelskirch to Schliep, 10 Oct. 1938, *ibid.*, pp. 606-07.

8 Memorandum of Wiehl, 4 Nov. 1938, *ibid.*, pp. 608-09.

9 Memorandum of Schnurre, 1 Dec. 1938, *ibid.*, p. 614.

10 Memorandum of Hilger, 23 Dec. 1938, *ibid.*, pp. 615-18.

cate the failure of the editors to find anything about it. According to a restricted ("nur für den Dienstgebrauch") publication of the German Foreign Office, which was captured and is now in the Library of Congress, the German-Russian trade and payments agreement of March 1, 1938, was extended for one year by an exchange of notes which took place in Berlin on December 19, 1938.[11] This extension of the agreement clearly fits into the chronological framework and must be noted to establish the necessary connection between the German policy formulation of December 1 and the conversation with the Russians of December 22, 1938.

Aside from a very startling typographical oversight—it is not clear by whom[12]—the next substantive issues concern two documents of February 6, 1939.

First, there is a letter of Ambassador Schulenburg to the German State Secretary, Weizsäcker.[13] In this letter Schulenburg discusses the causes and effects of the recall of the German economic negotiator Karl Schnurre while on his way to Moscow at the end of January, 1939. Schulenburg says that "in the meantime the Embassy has been instructed to put out tentative feelers to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Trade, Mikoyan . . . ." The instructions here referred to were presumably the basic directives for the Moscow Embassy to follow now that Schnurre was not coming. This document is not identified by any footnote; perhaps it was the telegram from Berlin, No. 12 of February 4, which the editors did not find.[14] Perhaps it was some other telegram which the editors failed to look for. In any case, it seems incredible that nothing at all was found of any message from Berlin to the Moscow Embassy between the curt announcement that Schnurre would not come on January 28 and Weizsäcker's letter of February 15. The incident of Schnurre's recall is certainly of great interest and attracted considerable international attention at the time. The absence of adequate documentation on this episode is very surprising.[15]

The second, and even more startling, issue concerns the next document

---

11 Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, *Vertrags-Verzeichnis seit 1920, Stand Oktober 1941* (Berlin, 1941?), p. 601 (Item 1792).

12 In No. 483, p. 618, the date of a conversation which took place on January 11 is mistakenly given as November 1 (for the date of January 11, rather than the other possibility—January 10—see the first sentence of the second paragraph of Memorandum of Wiehl, 12 Jan. 1939, *GD* IV, p. 620.

13 *Ibid.*, pp. 623-24.

14 Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, 10 Feb. 1939, n. 1, *ibid.*, p. 626.

15 The files might well reveal some document on the decision to recall Schnurre made by Ribbentrop while both were in Warsaw (see Peter Kleist, *Zwischen Hitler und Stalin* [Bonn, 1950], pp. 20-21). More documents on this incident appear in the publication on British than on German foreign policy (Seeds to Halifax, 30 Jan. 1939, *BD* IV, 54; Kennard to Halifax, 1 Feb. 1939, *ibid.*, p. 67; Kennard to Halifax, 6 Feb. 1939, *ibid.*, p. 82; Seeds to Halifax, 17 Feb. 1939, *ibid.*, p. 115).

in the collection. This is a memorandum by Emil Wiehl, Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Office. It is dated February 6, 1939, and has the title: "The Economic Consequences of a Rupture of Relations with the Soviet Union."[16] This document stands by itself, carries no footnote, and is not related to any other document in the book; yet it concerns the subject of the breaking of diplomatic relations between Germany and the Soviet Union! Was such a break considered likely or desirable at the time? What was the occasion for Wiehl to submit such a document "to the State Secretary for the Foreign Minister"?[17] Is this just a mental exercise on the part of a high government official or is it a presentation of real issues? It would appear that the editors simply stumbled over this document; and while they found it interesting enough to print, their curiosity was not sufficiently aroused to look into the question of "a Rupture of [German] Relations with the Soviet Union" any further.[18]

In addition to these defects of the chapter, there is no clarification on the outcome of the economic negotiations. The German revision of plans for the talks is noted,[19] but nothing is noted or printed about Wiehl's hope that "by the next courier" he will be able to send Schulenburg new instructions.[20] Nothing is printed about the course of the negotiations in Moscow after February 12.[21] According to later documents, however, negotiations were broken off in February.[22] What happened? Is there not a single document on this? Did the editors look?

The various points raised here go to the heart of the most important issue in Russo-German relations in the period covered. The dealing between the two countries was mainly about their economic relations. It might well be said that the high points of the economic negotiations were first,

16 *GD* IV, 624-25.

17 According to the film number this document was found in the files of the State Secretary.

18 In the letter of Weizsäcker to Schulenburg of February 15 a Hungarian suggestion that the anti-Comintern nations temporarily withdraw their ambassadors in Russia as a demonstration of their soldarity is mentioned (*ibid.*, p. 627). Weizsäcker's comment on this was that, "although the idea of a common gesture is worth considering, the proposed *method* did not seem practical to us (author's italics)." If this has any bearing on the subject, there must be other documents in the files.

19 Memorandum of Wiehl, 11 Mar. 1939, *ibid.*, pp. 630-31.

20 Wiehl to Schulenberg, 8 Mar. 1939, *ibid.*, p. 630.

21 Schulenburg to Wiehl, 1 Mar. 1939, *ibid.*, p. 628; unless some other important documents have been omitted, "our last visit" must refer to that of February 11 (Schulenburg to Auswärtiges Amt, 11 Feb. 1939, *ibid.*, pp. 626-27), and "the next day" would then be February 12.

22 Memorandum of Schnurre, 5 May 1939, Sontag, R. J., and Beddie, J. S. (eds.), *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941* (Washington, 1948), p. 3; Memorandum of Schnurre, 18 June 1939, *ibid.*, p. 23; Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, 27 June 1939, *ibid.*, p. 25.

the use by the Germans of the extension of the trade and payments agreement to present more sweeping economic proposals, second, the spectacular recall of the German economic negotiator from Warsaw while on his way to Moscow, and third, the breaking off of the economic negotiations at the end of February or the beginning of March, 1939. On each of these three points the edition is seriously deficient. It is indeed unfortunate that in matters of such importance historians will be forecd to depend on source material so unsatisfactorily edited.

Columbia University

NOTES

At the Free University of Berlin there has been established an Osteuropa-Institut to fill the gap left by the elimination of the Breslau and Königsberg institutes from the German Kulturraum. It began to function with the Summer semester of 1951. In view of the proximity of various phases of Soviet influence and the opportunity to study Soviet Russian action at first hand it is thought the Berlin location will turn out to be profitable and instructive. For efficient operation and more comprehensive coverage, the Institut has been divided into four sections. (1) Slavic languages and literatures, under the direction of Professor Max Vasmer, editor of a Russian Etymological Dictionary and of the *Zeitschrift f. Slavische Philologie.* (2) East European History, under the direction of Professor Werner Philipp, formerly of Mainz. The present project is a history of Lithuania in the fifteenth century. (3) East European Economy and Industry, under the direction of Professor Karl C. Thalheim and Erich Kosiol. The project now under way is a study of the social and economic transformation in the Soviet Zone of Germany 1945-50, scheduled for early publication. (4) Legal section, to be organized for the Summer Semester of 1952. A fifth section on *Landeskunde* is also contemplated.

❖ ❖ ❖

The annual convention of the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde* was held at Marburg/Lahn November 30—December 2. Divided into sections for Economics, Sociology, Political Science, Humanities, papers were read and discussed. There were 120 *Fachleute* in attendance at this first German conference on Eastern Europe since the end of the war.

❖ ❖ ❖

It is reported that the Czech philological journal, *Listy Filologické,* which has just completed its seventy-fifth year will cease publication. This announcement comes but shortly after the sudden cessation of the *Lidové Noviny,* the somewhat transmogrified heir of the most respectable of the Czech newspapers in late January, and the appearance instead of the weekly *Literarní Noviny* modelled after the *Literaturnaya Gazeta.* The group that had hitherto been editing the *Lidové Noviny,* the *Svaz československých spisovatelů,* is being reorganized to "assure the attainment of its appropriate goals."

❖ ❖ ❖

On January 12, 1952 at the conclusion of a conference of Polish historians on methodology at Otwock, the participants sent the following letter to President Bierut:

". . . Citizen President: The Conference of Polish historians held at Otwock which has brought together 172 scientific workers in the field of history, puts on record its explicit testimony to the fact that the methods of Marxism-Leninism are put into practice by Polish historical science, that the younger generation of Polish historians is being brought up on these methods, and that the great achieve-

ments of Soviet historical science have become the model for our historians," etc. "The course of the conference made it clear once again to all participants that the method of Marxism-Leninism, the only method providing a knowledge of the truth concerning the past, is an excellent tool of historical work," etc. (from *Trybuna Ludu,* Jan. 15, 1952.)

❖ ❖ ❖

The new "Projected" Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Poland is printed on pages 3 and 4 of the January 27, 1952 issue of the Warsaw *Trybuna Ludu.* It was approved on January 23 by the Constitutional Commission. There is to be general and public discussion of the document until April 6, after which time the Commission will take into consideration popular suggestions for modification and soon thereafter resubmit it to the Constitutional Sejm. The form in which the Document now appears provides no great surprises.

❖ ❖ ❖

A British scientist, Professor J. D. Bernal, was one of the principal speakers at a plenary session of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences on December 9, 1951. The session lasted until December 15. There were several other foreign speakers. The General Secretary of the Academy, Professor Erdei-Gruz, is reported to have pronounced that the Hungarian scientists, like Soviet scientists, realized that their task was not only to comprehend nature, but also to transform it.

❖ ❖ ❖

The External Research Staff of the Office of Intelligence Research (Department of State) has performed an exceedingly useful task in preparing lists of recent and current social science research on selected countries and areas outside the United States. Of particular interest to readers of the *Journal* are at least two of the lists: on the USSR and on Eastern Europe (excluding USSR). In each case projects of individual scholars whether of book or article compass are listed, master's and doctoral dissertations, and their date of probable publication or completion. It was to be expected that the list could not possibly be exhaustive, but those now engaged in such projects are urged to communicate with The Chief, External Research Staff, Room 601, State Annex No. 1, Washington 25, so that future lists may be as nearly as possible complete.

BOOK REVIEWS

HARKINS, WILLIAM E., *The Russian Folk Epos in Czech Literature 1800-1900*. New York: King's Crown Press, 1951. Pp. 282.

In the concluding chapter of his stimulating monograph Mr. Harkins admits that "the subject of his study is in a sense an artificial one" (p. 228). Modern Czech literature, developing successfully since 1800, bears only in some of its products a visible mark of the influence of the Russian folk epos. According to Mr. Harkins "the Czechs had a highly developed folk lyric of their own, and they did not need to borrow the Russian lyric" (p. 229). These two statements are concerned with folk poetry only. They can be supplemented by a general observation that from the dawn of the literary revival, about 1800, Czech writers were inspired mainly by the Western masters of verse or prose, German, French, English and Italian. Although Mr. Harkins deals only with one facet of the Czech literary life his dissertation is highly attractive and meritorious. A detailed treatment of literary interdependence gave him a welcome opportunity to comment from time to time on the political and emotional relationship of the Czechs and Russians.

One of Mr. Harkins' observations culminates in a statement that the Russian folk epos, especially the *byliny,* was more eagerly studied and imitated by modern Czech poets than their Russian contemporaries. This can be explained partly by the specific character of the *byliny* and partly by the different level of the Russian and Czech literary production in the Romantic era. The traditional and rather frigid form of the *byliny* offered very little incitement to modern Russian poets. As Mr. Harkins says, "imitation of the *byliny* would have been relatively simple but it would have produced nothing new." In Czech literature quite the opposite was the case: the use of the strange and exotic form produced the effect of great originality, even where there was none" (p. 224). The Czechs inclined in general more to the lyric than epic, increased their adaptation of the *byliny,* the lyric element, and changed to some extent the motives to fit them into their motive pattern.

It should also be borne in mind that the patriotic undertone of the *byliny* was more easily noticed by modern Czech poets than their Russian contemporaries. Pressed by the Germans, the Czechs indulged in visions of a united and powerful Slavdom. They believed to have discovered in the Russian folk epos what seemed to be non-existent in the realm of sober realities: the friendly Russian people, as well as Russian heroes slaying in duels or battles the oppressors and the foes. While many of the modern Russian writers turned eagerly to Western sources of inspiration, some of their Czech contemporaries were fascinated by the Russian folk epos and drew from those wells.

It was both fortunate and significant that the pioneer work in introducing the Russian folk epos to the Czech reading public was undertaken by an outstanding poet, František Ladislav Čelakovský (1799-1852). His collection, *Ohlas písní ruských* (Echo of Russian Songs), was a masterpiece. Čelakovský's poems

were not mechanical translations of the *byliny* but products of his creative capacity. The very title of the book, *Ohlas* (Echo), indicates that Čelakovský was anxious to give the readers a free adaptation, created in the spirit of the original (p. 79). In a later period Julius Zeyer (1841-1901), equal to Čelakovský in stature, preserved the same amount of independence. Zeyer's narrative poems inspired by the Russian folk epos, originated in a more hopeful atmosphere than Čelakovský's *Ohlas*. They should be studied carefully in connection with literary and political trends of the late nineteenth century.

Mr. Harkins has added to the knowledge of forces determining the course of Czech literary life in the nineteenth century. His characterizations of both the Czech and Russian writers are precise and convincing. His book is a fine piece of critical scholarship in the rather neglected field of comparative Slavic literature. Although he concentrated on the reception of Russian motives by the Czech poets, he showed indirectly that a fuller view of the Czech literary scene would be obtained of the Western influences were also traced and presented.

Stockholm, Sweden ROBERT VLACH

PURYEAR, VERNON JOHN, *Napoleon and the Dardanelles*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. Pp. 437. $5.00.

This is the latest of four volumes from the pen of Professor Puryear dealing with an important phase of the history of the problems of the Turkish Straits in European diplomacy. His previous volumes have dealt with Great Britain, Russia, and the Straits Question during the period of the Crimean War, 1844-1856, France and the Levant, and International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East, during the mid-Nineteenth Century. Based essentially on research in the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the present volume carries the thread of the question of the Turkish Straits throughout the Napoleonic period as one of the most important aspects of the conflict of interests among France, Great Britain and Russia in their relationships with the Ottoman Empire, in particular. Of special interest, perhaps, are the chapters dealing with the Treaty of Tilsit (1807), and the negotiations of March-June 1808, with the postmortem at Erfurt (Chs. XIII-XV), leading ultimately to the break between Napoleon and Alexander I of Russia. While he is not oblivious of the broader questions at issue between the two Emperors, particularly in the zones of friction and security in eastern and southeastern Europe, Professor Puryear is convinced that the adamant refusal of Napoleon to surrender the Dardanelles to Alexander was the key to the final break between the French and Russian empires and, therefore, for the events which finally led to the downfall of the French Empire and Napoleon. The collapse of the Napoleonic empire "may be attributed significantly," he writes in his preface, "to the ultimate failure of its policies for the near East"—policies which "involved the deception of Turkey and Persia and the withholding of the Dardanelles from Russia." He also notes that foremost among the policies bequeathed to succeeding generations of French statesmen "was that Russia should be excluded from the Dardanelles" (p. 407).

Professor Puryear's volume is replete with historical parallels between the Napoleonic period and the present day in regard to the Eastern Question and the problem of the Turkish Straits, indicating precedents between the Napoleon-Alexander and the Hitler-Molotov (1940) conversations and for the position adopted with respect to the Soviet proposals of August 1946 by the United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey. But he is aware of the differences as well as the similarities in the situations in these historic periods and conflicts.

There is an excellent bibliography and a guide to the archival materials, and the work is thoroughly annotated. This well-written volume is significant as the only detailed work covering the important question of the Straits throughout the period of Napoleon.

Arlington, Virginia HARRY N. HOWARD

OKUN, S. B., *The Russian-American Company*. Edited, with an introduction, by B. D. Grekov: translated from the Russian by Carl Ginsburg: preface by Robert J. Kerner. Russian Translation Series of the American Council of Learned Societies. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. Pp. 311. $4.50.

The present volume is an important contribution to the existing literature on Russian colonization in North America. Okun has discovered and made extensive use of a number of documents in the archives of various departments and agencies of the Russian government. More significantly, he has attempted for the first time to deal with the activities of the Russian-American Company as a part of the broader picture of Tsarist internal policy and international relations during the first half of the nineteenth century. First published in the Soviet Union in 1939, the book appears in English in the Russian Translation Project Series of the American Council of Learned Societies.

To read the author's account of Russia's Alaskan venture is to be convinced again that Tsarist hopes for a foothold in North America were foredoomed. Like her British and Spanish rivals, Russia had to retreat before the wave of American continental advance. But even before the emergence of the United States as a leading contender for possession of the Pacific coast, the odds on Russian victory were low indeed. The economic backwardness of the Empire together with the lingering institution of serfdom precluded the development of a prosperous colony. Nor were the methods of the Company which was entrusted with the exploitation of the trans-Pacific territory calculated to offset these handicaps. Too late the Company saw that conservation was necessary to prevent the fur treasure of Alaska from vanishing, and with it the revenues of the Colony. Meanwhile, the human resources of Alaska, the aborigines, were being squandered with equal disregard for the consequences. Serfdom limited colonial recruitment, and the rigors of the northern climate, as well as the rapaciousness of the Company, offered little incentive to the free man to make his home there.

In the diplomatic arena, St. Petersburg was faced with a paradoxical situa-

tion. The answer to the ever-present problem of provisioning the colony seemed to be expansion southward into areas more suitable for agriculture. But the European policies of Russia made it impossible to challenge Spain, England and the United States who over the years controlled the coveted regions. Alexander I's support of the Spanish struggle for colonial restoration after 1815, Nicholas I's need for British friendship for his Near Eastern plans, and finally the continuous desire to cultivate the United States as a counter-weight to Britain, all tied Russian hands in the Pacific. By the end of the 1850's, the sale of Alaska to America was considered the most satisfactory way out of the impasse: American friendship would be further enhanced, a blow would be struck at England, and some return could be realized on the economic investment. The deal was finally consummated, following the interruption of the American Civil War, in 1867.

Despite Okun's Marxist interpretation of all events and trends, the book is a scholarly endeavor, avoiding the usual multitudinous salaams to the Communist prophets. Unfortunately, the reviewer was not able to obtain a copy of the Russian text, so he cannot place responsibility for some of the errors. For example, the diplomatic envoys exchanged by Russia and the United States held the rank of minister, not ambassador, until 1893, when Congress created the latter grade in the foreign service. But the term ambassador is used throughout the book. Again, the running title of Chapter VI, "Ross's Colony," appears to be an inept, as well as an inaccurate translation. There seems little question that the translator and Harvard Press must share the responsibility for the inexcusably large number of typographical errors. One or two maps would have been welcome additions to the text. But none of these criticisms detract from the importance of having this work available to American scholars.

University of Colorado ROBERT P. BROWDER

GLEASON, JOHN HOWES, *The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain: A Study of the Interaction of Policy and Opinion.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950. Pp. 314. $5.00.

The greatest of all international rivalries was that of England and Russia in the Near and Middle East. In time it ran for over one hundred years; and it vitally affected, if not actually determined, the foreign policies of its two protagonists. And during one of its periodic crises Great Britain actually prepared (1885) a draft of a declaration of war. Nor is this rivalry confined to the historical past; it exists today—in a modern virulent form—over an extended area and with an extended compass of national interests and political ideologies. Certainly, the so-called Truman Doctrine of 1946 relative to Greece and Turkey means that the United States has taken up the standard and assumed the obligations so long held by England's now economically weakened hands.

John Howes Gleason, in *The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain,* has provided a well-reasoned, objective, and thoroughly documented account of the beginnings of this great issue. And it is in relation to origins that one must examine, briefly, the competency of his volume.

Mr. Gleason is correct in ascribing to William Pitt the statement in 1791 of fundamental Anglo-Russian antagonism, and he gives a valuable and convenient summary of Pitt's proposal and policy and of the reasoning of Pitt. Mr. Gleason is equally enlightening in presenting Palmerston's attitude and policy in the situation after the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi which produced "The Crisis of 1833."

There is another point, although outside the research area of this volume, but one that this reviewer believes should have been included or at least mentioned in Chapter II, "England and Russia Prior to 1815." That point deals with the personal rivalry of George I and Peter the Great, and relates to George's great concern over Hannover, and which includes all the historical implications of the term, "The Great Northern War." Certainly this period, up to 1721 (Nystadt), was a time of the real origins of Anglo-Russian rivalry, if one wishes to go back to the actual beginnings.

The principal part of Mr. Gleason's volume deals with the period 1815-1841 and centers around the great crises in the Greek Revolt of the 1820's, the Russo-Turkish War and its aftermath, the Russian support of the Sultan in the time of Mehemet Ali, and the subsequent Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the early Russian moves in Afghanistan.

These are great issues and important areas for historical research, and they have been examined by numerous scholars in minute detail. Within its compass Mr. Gleason's study, relating principally to contemporary English opinion and based largely on contemporary sources, is very satisfactory.

There are, however, certain significant products of prodigious scholarly research in this period which could have been noted. Only two examples may be given: Paul Knaplund, "Finmark in British Diplomacy, 1836-1855," *American Historical Review,* XXX, No. 3, 478-502 (April 1925), which relates to Palmerston's efforts to block Russian expansion in Northern Scandinavia; and R. J. Kerner, "Russia's New Policy in the Near East after the Peace of Adrianople," *Cambridge Historical Journal,* V, No. 3, 280-290 (1937) which indicate an important aspect of Russia's attitude towards Turkey.

Mr. Gleason's volume is a most convenient account of an important phase of Anglo-Russian rivalry—of a rivalry that has been called "The Victorian Illusion."

University of Colorado JAMES G. ALLEN

PRIBRAM, ALFRED FRANCIS, *Austria-Hungary and Great Britain, 1908-1914.* London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1951. Pp. 328.

This final contribution of the late Professor Pribram to diplomatic scholarship is divided into three parts of varied merit: a quick survey of Anglo-Austrian relations from Richard Coeur de Lion to the eve of the Bosnian imbroglio of 1908; thumb-nail sketches of leading British and Hapsburg policymakers from 1908 to 1914; and dealings between the two countries during those half-dozen years. Nearly a sixth of the volume is devoted to scholarly notes.

The sketch of Anglo-Austrian diplomacy to 1908 condenses a thorough and skillful study published by Pribram before 1914 and seems not to have been affected by subsequent findings of other scholars. Better than half the space is assigned to the record after 1789, though developments just before 1908, which foreshadowed the shape of things to come, are dismissed with unpardonable brevity. Mr. Ian D. F. Morrow, the translator, performed his task in a literal, not a liberal sense, with the result that the narrative is peppered with unwieldy sentences.

Appraisals of British and Austrian statesmen before the First World War are controlled by strict scholarship. The portraits that emerge are, on the whole, conventional and familiar. The verdict on Edward Grey is more sagacious and judicious than has been rendered by many another writer with a Central European background.

As a work of original investigation, the heart of the volume traces the passage from the announcement of the annexation of Bosnia to the outbreak of the general war. The reconstruction of the hectic sequence after the crime at Sarajevo is the most distinguished section of the book. Here is as complete and authoritative an account of Anglo-Austrian maneuverings as any reader is likely to want; for many the minute analysis will seem a repellant maze of detail.

Chief interest lies in the conclusions reached by this seasoned spadeworker, whose acquaintance with the pertinent literature was unsurpassed. On that score the treatment, alas, is distinctly disappointing, for we are seldom admitted far into Pribram's thinking. Terse summaries of important episodes are provided, it is true, the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and the latter's reply are cautiously assessed and, in the light of events, the diplomacy of the Ballplatz is labelled wrong-headed. Yet the overarching attitude of Pribram is revealed in the observation that, "The present writer deliberately abstains from expressing any opinion as to whether or not war [in July, 1914] could have been avoided" (p. 259). National self-interest, we are told (p. 1), is ever the guide of policy and the significance of the personal equation in diplomacy is commented upon (pp. 57-58).

Not everyone will endorse the point of view, shared by Pribram with Palmerston in an earlier day and Winston Churchill at present, that the Hapsburg Monarchy was an international asset of the utmost value. It is a pity that the author did not live to see his book through the printing stage; had he done so he would no doubt have caught factual blemishes that appear on his pages. Many who knew Pribram will applaud the affectionate portrayal of the career, the personal qualities and the learning of this acute and sensitive mind which forms the preface.

University of Rochester ARTHUR J. MAY

WHITE, JOHN ALBERT, *The Siberian Intervention.* Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1950. Pp. 471. $6.00.

This is a well documented and scholarly book. In its preface the author

claims that his "aim was to make a contribution to the scholarly and objective investigation" of the subject. The work is undoubtedly scholarly, but as for the objectivity, he himself acknowledges: "It is too much, therefore, to expect that the facts, as stated here will meet with anything like universal approval."

The author has made a good use of the documents collected in the Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace of the Stanford University, but unfortunately the choice of his materials was mostly either of Communist or pro-Bolshevik origin. Hence, the lopsidedness of the whole work, which is far from being objective. Possibly, the period in which the book was written (prior to 1948) had something to do with this lack of objectivity. Bolsheviks were in vogue then. Returning to the contents of the book, it has to be noted that it is intensely anti-Japanese. In view of the eventualities it is still a question as to whether the Soviet domination of Eastern Siberia is better than the Japanese.

All chapters of the book are equal in their scholarly documentation and are equally permeated with the poorly concealed sympathies and antipathies of the author. The Intervention was a tragic mistake of the Western Powers and the book reflects correctly the impending feeling of doom of all the enterprise. "Japan wanted Eastern Siberia; the United States was determined to prevent her from acquiring it" (p. 262). "In this fact lies the key to an understanding of American neutrality toward the various Russian factions." "This had the effect of making the American policy at times appear pro-Bolshevik." It not only appeared, it was pro-Bolshevik. This reviewer was in Vladivostok during the Intervention and personally observed the tendencies and inclination of the American occupational forces. It was the attitude of vacillating "neutrality" in the headquarters and open sympathy to the Reds among the soldiery.

The most dramatic pages in the book are met in Chapter 9, "The Allied Withdrawal," where the author makes an unsuccessful attempt to justify the betrayal of Kolchak to the Irkutsk Political Center, which, practically, was nothing else but the Soviet Military Revolutionary Committee. This was a ghastly affair resulting in the execution of Kolchak and his last Prime Minister, Pepeliaev, on February 7, 1920. Both Commanders, General Janin (French) and General Syrovy (Czech) agreed on the question of the surrender of Kolchak. Janin only stipulated that it should take place after his departure from Irkutsk. The author's attempt to justify this gruesome act is so futile that at the end of it he himself agrees: "The use of the word "betrayal" to describe their surrender of Kolchak to the Political Center cannot, therefore, have anything more than moral significance." This sentence makes the reader wonder whether the author consider the "moral significance" so insignificant that it is possible for him to treat it as a trifle and not to consider it to be obligatory for a General, who, by an unwritten law has to be an "officer and a gentleman."

Perhaps, one may recall that the grim irony of history has meted the retribution for the Kolchak betrayal: to the Czechs at Munich and to France in the débâcle of 1940.

Boulder, Colorado ALEX NENNSBERG

ARENDT, HANNAH, *The Origins of Totalitarianism.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951. Pp. 477. $6.75

KOGON, EUGEN, *Der SS-Staat, Das System der deutschen Konzentrationslager.* Frankfurt am Main: Verlag der Frankfurter Hefte, 1949. Pp. 412.

Both works represent major contributions to a discussion of the historical record and of the socio-psychological foundations not alone of nazism but of twentieth-century totalitarianism in general. Hannah Arendt, a German exile, whose early existentialist orientation has remained characteristic of all her writings, and Eugen Kogon, a Catholic journalist who spent seven years as a political prisoner in Nazi concentration camps, have reached, however different their observation points, many analogous conclusions. Analogous are also the motivations of the two writers. Since both are convinced, that only "the truth can make us free", the authors examine and bear consciously the burden which our century has placed upon us—"neither denying its existence nor submitting meekly to its weight" (Arendt, p. viii).

The first edition of Mr. Kogon's book grew out of a report which the author prepared on the Buchenwald camp immediately after his liberation for the use of the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF and of the Nürnberg war crimes commission. Already at that time the author fitted his eye-witness account into a searching scrutiny of the general system of Nazi terror and concluded with a chapter on "The German People and the concentration camps" which foretold many of the post-war developments in Germany. For the third edition, here reviewed, the author has added new chapters which deepen the political analysis of the Nazi state and movement, and enlarge on his earlier conclusions.[1]

In Miss Arendt's book the comprehensive parts which under the headings of "Antisemitism" and "Imperialism" investigate the forerunners of modern totalitarianism are particularly rewarding. Here as throughout her work the author displays an extraordinary ability to utilize for her research out-of-the-way sources and to obtain valid results even where occasionally the sources are far from limpid. At the same time often told episodes such as the Dreyfus affair or the anti-Jewish pogroms in czarist Russia obtain new significance. Miss Arendt connects in a convincing way the birth of nation-state and modern antisemitism, discusses the often neglected phenomenon of the political ignorance of the Jews, provides insight into antisemitism as a major political concept, and clarifies the political and psychological motivation of pre-totalitarian mob violence and sadism.

For the author's reasoning the significance of imperialism lies mainly in the dissolution of the concept of the nation-state and in the simultaneous

[1] The serious student should be warned that the American edition of Mr. Kogon's book (published under the title *The Theory and Practice of Hell,* New York, Farrar, Straus & Co) is a most unsatisfactory surrogate. While the translation is fair, the "adaptation for English and American readers" leaves out significant passages and in its rearrangement of the original constantly sins on the side of sensationalism.

growth of the various pan-movements as "parties above parties". The decadence of the modern party system which is so painfully evident in today's Europe is traced back to the period preceding the first world war.

In her analysis, the minority treaties of the Versailles settlement and the disappearance of a central despotic bureaucracy in Central Europe resulted in the actual end of the Rights of Man. Miss Arendt's discussion of the phenomenon of "statelessness" is highly original and helpful for both the sociological and legal concepts of nationality in a modern law of nations. At this point the two authors seem to disagree: where Miss Arendt considers indispensable a return to the conservative-positivist approach of Edmund Burke, Mr. Kogon seeks a redefinition of human rights in natural law concepts as they are presently entertained by the Catholic Church.

The broad historical background traced by Miss Arendt lends perspective and depth to her treatment of Nazism and Bolshevism. The affinity of the two systems has often been hinted at, but never before demonstrated with a similar amount of painstaking details: "Practically speaking, it will make little difference whether totalitarian movements adapt the pattern of Nazism or Bolshevism, organize the masses in the name of race or class, pretend to follow the law of life and nature or of dialectics and economics" (p. 306). Among the many aspects of modern totalitarianism, analyzed by the author, are the varying roles of ideology, propaganda and violence among the élite, the mob and the masses. The description of the totalitarian movements as "secret societies established in broad daylight", and as agents of an artificial creation of civil war conditions, might not only be helpful as an elucidation of the historical record but might also provide new orientation in our present perplexities.

Miss Arendt's discussion of "Totalitarianism in Power" is weaker than other parts of her book, her categorization becoming somewhat labored and her sources overworked. But here Mr. Kogon's report reads like a case study, implementing the fundamental analysis of totalitarianism given in both works. His observations leave no doubt that the concentration camps are the truest image of a totalitarian society in which it has become possible to dominate man entirely, by killing as it were the juridical person in him, and by dragging out the process of physical death over months or years.

Where Miss Arendt analyzes the *Gestalt* of the mob, Mr. Kogon submits illustrations by his biographical sketches and his description of the behavior of SS-leaders inside and outside Buchenwald. Where *The Origin of Totalitarianism* concludes that the camps had organized an abnormal existence beyond life, *The SS-State* demonstrates how it was precisely the unreality of the scientific tortures which made prisoners and guardians alike live truly in "hell". ("Normal men don't know that everything is possible", remarked the Frenchman Rousset, another survivor of a Nazi concentration camp.)

It is in their prognostic that the two authors seem to differ somewhat. Miss Arendt is convinced that the very existence of totalitarian régimes has vitiated international politics to an extent much more devastating than mere aggressive-

ness would be able to do. Not that these régimes play power politics in an especially ruthless way, but that there is hidden behind their politics an entirely new and unprecedented concept of power and reality, is considered by her as the greatest danger. Their rootlessness and neglect of national interest rather than nationalism, their contempt for utilitarian motives rather than unconsidered pursuit of self-interest, their unwavering faith in an ideological fictitious world, rather than lust for power are described as a permanent threat. Hence to Miss Arendt all efforts to escape from the grimness of the present into the anticipated oblivion of a better future are vain. If one presses her arguments, there is really no way to avoid the eventual domination of the globe by a totalitarian power.

For Mr. Gogon the present is equally grim. He believes that an unholy trinity, the uncorrected traits of German national character, a superficial indictment for "collective guilt" by the Allies and the continued existence of totalitarianism east of the border dividing Germany, have prevented the German people from truly facing the experience of Nazism and concentration camps. Writing from Germany, Mr. Kogon admits that if Hitler came back to-day a great many Germans would follow him again "only with somewhat more guilt-feelings" but also bend on applying even more ruthless power. Yet the author is convinced (or tried to convince himself) that a unified Europe will be able to provide for German and European youth that atmosphere of "lived and shared" freedom which expunges not the memory but the fear of terror and violence.

The question remains whether even a rejuvenated half of a continent will, by its very existence, sap the foundation of totalitarian Soviet power.

University of Colorado HENRY W. EHRMANN

EINAUDI, MARIO, DOMENACH, JEAN-MARIE & GAROSCI, ALDO. *Communism in Western Europe,* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951. Pp. 239. $3.00.

Professor Einaudi and the Rockefeller Foundation must be congratulated for bringing out this small volume on "Communism in Western Europe". This condensed treatment of the French and Italian communist parties presents a wealth of useful information concisely and objectively. It will be useful to students of comparative government and ought to be read by all those who are concerned with the threat of Communism and are puzzled by the paradox of Communist success among the two most individualistic peoples of Western Europe.

In the section on the French Communist Party, Jean-Marie Domenach, an editor of the left-wing Catholic monthly *Esprit,* sketches the doctrine, general strategy, history and principles of organization of the party. He analyzes the factors that explain its continued growth: structure, men, tactics and propaganda themes. Although he avoids dealing with the long-range historical factors that explain French receptivity to Communism and perhaps overemphasizes the importance of the Resistance as the main factor for the sudden growth of the party in the post-war years, the picture he presents is on the whole a convincing one. It is essentially that of a party with an efficient organization, supple tactics and

devoted militants that benefit from the ambiguity of appearing both as the pro-Soviet party of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the heir to the old French leftist tradition. Domenach makes a wide use of official Communist sources: perhaps too much so - at times he appears to give the party the benefit of the doubt, as when he gives the official definition of democratic centralism without comments or when he states that the Central Committee elects both Political Bureau and Secretariat while in fact it is the inner circle of top leaders that establishes the list of members to be "elected".

In his treatment of the Italian Communist party, Aldo Garosci a former leader of resistance to fascism, emphasizes the history of the party. He gives the impression of having more direct and less formal sources of information than Domenach, particularly concerning leaders and tactics. The significant difference between the Italian and the French parties is, of course, the fact that the former had to struggle in illegality and at times in exile from 1926 to the liberation. This gave it the advantage of appearing to be free from contradictions and consistent in its opposition to Fascism. It also led to tactics of collaboration with anti-fascist organizations that later paid dividends. The Italian Communist party did benefit at the liberation from its prestige as the most vigorous opponent of Fascism as well as from the totalitarian mold that to some extent shaped the political reactions of Italians in the immediate post-war period. Tactics of penetration and control help to understand the Communist success in colonizing the Socialist party under Nenni.

The introductory part by M. Einaudi does not measure up to the standards set by Domenach and Garosci. One finds there a number of generalizations some of which are useful, others too vague to be meaningful or largely irrelevant. In the chapter entitled "What must be done" the reader finds counsels of perfection: the extensive claims of the parties and the suspicion of the executive must be abandoned; there must be a true acceptance of the spirit of the constitution. The most important point concerning the success of Communism seems to be missing, namely, the fact that by its very nature as a disloyal opposition, the Communist party presents the creation of an effective lever for social change; the millions who vote for the Communist ticket are in fact losing their votes and strengthening the monopoly of power for the bourgeoisie. There is an unbalance in the representation of social forces that prevents the underprivileged elements from exercising effective pressure and from being adequately represented in the decision-making process. Communism will continue to be appealing as long as an effective instrument for social change is lacking. To state the problem is, however, quite different from solving it.

The truth of the matter is that relatively little is known about the reasons for the successes of Communism in France and Italy. The assumptions that are made cannot be proved or disproved. There is need for a systematic enquiry that is only beginning to be undertaken and is one of the greatest challenges facing political science today. This little book is a useful start in the right direction.

University of Virginia CHARLES A. MICAUD

TREFOUSSE, H. L., *Germany and American Neutrality,* New York: Bookman Associates, 1951. Pp. 247. $3.75.

The documents show that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was no less a surprise to the German Government than to ours. It was, in fact, the very negation of the policy which Hitler had chosen as the correct one in relation to the United States. For more than two years he had been intent on keeping America on the sidelines; the submarine must not again furnish the occasion for American entry into the war. Even under provocation of Roosevelt's shoot-on-sight order, Hitler held his navy in check. On Trefousse's evidence, the Nazi press too was subject to a restraint which, for it, was noteworthy.

Paralleling these domestic measures designed to keep the United States immobilized until the Nazis might choose their own time to deal with her, was a policy, also to that end, which exploited the isolationist sentiment in America. Although not of his own creation, this sentiment was Hitler's strongest asset. He thought he was reinforcing it by adding the element of fear when in September 1940 he entered an alliance with Japan pointedly aimed at the United States. However, Japan proved to be a strongly self-willed ally. Refusing to follow the urgent advice of Berlin to attack Singapore and/or Siberia, the Japanese kept their own counsel and, obedient to the dictates of strict military logic, sought to protect their rear and to maximize the period of time in which they could without interruption ensconce themselves in the islands of the Pacific. But what was logical from the military point of view was highly inexpedient from the political. The bombing of Pearl Harbor released the vise of domestic controversy in which, for years, American policy had been locked.

Not only did Japan proceed independently of Hitler; she actually worked her will on him. Only a few days before Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Ambassador succeeded in getting Hitler's promise to go to war with the United States even though, contrary to the alliance contract, Japan opened hostilities. By then adversity had accumulated in such proportions that Hitler could do nothing but comply, even at the expense of his resolve not to take on the United States as a full belligerent until he had disposed of his enemies closer home. The declaration of war on the United States solved many of Germany's short run dilemmas, but it and Pearl Harbor which precipitated the German action, spelled the doom of the Axis in the long run. Actually to invite American entry into the war was, as Hitler correctly perceived in the beginning, a very poor gamble.

This book is a sound, able study of a question which is central to the story of America's relation to the Second World War. It is a useful and highly welcome addition to the literature of that war.

Indiana University EDWARD H. BUEHRIG

HOLBORN, HAJO, *The Political Collapse of Europe.* New York: Knopf, 1951. P. 207. $2.00.

This study suffers from ambiguity. At one point the work is described as "an attempt at historical interpretation rather than a historical narrative of events"

(p. v), while elsewhere it becomes "a determined attempt to condense the events of the international political history of modern Europe to the essentials" (p. 195). Without clearcut and steady purpose this compact manual falls between two stools: it is neither a consistent philosophical interpretation nor is it an orderly guide through the vast and confusing labyrinth of modern political history. Although cast in the form customary for undergraduate instruction, the book presupposes considerable familiarity with the actualities of European evolution.

Starting off with a short exposition of "historic Europe" (the continent east to the Pripet marshes plus the Balkans) and the emergence of Russia as a real counter in high politics, the book carries through to the mid-twentieth century. The balance of power idea, the Napoleonic era and its aftermath, the upthrust of imperial Germany, the disintegrating consequences of industrial capitalism and imperialism, Europe and the two global wars and the bearing of the decadence of "historic Europe" upon the policy of the United States are the principal themes elucidated. Half of the work is devoted to the years after 1918; the final quarter, from Munich onward, incorporates the latest findings from primary and secondary diplomatic literature..

The scholar, Professor Holborn proclaims, has a responsibility to apply his learning, pragmatically, to the problems of the present. European political stability as it evolved in the nineteenth century crashed to the earth with the Frst World War leaving "only the façades standing" (yet it is suggested that Anglo-French cooperation might have restored the structure); the Second World War killed "historic Europe," and resurrection is not to be expected (but it is argued that recovery is not a fanciful academic vagary). Since 1917 public leadership in the United States has frequently misread the realities of Europe; and yet for its own physical security and for cultural and moral enrichment the United States requires a free Europe. Notwithstanding the title. the book is not a lugubrious essay in nihilistic pessimism. Historic Europe has disintegrated, it is true, and lives in constant peril of Soviet expansionism, but, if the Western nations can effect a considerable measure of unity, centered upon Franco-German collaboration and aided by the United States, a third bloc of power may emerge as a counterweight to the United States and the Soviet colossus.

Holborn presents us with some shrewd, penetrating, and sagacious insights. "Governments have always been inclined to turn sins of omission into virtues of commission" (p. 48); "the philosophy of Karl Marx is an arsenal from which many political schools can draw arms" (p. 114); "Adolph Hitler thought of himself as a modern Genghis Khan, capable of setting the course of history for the next thousand years by the application of his absolutely amoral and ruthless will power" (p. 147); "the record of the conversations of the Big Three [during the Second World War] makes painful reading" (p. 175). On the other side of the ledger, there are certain historical judgments which do not command complete confidence as, for instance, that the German liberals chose the way of *Realpolitik* (p. 38; cp. p. 41); the destruction of Germany as a naval and

colonial power formed the supreme British objective in the First World War (pp. 93, 117); "Munich cannot be defended on any good ground" (p. 157).

From the mass of pertinent literature, Holborn, in a bibliographical note, has selected and skillfully appraised the most readable, stimulating and authoritative volumes.

The University of Rochester ARTHUR J. MAY

DEUTSCHER, ISAAC, *Soviet Trade Unions: Their Place in Soviet Labor Policy*, London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950. Pp. ix, 156. $1.75.

This concise study deals with two closely interrelated themes: the historical development of trade unionism in the U.S.S.R., and the place occupied by organized labor within the Soviet social context. Since the second theme has not been treated in all its minute ramifications, the author's basic contribution lies in his scholarly analysis of historical contingencies which led to the full crystallization of the Soviet trade unions as a secondary, and fully subservient, agency of the state (or the Party). Mr. Deutscher deals primarily with the period preceding 1930, that is, with the formative era of Soviet trade unionism.

During the early years of the formative period the trade unions had neither well-defined functions nor a clear-cut ideological orientation. Bolshevik extremists, led by Trotsky, advocated full subordination of organized labor to the state. The spokesmen of the Workers' Opposition clamoured for autonomous trade unionism. "Moderate" Bolsheviks, headed by Lenin, sought a compromise between the two extremist views; yet while they gave lip service to the claims of the spokesmen of organized labor, they were ready to accept —at least for the time being—unqualified subordination of unions to the state. The discussion between the "extreme" and "moderate" Bolsheviks thus became an academic discourse. The future developments led to a gradual, and eventually complete, annulment of the most cherished prerogatives of labor unions: the right to defend the interests of the workers' class *vis-à-vis* the state-employer. The strike and collective bargaining, the workers' most potent defensive tools, were eliminated by gradual steps.

The author concludes that the unenviable position in which the Soviet unions find themselves today has been conditioned 'not by the needs of planned economy as such but by the application of planning to an extremely low level of economic and cultural development, the level at which Russia stood until recently." In the opinion of this reviewer this explanation disregards the crux of the problem. The trade unions, as the other officially recognized Soviet organizations, have evolved to their present status primarily through the successful efforts of Bolshevik leaders to develop a unicentered power system, the monolithic structure of the Soviet state. The weakening of trade unions as champions of the workers' rights has been an inevitable result of the growing consolidation of the Politbureau's totalitarian hold on the country. Political developments rather than

economic and cultural levels contain the key for the understanding of the structure and social role of Soviet trade unions.

The author gives hardly any account of several important changes affecting the labor movement during the last decade. For example, he fails to mention the recent change in wage policy from "middle-arithmetical" to "middle-progressive" norms of output, which raises the remuneration of skilled workers by reducing that of unskilled workers. He also fails to take into account the social effects of the recently introduced policy of allowing engineers to join trade unions. He discusses Stakhanovism only in its initial phases, and overlooks present-day emphasis on "group Stakhanovism," in which the intelligentsia plays the leading organizing role. Despite these comparatively unimportant omissions this study is a welcome contribution toward a fuller understanding of Soviet social life and political trends.

San Jose State College ALEXANDER VUCINICH

NEWMAN, BERNARD, *Turkish Crossroads.* London: Robert Hale, 1951. Pp. 258. 19/-net.

Like other works by Bernard Newman, such as *Balkan Background* and *Baltic Background,* this one is a popular travelogue, with brief historical disquisitions and politico-economic analyses thrown in for good measure. The title, of course, speaks for itself, for Turkey is at the continental crossroads, with all the trials and tribulations of that location. Essentially, the volume gives the author's descriptions and impressions of Istanbul, the Erzurum area, Malatya, Antioch, Ankara, and Izmir, of the people whom he saw and with whom he talked, and the general impression which the author obtained of the Turkish scene as a whole. He also writes of the Turkish government and constitution, of Ataturk, Ismet Inonu and Celal Bayar, of current Turkish politics, and the place of Turkey in current world politics. Within the context of the latter, he suggests that if English is the language one uses with his friend, French with his wife, Italian with his mistress, and German with his horse, Turkish is the language to be used with the Russians!

The author has a thorough appreciation of the rugged, sterling qualities of the Turkish people, and his book may well be compared with the recent volume of Eleanor Bisbee, *The New Turks,* which gives a similar impression. Generally, his assessment of the Turkish constitutional and political structure is accurate, although he uses the term "totalitarian" and "dictatorship" too loosely in connection therewith and more specifically in connection with the elections of May 1950 (Chs. III, VII especially). The author's popular essay (Ch. XI) on Turkish foreign policy, although generally accurate, leaves much to be desired, as does his treatment of the problem of the Turkish Straits, both historically and in its present phases. There are interesting data on the Armenian and Kurdish problems, and on the recent attempt of Bulgaria to deport large segments of the Turkish-speaking minority from Bulgaria to Turkey.

Because of its portrayal of the transformation which has occurred in Turkey

during the past thirty years, and of the impressions which the author obtained from Turks in all walks of life, his volume is well worth reading.

Arlington, Virginia HARRY N. HOWARD

COLVIN, IAN. *Master Spy.* New York-London-Toronto: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951. Pp. 286. $3.50.

This is another book on Canaris, the man who was the chief of the German Military Intelligence Service from 1935 to 1944. In 1949, Karl Heinz Abshagen, a German journalist, wrote *Canaris. Weltbuerger und Patriot* (reviewed in this *Journal,* vol. 11 (1951), no. 1); two years later, a British colleague of his tried his hand on the mysterious admiral.

I regret to report that Colvin has added little to Abshagen's dubious contribution. Both were handicapped by the unavailability of the main primary sources. Canaris' diary has not been found and, probably, never will. The documents of the *Abwehr* are partly destroyed; what remains is inaccessibly stowed away in military archives. The publication of documents relating to World War II which shed light on the history of the *Abwehr* and the career of its chief has barely begun. Therefore, the biographer must mainly rely on testimonials and memoirs, insufficient sources of information no matter how intelligently he may try to exploit them.

Abshagen's book is a biography; Colvin is less ambitious. His point is that Canaris was an implacable enemy of Hitler's (there is no doubt about this) which he proved by furnishing the British with vital military information and by establishing contacts which might be instrumental in shortening the war and in overthrowing the Nazi régime.

This is indeed an interesting point which Colvin tries to prove despite the fact that Admiralty and Foreign Office refused him access to the documents. Therefore, his book (in order to make it a book) contains much conjecture, divination, and extraneous material. It is, however, lively reading. There are numerous passages which describe meetings and encounters in direct discourse although no minutes nor verbatim reports exist. It is the kind of liveliness or life-likeness which gives the scholar pause.

Evidently, a book on Canaris is a difficult undertaking not only because of the handicaps already referred to but also because of the nature and scope of the subject. The Admiral, by virtue of his position, was involved in many of the major European developments, both military and political. Hence, the demands made on the biographer's *fundus* of information and on his knowledgeability are considerable. It appears that Colvin does not possess these qualifications.

One major example must suffice to prove this contention. Chapter 14 is entitled "The Admiral Advises Franco". It deals with the negotiations which were to lead to Spain's entry into the war, the first act of which was to be the reduction of Gibraltar. Preliminary discussions were held between Suñer and Hitler in Berlin. The former pointed out "that an attack on Gibraltar had been

discussed with German military experts and that Spain would need ten 15-inch (38-cm.) guns to reduce the rock . . . It is interesting to divine (sic) from their talk, when they moved over to the map table, that Hitler was insistent that Stukas were far more devastating that the artillery requested." (p. 147). Even the casual student of Hitler's military "genius" knows that he was not only very much interested in but also rather conversant with weapons and their efficiency. Actually, it takes considerably less than expert knowledge to see that a Stuka (a dive bomber which was light, maneuverable, and of limited load capacity because it was designed to be used against personnel and not against positions) would not make a dent in the Rock—nor would any number of them. Hitler's argument could make sense, however, if he had been interested (for reasons which I dare not divine) in getting Spain involved in a hopeless and disastrous undertaking. But Hitler did want Gibraltar in order to seal off the Mediterranean. Goerlitz, a reputable historian, informs us (*Der deutsche Generalstab,* p. 543) that Hitler, after meeting Franco at Hendaye, ordered the construction of siege guns heavier than those which Suñer is supposed to have referred to (60 cm./24 in.) and instructed his staff to prepare the operational plans for the military occupation of Spain. However, a month later (December, 1940), the project was dropped. Colvin gives Canaris major credit for this. The Admiral doubtless encouraged Franco to show as little cooperation as possible. In this, Colvin informs us, Canaris used various contacts. To give one example: he had his ideas conveyed to one of his associates so that the latter might inform Suñer who, in turn, would inform Franco. This, in itself, is not implausible but on the same page (148) Colvin characterizes Suñer as "pro-Nazi". The Master Spy uses a pro-Nazi to thwart Nazi schemes. The fact remains that Hitler desisted, yet, it would appear, this was not, predominantly or exclusively, because of what Canaris said and Franco did not do (what person ever changed Hitler's mind except the Fuehrer himself?) but because Hitler's attention was diverted to the Balkans (Mussolini's ill-fated campaign leading to Nazi intervention) and to Russia. These developments are not even mentioned by Colvin, a proof of his limited perspective.

This is *but one* instance as to why a reasonably informed reader will take a dim view of this book.

University of Colorado GERHARD LOOSE

WARRINER, DOREEN, *Revolution in Eastern Europe.* London: Turnstile Press, 1950. Pp. 188. 12s. 6d.

SETON-WATSON, HUGH, *The East European Revolution.* New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951. Pp. 406. $5.50.

Both of these books set out to describe and analyse the revolutionary changes that the Nazi and Communist imperialisms alternately wrought in the small countries occupying the *Zwischenraum* of Germany and Russia. Both were written by British writers; the first by a newspaperwoman, the second by an Oxford don. These is, however, little similarity between the two.

Doreen Warriner's book is more general and limits itself to a study of developments in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The author, who had previously written a number of economic studies (notably: *Economics of Peasant Farming,* 1939), is more interested in economics than in politics. Two thirds of this book are devoted to an analysis in orthodox marxist terms of the economic aspects of the bolshevization of Eastern Europe. With particular enthusiasm she describes the plans adopted by the Communist governments of Eastern Europe for rapid industrialization of their countries and collectivization of their agriculture. Although these plans are admittedly ambitious and the human and material resources at the disposal of Communist leaders patently mediocre, she has no doubt that they will be successful; consistently she writes of large factories, power plants, etc., that "will be built" as though their realization was absolutely certain. No attempt is made to form independent estimates on the prospects of these plans. Nor is any attempt made to analyze them in the light of the successes and failures of the Russian economic plans, on which they are patterned and which are now in their twenty-third year and thus old enough to form a standard of factual comparison.

As for the political changes effected by the Communists in Eastern Europe, Doreen Warriner views them as spontaneous internal revolutions uninfluenced by Soviet pressure. The loss of political freedoms that followed the Communist seizure of power is explained away in callous and pseudo-rational terms as being of no meaning to the peoples of Eastern Europe. No tears are shed over the tragic fate of the handful of courageous men who fought to preserve them. Thus for instance, although she admits that the evidence against Nikola Petkov, whose trial she "covered" for *The New Statesman and Nation,* was "slight," she justifies it in this truly unique way: "In the past. . . Petkov and the opposition *en masse* would have been assassinated. The treason trial is an advance in that it is a rationalisation, an attempt to make punishment the expression of the community's denunciation of the crime." (p. 23) In quarrels between Communists, she consistently takes the side of Moscow or of Moscow-approved groups. Tito's claim to be still a good Communist after the rupture with the Cominform, she finds "absurd;" he is merely another Pilsudski. (p. 62)

The international aspects of the bolshevization of Eastern Europe are completely ignored. As a report on conditions in Eastern Europe this superficial, callous, and inaccurate book is nearly worthless. It may, however, have some value as documentary proof of the persistent appeal of Soviet ideology among British left-wing socialists.

Hugh Seton-Watson's study is a much more important book. It is more intensive in treatment and extensive in scope. It proposes to analyze and describe in a manner "intermediate between journalism and history" (p. viii) all aspects of the bolshevization of Eastern Europe, giving due attention to economic, political, international, religious, and purely human factors. Beside the countries dealt with by Warriner, it treats also Rumania, Albania, and Greece. It is also

a superior book to the author's previous study, *Eastern Europe between the Wars 1918-1941,* to which the present volume forms a sequel.

In his former work, written during the war when hopes ran high that the conflict would be followed by a long period of friendly co-operation, or at least peaceful "co-existence," between Soviet Russia and the Western world, he took the rulers of East European countries severely to task for their fear of the "Bolshevik bogey." Now he apologizes rather naïvely for this attitude: "I knew nothing of Russian history, the Soviet régime, or the organisation of communist parties. I had seen communists in Eastern Europe only as martyrs of fascist dictatorships." (p. ix) Obviously, a study of Eastern Europe which ignores Russia and Communism even for the period of Soviet isolation is incomplete. Seton-Watson now strives to correct this inadequacy. Moreover, as distinguished from his first work, he has made in preparation of the present volume a thorough study of the literature available on Eastern Europe. This combined with his wide knowledge of East European affairs and personalities (as the son of Robert W. Seton-Watson all doors were open to him in the Danubian capitals until recently) and his remarkable linguistic training (he reads beside the Slav languages also Hungarian and Rumanian) gives him a position of great authority on the subject, a fact of which, incidentally, he is most unpleasantly aware (his books are full of sneers at others who presume to write on East European affairs). The result is an exceptionally well balanced study analyzing and integrating a mass of information into a lucid and coherent picture of Eastern Europe since the outbreak of World War II. The principal objection to this book that a non-British reader will raise is that it is written from a narrowly British point of view. Not only is England used as a standard of comparison for developments in Eastern Europe, which is absurd, but the latter are appraised solely in the light of British interests. American interests and those of the Western world in general are identified with those of Britain.

The book would have benefited from a better bibliography. Certainly the full names of authors and the dates and places of publication of their works should have been included. A surprising omission is the World War II memoirs of President E. Beneš.

The situation in Eastern Europe is rapidly changing and time will no doubt correct much of the information in this book and invalidate many of its conclusions, but for a long time it will remain a very useful and complete *vademecum* of the subject.

Florida State University VICTOR S. MAMATEY

HERZ, EMIL, *Denk Ich an Deutschland in der Nacht.* Berlin: Verlag des Druckh., 1951. Pp. 329. D.M. 12.

This is a personal history, the history of the Steg family, set down by an exiled writer for his son who requested it before going to war as an American soldier. But the author, a former editor and head of the book publishing branch

of the famous Ullstein publishing house, has succeeded in giving us a historical and sociological survey of German Jewry through three centuries.

Emil Herz goes back in history to the beginnings of the career of Samuel Steg, born in the Rhineland and schooled in Prague, who came to the small town of Warburg in Westphalia, in 1774, to take over the duties of rabbi. The great-great grandson chronicles with loving care and a reassuring sense of proportion the lives of five generations and with it gives the reader an insight into the development and growth of Germany itself. The role German Jews have played in this, from persecution and discrimination to emancipation—and back to degradation and extinction—is set down dispassionately and accurately from family papers, tradition and the rich well of personal experiences. For the second part of the book - and possibly the more fascinating one—is an autobiographical account of an exceptionally rich and fruitful life, which Emil Herz, now in his seventies and a resident of Rochester, N. Y., has set down. For me it constitutes a *Kulturgeschichte* in itself, evoking as it does the atmosphere of an irrevocable past: of the cultured, middle-class Jewish intellectual.

Here is the story of the typical small-town childhood, the boy's ambitions and the formation and experiences of the young student at Bonn University. actively taking part in the intellectual life of his country and well acquainted with its political one. Here, too, is the chronicle of the foundation and near-incredible growth of Ullstein's book publishing branch, which Herz helped found and eventually headed and which I read with the greatest admiration for the foresight and creative ability of its managing editor. At the same time the account of the work at Ullstein's is a mirror of the political trends of Germany in the 30 years preceding Hitler's ascension to power, and a fascinating picture of the flowering of the spirit at that time.

The style neatly fits the message: it is sober, simple and workman-like without any self pity or mawkishness, but distinguished by honesty and clear-sightedness which cannot help but affect and move the reader. It also may help him understand why German Jews used to regard themselves so deeply belonging to the *Vaterland* that their longing still 'keeps them up at night' as Heinrich Heine expressed it in the words from which the title of this book is taken.

University of Nebraska EMILY SCHOSSBERGER

SHORTER NOTICES

PTASNIK, JAN, *Miasta i mieszczaństwo w dawnej Polsce.* 2nd. ed. Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1949. Pp. vii, 439.

On its first appearance in 1934 this study of Professor Ptaśnik assumed a commanding position in the literature of economics and society of medieval Poland. Professor Ptaśnik's major work had been in medieval cultural history, but his work in the archives of *Kraków,Lwów* and Warsaw had convinced him of the need for a reassessment of the concepts current concerning Polish cities and city life. He was interested in the use of judicial institutions, but as he was not trained as a legal historian, his work in this respect was subject to criticism and emendation. A central problem of Polish economic and social history was the relation of German town law and the German merchant to the Polish town and countryside. Perhaps the most significant single feature of Ptaśnik's work was the new light he shed on this problem. With conclusive proof he showed that the German influence in Polish urban society had been unduly magnified and that the process of polonization of German burghers had clearly set in as early as the fourteenth century, and increased in tempo in the fifteenth so that although names may have remained German, the bearers were to all valid intents already Poles. It was not without interest, furthermore, that this process was perhaps more marked in Upper Silesia, which by that time had no organic connection with the Polish Kingdom.

This second edition has been subjected to some editorial correction of obvious factual errors which in the first posthumous publication in 1934 had been allowed to pass, and is provided with a foreword by Professor Stanisław Arnold, one of the leading economic historians of Poland.

S. H. THOMSON

REBET, LEV, *Formuvannya Ukrayins'koyi Natsiyi.* Munich: Suchasna Ukrayina. 1951. Pp. 59.

There are more complete books available in English (Chamberlin, Manning, Mirchuk, Doroshenko) on the formation and development of the Ukrainian nation than this booklet in the Ukrainian language. Its publication is nevertheless a significant sign of our times and comes like a voice from the edge of the tomb to remind us of the "Dark Ages" in which we live. The author belongs to a little band of displaced Ukrainian scholars who are trying in a truly heroic struggle to maintain themselves outside their native land and still carry on scholarly work. The contents of this booklet were printed in a Ukrainian newspaper published every two weeks in Munich, Suchasna Ukrayina (Ukraine To-Day). The series of articles appeared in 1951.

The author is aware of the difficulties of scholarly research where source material is limited and financial aid almost non-existent. He has however a burning interest in the subject which he discusses, the emergence of historical consciousness, the historical role of the Ukrainian people, and their present plight. He knows that the solution of the Ukrainian problem lies with the forty million people who are living in the Ukraine but he believes that the ultimate solution will be greatly influenced by the sympathetic understanding and encouragement which the people there receive from outside. This booklet is intended as a useful contribution to an understanding of the Ukrainian people.

The author is not dogmatic but indicates varying points of view. In his bibliography he lists the works of some twenty Ukrainian authors.

This work ought to be sympathetically received by readers who are trying patiently in these critical days to piece together the historical facts which appear, disappear and reappear in the story of that fascinating, dynamic area, Central Europe.

University of Saskatchewan GEORGE W. SIMPSON

STRAUS, HANNAH ALICE, *The Attitude of the Congress of Vienna toward Nationalism in Germany, Italy, and Poland.* In *Studies in History, Economics and Public Law,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. Pp. 164.

The above work, which is one of the many doctoral dissertations on some aspect of nationalism written under the direction of Prof. Carlton J. H. Hayes, is a study of the attitude of the plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Vienna towards the national movements in Italy, Germany, and Poland—the parts of Europe where the nationalist issue could best be observed. Dr. Straus outlines, in a concise and schematic manner, the motives of the plenipotentiaries at Vienna who favored and disapproved the national cause in each of these countries. Two basic threads run through the volume: (a) the fact that, with the possible exception of Poland, nationalism was still a vague, inchoate force which affected only small minority groups in 1814-15, and (b) the fact that the Great Powers at Vienna, though acutely aware of the nationalist issues in Germany, Italy, and Poland, considered them only from the point of view of how the nationalist strivings would affect the balance of power in Europe (especially in the case of Great Britain) or how they would enhance or harm the security or prestige of their own particular country.

Dr. Straus has by no means exhausted the voluminous amount of material available for her study, but has confined herself largely to some of the most important and more available works in German, Italian, French, Spanish, and English. Nevertheless, although she has overlooked some pertinent material, her bibliography is adequate. She has not come to any startling new conclusions. The value of her work is in the way she has drawn on readily available material to bring together various observations, hitherto scattered, in a well-organized, compact work in which the most significant issues are clearly pointed out.

University of Texas R. JOHN RATH

THIMME, ANNELIESE, *Hans Delbruecks politische Zeitkritik.* Göttingen, 1951.

One of the great desiderata for a deeper understanding of imperial Germany and especially of its internal policy is a biography of Hans Delbrueck which would do equal justice to one of the most sympathetic personalities of German public life over decades, to a great historian (Hans Delbrueck as military historian has been brilliantly evaluated by Gordon Craig HANS DELBRUECK) and to a first-rate conservative publicist of independent and moderate judgment. The nearest approach so far to a biography is made by Annelice Thimme in her Göettingen Ph. D. thesis *Hans Delbruecks politische Zeitkritik waehrend der Wilhelminischen Epoche, 1890-1918* (1951; 215 pp. and 9 pp bibliography, mimeogr.), - a thesis far above the average, mainly based on Delbrueck's regular contributions to the section "Politische Korrespondenz" of the *Preussische Jahrbuecher.*

Written with remarkable knowledge of events and personalities of the

period, the thesis first takes up static elements-the German Government, the autocratic allures ("persoenliches Regiment") of the Emperor and Delbrueck's attitude toward conservatives, liberals and the Center Party (not hiding limitations in Delbrueck's outlook, for instance his dogmatic anti-Catholicism with the Kulturkampf imprint). The main part of the thesis is devoted to the political problems of the Wilhelminian period as mirrored in Delbrueck's criticism. Internal policy is summarily being disposed of under the heading "The Social Question" comprising "Social policy", "the Christian-social movement" Adolf Stoecker, Friedrich Naumann), "the Social-Democratic Party" and "the question of electoral systems" in the Reich and Prussia. In analyzing Delbrueck's ideas on Germany's problem of nationalities, the author deals with the Poles and Danes, but leaves out the problem of Alsace-Lorraine. The sections on foreign policy concentrate on German "World politics" and the Navy problem stressing Delbrueck's "patriotic illusionism" in both respects.

While some unpublished illuminating materials in the possession of the Delbrueck family were put at the author's disposal, the archives of the *Preussische Jahrbuecher* in the Manuscript Division of the Oeffentliche Bibliothek (formerly Prussian State Library) at Berlin, a gold-mine for research on decades of German intellctual history, have not been touched. The chapter on political problems of the Great War when Delbrueck took a leading part in the discussion of war aims, of submarine warfare and of the reorientation of German internal policies, deserves special attention. In an early stage of the war Delbrueck advocated a large German colonial Empire in Central Africa, but in his appraisal of the German situation he later became sober and realistic in advance of the majority of his compatriots. For discussion of problems of the European East certain papers left by General von Beseler, the former Governor General of Poland, are used here for the first time.

Washington, D. C. FRITZ T. EPSTEIN

FISCHER, LOUIS, *The Soviets in World Affairs, A History of the Relations Between the Soviet Union and the Rest of the World.* 2 Vols. Second Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. Pp. 960. $10.00.

Princeton University Press and Mr. Fischer are to be congratulated for making available once again this familiar and indispensable work on Soviet foreign relations. Despite the changed atmosphere both international and, for Mr. Fischer, personal, since the initial appearance of the two volumes in 1930, the author has wisely refrained from any revision of the original text, although a new introduction has been added.

The content of the study is too well known to warrant discussion in this note. But the new introduction together with a rereading of the text does direct attention to at least two basic questions. Are present Soviet aims different from those of two decades ago? Has the development of Communist foreign policy from "renunciation" to an "orgy of gab" been the result of forces implicit though unpredicted in Bolshevik logic or has it been a planned program, varying in its manifestations with the availablitiy of implimentation to the Soviet leaders? To what extent do the early unfriendly acts of the outside world explain Soviet distrust of the western nations? Certainly the later friendship and aid of the United States and its allies in World War II did nothing to dispel Russian hostility. Quite the contrary, it was the signal for a stepped-up campaign against the west once the common danger had passed.

The reissue of these volumes should prompt many students of Soviet affairs to turn to them again in order to reevaluate the events they describe in the clearer, light of twenty years of historical perspective.

University of Colorado ROBERT P. BROWDER

UDALCOV, I. I. et al. *Velká říjnová socialistická revoluce a naše narodní svoboda.* Prague: Rovnost, 1950. Pp. 125. Kčs. 31.

This small volume contains the nine principal speeches delivered at a Scientific Conference of the Socialist Academy in Prague on November 4, 1949. The tone of the Conference was set by the Soviet Historian I. I. Udalcov, who has shown much interest in Czechoslovak history for some time. His address was a general exposé of the international significance of the October revolution. There is nothing unexpected in his paper. On the other eight papers, all by Czech Marxists, various aspects of the intimate relation that is said to exist between the October 1917 Revolution and the achievement of Czech independence a year later are treated. Oldřich Říha discusses the struggle that was waged outside the homeland for Czechoslovak independence. The general assumptions and conclusions are somewhat different from those of bourgeois historiography that regards Masaryk, Beneš and Štefaník as largely instrumental in winning that struggle. Arnošt Klima, known in the West for his article on 1848 in Bohemia in the corporate work *Le Printemps des peuples* (Paris 1948, 2 vols.) published in English as *The Opening of an Era* (London, 1948), discusses the Czech movement in Russia and the October revolution. Again, the reader who has read previous accounts of these troubled years or has talked with Czech participants will feel that perhaps the proportion of those who were favorably impressed by the Bolshevist revolution is here represented as unexpectedly high. General Čeněk Hričska's contribution on the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia points out that T. G. Masaryk failed to understand properly the nature of the first World War, and consequently misguided the Legionaries. Jiří Doležal takes up in earnest the intriguing question of the position of the Soviet Union toward Czechoslovakia at the time of Munich. This is a question on which many readers would like enlightenment. The unpublished part of Beneš' memoirs would help to elucidate this hazy question. The proclamations of Litvinov we know. Whether they meant anything or not, we do not yet know. When Doležal quotes Fierlinger's report that there were divisions of Russian troops and adequate air units to defend Czechoslovakia already mobilized, one is tempted to smile remembering (1) the Soviet insistence on the conditional nature of her guarantee to Czechoslovakia, and (2) the Finnish fiasco of the next year. Professor Václav Husa begins his paper on the "Soviet Union and our Liberation" with the significant statement: "The preceding surveys have shown what great tasks await our historical science, before the determinative importance of the great October revolution for the rise of the Czechoslovak state and for the existence of the independence of our state may be appropriated and accurately evaluated." It is indeed a great task to reverse, in a short time, the judgments of a whole generation of historical research and that without supporting documentation.

Mexico City TOMAS MARNY

RAMBAUD, LOUIS, *Le Grand petit Chancelier Dollfuss, 1892-1932.* Lyon: Emmanuel Vitte, 1948. Pp. 259.

An objective and scholarly biography of Engelbert Dollfuss has long been needed. His strong religious and political convictions and his determined and

at times rather ruthless measures to suppress the enemies, real or alleged, of his country, together with the authoritarian and corporative constitution which he promulgated in 1934, have all served to make Dollfuss a center of violent controversy. On the one hand, he has been panegyrized as a veritable Redeemer, unblemished by the sins of mortal man; on the other, he has been depicted as Satan Incarnate. Few writers have been able to assume a neutral, unbiased point of view when discussing "Millimetternich."

Unfortunately for the historiography of recent Austria, Louis Rambaud, one of the leading Catholic writers in France, has been unable to tear himself away from the aura of prejudices which have befuddled the evaluation of the confused period in Austrian history between 1932 and 1938. The vein in which the whole volume is written is perfectly illustrated by the words which the author inscribed in the visitor's book in the house at Texing where Dollfuss was born: "Since 1932 I have admired and loved Engelbert Dollfuss. When I return to my country I will glorify his great memory by the book which I will write" (p. 8. Italics in original omitted).

Like most conservative writers on Austria, Rambaud emphasizes that Dollfuss' enemies, the Social Democrats, aimed at establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat, through violence if necessary (pp. 75-6), whereas Dollfuss employed forceful methods only if and when his opponents first used violence (p. 115). Dollfuss' dissolution of parliament in March, 1933, is defended as an energetic act by a real leader interested only in saving his country from destruction (pp. 118-19), and the chancellor's vigorous measures in February, 1934, are depicted as necessary to put down an insurrection begun by the Social Democrats.

Rambaud's work thus falls into the category of a eulogy. Needless to say, none but the most ardent admriers of Chancellor Dollfuss will agree with all of the author's statements.

University of Texas R. John Rath

Documents of the Hostile Activity of the United States Government against the Hungarian Peoples' Republic. Budapest: Hungarian State Publishing House, 1951. Pp. 323.

The Information Department of the Hungarian Foreign Office has collected and published in English text or translation, under 12 heads, diplomatic exchanges, foreign office news releases, extracts from court and police records, extracts from newspaper articles concerning the imperialist, reactionary, fascist, slanderous, calumnious, malicious, interfering, spying, provocative, warmongering activities of the Government of the United States and its diplomatic and espionage agents abroad. It is a remarkable collection. In the Preface (p. 7.) one reads: "The documents published in this White Book show however, that the Government of the United States of America brazenly violates the rights, the independence, and the state sovereignty of the Hungarian Peoples' Republic, is repeatedly interfering in the domestic affairs of this country and strives to undermine and overthrow Hungary's democratic state and social system."

P.

America and the Mind of Europe, edited with an introduction by Lewis Galantière. New York: Library Publishers, 1952. Pp. 125. $2.75.

The title of this small book was the theme of the January 13, 1951 issue of the *Saturday Review of Literature,* most of whose aricles are here reprinted.

Their impact remains grave and deeply disturbing.

In his introduction Galantière explains succinctly why "it is essential to Soviet purposes that the American people turn their backs on Europe"; then propounds the "prodigious paradox" of a nation with a sound moral cause, i.e. the United States, being "morally on the defensive". He arraigns American intellectuals for having failed to enlighten Europeans on the nature of American ideals. Europe, he believes, "needs to hear from a new Tom Paine; for a new America does exist, though it has not yet found its voice."

Raymond Aron, answering the question "Is Europe prepared to accept American leadership?" indicates that the many Europeans who shout "no", and the still larger number who give only a qualified affirmative, are resistant to some extent to their own conception of American capitalism, and, to a larger degree, to American culture as they have seen it in its mediocre, mass-produced and self-righteous aspects.

Denis de Rougemont, while attesting the gravity of Europe's moral and spiritual sickness and the powerlessness of her intelligentsia, stakes his faith on the solidification, with American succor, of "the supranational unity of European culture", that foundation of all western culture.

Koestler is concerned with "an acute neurosis, the chief symptoms of which are evasion of reality and resentment of reality", and with its manifestation in a sinister "semantic decay" which has perverted the meaning of such words as "Left", "Socialist" and "capitalism". Western Europe, thus confused, can neither restore herself to wholeness nor remain "a power vacuum between two centers of power". He concludes, "the seat of the Holy Roman Empire has shifted to Washington, D. C." and ". . . the inescapable conclusion is bitter to admit for us Europeans and unpleasant to accept for you Americans".

The rest of the articles, by Stephen Spender, Leo Lania, M. J. Lasky, Nicolas Nabokov, J. T. Soby cover more specific cultural aspects of post-war Europe's restoration or limbo, according to the point of view of the author. Lasky, dealing with literaure and the arts, is particularly acute in his probing of the dangerous waverings of a rump Europe, cut off from "the traditionally fructifying cultures of the Slavic East", discouraged by its own stereotyped judgments of American civilization, and unable to synthesize anything organic from the remnants of its own cultural tradition. America, in turn, is oversensitive to European criticism. Ending on a note of hope, he recalls T. S. Eliot's opinion that the Americans may ultimately be destined to become Europeans "in a way that no European ever could become."

The consensus of these anxious analysts appears to be that the European idea, threatened as never before, yet more valuable than ever, must be saved, in spite of European pride and American ignorance, by an American-led moral and cultural offensive which must, to succeed, step very softly and carry the balm of appreciation and patience.

R. Vere

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

GENERAL

Čerych, Ladislav, "Střední Evropa a Federalismus" *Skutečnost,* 1951, Ročnik III, Číslo 8-9, 159-161.

Eayrs, James, "New Weapons in the Cold War (A Study of Recent Techniques in International Propaganda)," *Intern. Jl.,* Winter, 1951-1952, 36-47.

Erjavec, Fran, "Slavic Danger," *Eastern Qy.,* Jan.-Apr., 1952, 15-21.

Fraenkel, Han, "Die Schweizer Democratie in Widersprüchen," *Aussenpolitik,* Feb., 1952, 99-106.

Gurian, Waldemar, "Totalitarian Religions," *Rev. of Pol.,* Jan., 1952, 3-14.

Halecki, O., "Imperialism in Slavic and East European History," *Amer. Slav. & East Eur.* Rev., Feb., 1952, 1-26.

Kruls, H. J., "The Defense of Europe," *For. Aff.,* Jan., 1952, 265-276.

Listowel, Judith, "Communist Anti-Semitism," *East Eur.,* Feb. 21, 1952, 10-14.

Manera, Enrique, "La Significación del Mediterráneo en la defensa de Europa," *Politica internacional,* Sept. 1951, 73-90.

Moyse Robert, "No Star for the Wise Man (Some Fiscal Problems of NATO Countries)," *Intern. Jl.,* Winter 1951-1952, 1-11.

Murillo Rubiera, Fernando, "La política internacional en el tercer trimestre de 1951," *Politica internacional,* Sept., 1951, 127-137.

Pachydermus, "Escapism," *East Eur.* Dec. 6, 1951, 1-4.

Pachydermus, "Will the Dupes Help Them?" *East Eur.,* Jan. 17, 1952, 6-10

Paprocki, Stanislaw J., "Political Organization of the Ukrainian Exiles After the Second World War," *Eastern Qy.,* Jan.-Apr., 1952, 41-50.

Schmid, Carlo, "Die Aussenpolitik des Machtlosen," *Aussenpolitik,* Jan., 1952, 11-19.

Ševčík, Dr. Ján, "Októbrová revolúcia a jej význam pre mierové hnutie," *Slovanský Přehled 9,* XXXVII (1951), 381-385.

"Studien über Materialismus (III)," *Osteuropa,* Feb., 1952, 29-34.

Ursyn, Józef, "Kolegium Wolnej Europy," *Kultura,* Jan. 1952, 71-79.

Weber, Caspar, "Die Neue Rüstungsfinanzierung," *Schweizer Monatshefte,* Jan., 1952, 585-590.

AUSTRIA

Federhofer, Hellmut v., "Grazer Geigen- und Lautenmacher des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts," *Blätter für Heimatkunde,* 25. Jahrgang-Heft 3 Graz 1951, 74-80.

Graf, Alexander v., "Ein alter Foliant erzählt seine Geschichte," *Blätter für Heimatkunde,* 25. Jahrgang- Heft 4 Graz 1951, 106-112.

Mayer, R., "Das Bürgerhaus von Altgraz," *Zft. d. Hist. Ver.,* XLII (1951), 78-90.

Meister, O., "Justus von Liebig und die Steiermark," *Zft. d. Hist. Ver.,* XLII (1951), 140-149.

Novak, Viktor, "Principium et Finis - Veritas (Concerning the Case of Archbishop Stepinac)," *Intern. Aff.,* Dec., 19, 1951, 7-11.

Pirchegger, H., "Die Herren von Pettan," *Zft. d. Hist. Ver.* XLII (1951), 3-36.

Posch, F., "Der Kampf um die Freiheit der Untertanen der Herrschaft Stein zu Fürstenfeld und der Bürgerschaft zu Fehring," *Zft. d. Hist. Ver.* XLII (1951), 54-77.

Tremel, Ferdinand Von, "Der Streit um den Wein," *Blätter für Heimatkunde,* 25. Jahrgang- Heft 3 Graz 1951, 65-73.

Tremel, F. "Steirische Miszellen aus den Publikationen der Tauschvereine," 1. Die Obersteiermark in der Römerzeit, 158-159, 2. Das Edlingerproblem 160-163, 3. Der Saumhandel Über die Tauern 164-166, *Zft. d. Hist. Ver.,* XLII (1951).

Walters, Eurof, "Unpublished Documents: Aehrenthal's Attempt in 1907 to Re-group the European Powers," *Slav. & East Eur. Rev.,* Dec., 1951, 213-251.

THE BALKANS

Berić, Dušan, "Un vol littéraire au XVIIe siècle," *Istoriski Časopis,* 1949-1950. 127-134.

Bossy, Raoul, "Romania: Barrien Nation," *Intern. Jl.* Winter, 1951-1952, 23-29.

Čermelj, Lavoslav, "Denationalisation of Slovenes in the Anglo-American Zone of F. T. T.," *Rev. Intern. Aff.* Jan., 2, 1952, 11-13.

Dinić, Mihajlo, "Trois documents rélatifs á l'Office imprimé en caractères cyrilliques en 1512," *Istoriski Casopis,* 1949-1950. 109-114.

Kertesz, Stephen, "Soviet and Western Politics in Hungary 1944-1947," *Rev. of Pol.* Jan., 1952, 47-74.

Marković, Miroslav, "Was Zenophanes Eleates ever in Hvar," *Istoriski Časopis,* 1949-1950, 19-28.

Paikert, G. C., "Hungarian Foreign Policy in Intercultural Relations, 1919-1944," *Amer. Slav. & East Eur. Rev.,* Feb., 1952, 42-65.

Papagos, Alexander, "Guerrilla Warfare," *For. Aff.,* Jan., 1952, 215-230.

Radojčić, Nikola, "Autour du Code de Dušan. I Le Code de Dušan dans le Manuscrit de Studenica," *Istoriski Časopis,* 1949-1950, 103-108.

Radojčić, Nikola, "Le droit byzantin dans le Code de Dušan," *Istoriski Casopis,* 1949-1950, 10-18.

Tappe, E. D., "The Centenary of I. L. Caragiale," *Amer. Slav. & East Eur. Rev.,* Feb., 1952, 66-76.

Tomić, Lidija, "Crum et ses archontes slaves," *Istoriski Casopis,* 1949-1950, 87-89.

Vučo, Nikola, "Position des compagnons et apprentis au temps de l'affaiblissement des Corporations de métiers en Serbie," *Istoriski Časopis,* 1949-1950, 39-80.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Kohn, Hans, "Romanticism and Realism among Czechs and Slovaks," *Rev. of Pol.,* Jan., 1952, 25-46.

Lenoy, Ursula, "Reptiles Under the Water," *East Eur.,* Dec. 6, 1951, 4-7.

Odložilík, Otakar, "Koruna z Bobkové Višně," *Husův Lid,* Jan., 1952, 3-7.

GERMANY

Demetz, Petr, "Potíže Západoněmecké demokracie," *Skutečnost,* 1952, 5-10.

Dittrich, Erich, "Der Aufbau der Flüchtlingsindustrien in der Bundesrepublik," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv,* 1951 Band 67 Heft 2, 327-360.

Heimpel, Hermann v., "Rudolf Stadelmann und die Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft," *Hist. Zft.,* Oct., 1951, 285-307.

Hirsch, Helmut, "Bibliographical Article — Some Recent Material on the Saar," *Jl. of Mod. Hist.,* Dec. 1951 366-376.

Jaeger, Hans, "Sovietisation of East Germany," *East Eur.,* Jan. 24, 1952, 4-5.

Kann, Robert A., "Emperor William II and Archduke Francis Ferdinand in their correspondence," *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* Jan., 1952, 323-351.

Lamprecht, O., "Die Riegersburg im Mittelalter," *Zft. d. Hist. Ver.,* XLII (1951), 37-53.

Meyer, Hermann, "Karl Marx und die deutsche Revolution von 1848," *Hist. Zft.,* Dec., 1951, 517-534.

Meyer, Karl Alfons, "Kulturelle Umschau: Zeitschriften Westdeutschlands," *Schweizer Monatshefte,* Jan., 1952, 628-632.

Pradzyński, Jerzy, "List z Niemiec," *Kultura,* Feb.-Mar., 1952, 127-133.

"Pressestimmen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik," *Schweizer Monatshefte,* Jan., 1952, 601-602.

Treue, Wilhelm, "Firmengeschichte," *Hist. Zft.* Dec., 1951, 535-546.

Weber, Alfred, "Der Westen und die deutsche Einheit," *Aussenpolitik,* Jan., 1952, 5-10.

Zet-Ka, "Niemiecka Republika Demokratyczna w walce o pokój i zjednoczenie Niemiec," *Zycie Słowiańskie,* Grudnia 1951, 524-527.

NEAR & MIDDLE EAST

Howard, Harry N., "The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951," *Dept. of State Bulletin,* Nov. 19 & 26, 1951, 809-816, 839-843.

Huici Poyales, Félix, "Aspectos técnicos y económicos de la crisis del petróleo persa," *Politica internacional,* Sept., 1951, 109-123.

Patai, Raphael, "The Middle East as a Culture Area," *Middle East Jl.,* Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter, 1952, 1-21.

Stauffer, Thomas B., "Economic Review - Labor Unions in the Arab States," *Middle East Jl.,* Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 1952, 83-88.

Thomas, Lewis V., "Recent Developments in Turkish Islam," *Middle East Jl.,* Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 1952, 22-40.

POLAND

Antoniewicz, Jerzy, "Nieznana 'baba kamienna' z pruskiego terytorium plemiennego," *Sprawozdanta P. M. A.,* Vol. III, 1950, Livr. 1-4, 153-161.

Antoniewiez, Jerzy i Wesolowski, Kornel, "Wiadra brazowe z delfinowatymi uchwytami na ziemiach polskich," *Wiadomości Archeologiczne,* 1951, 137-184.

Antoniewicz, Jerzy, "Z zagadnień ochrony zabytków wczesnośredniowiecznego budownictwa obronnego na Warmii i Mazurach," *Sprawozdania P. M. A.,* Vol. III 1950, Livr. 1-4, 51-77.

Brock, Peter, "Bolesław Wysłouch, Founder of the Polish Peasant Party," *Slav. & East Eur. Rev.,* Dec., 1951, 139-163

Bronarski, Alfons, "Tłumacze literatury polskiej," *Kultura,* Jan., 1952, 121-126.

Burmeister, Alfred, "Tragedia polskich komunistów," *Kultura,* Jan., 1952, 101-109.

Campbell, C. A., "The Soviet Concept of Logic," *Soviet Studies,* Jan., 1952, 278-287.

Czapkiewicz, Andryej, "Moneta Kuficka z Lublina," *Sprawozdania P M. A.,* Vol. III, 1950, Livr. 1-4, 115-117.

Gardawski, Aleksander, "Niektóre zagadnienia kultury trzcinieckiej w świetle wykopalisk w miejscowości Łubna, pow. Sieradz.," *Wiadomości Archeologiczne,* 1951, 1-84.

Gardawski, Aleksander, "Wczesnohistoryczna osada z okresu piastowskiego we Wrocieryzu, pow. Jedrzejów," *Sprawozdania P. M. A.,* Vol. III, 1950, Livr. 1-4, 163-174.

Gassowski, Jerzy, "Wczesnohistoryczne cmentarzysko szkieletowe w Radomiu," *Wiadomości Archeologiczne,* Vol. XVII, Livr. 4, 1950-1951, 305-326.

Grajewski, Wiktor, "Krzepnie Przyjaźń polsko - czechosłowacka," *Życie Słowiańskie,* Grudnia 1951, 519-524.

Grażynski, Michal, "The Odra-Nysa Line - A Frontier of Central Eastern Federation and a Guarantee of Lasting Peace," *Eastern Qy.,* Jan.-Apr., 1952, 2-14.

Haisig, Marian, "Znalezisko rzymskich denarów we wsi Zubowice, pow. Tomaszów Lubelski," *Sprawozdania P .M. A.,* Vol III 1950, Livr. 1-4, 93-108.

Hensel, Witold, "Polskie tysiąclecie," *Sprawozdania P. M. A.,* Vol III 1950, Livr. 1-4, 27-48.

Kridl, Manfred, "Wacław Borowy and His Role in Polish Literary Scholarship," *Amer. Slav. & East Eur. Rev.,* Dec., 1951, 282-293.

Musianowicz, Krystyna, "Cmentarzysko i osada wczesnohistoryczna w Gozdowie, pow. Sierpc," *Wiadomości Archeologiczne,* Vol. XVII Livr. 4, 1950-1951, 251-304.

Musianowicz, Krystyna, "Wczesnohistoryczny puchar na pustej nózce z Ośnicy, pow. Płock," *Sprawozdania P. M. A.,* Vol. III 1950, Livr. 1-4, 119-122.

Musianowicz, Krystyna, "Z zagadnień osadnictwa wczesnohistorycznego, pow. Sokołów Podlaski," *Wiadomości Archeologiczne,* Vol. XVII Livr. 4, 1950-1951, 229-250.

Nadolski, Andrzej, "Cmentarzyska z późniejszego okresu lateńskiego w Gledzianówku i w Brzozówce w Polsce środkowej," *Widomości Archeologiczne,* 1951, 85-136.

Nosek, Stefan, "Materiały neolityczne z południowej Polski: 1. Osady kultury młodszej ceramiki wstegowej kreskowwkłutej w Jurkowie, w pow. brzeskim i Wężerowie, w pow. miechowskim 81-88, 2. Grób południowo-morawskiej ceramiki malowanej w

Kamieniu Plebańskim, w pow. sandomierskim," 88-92, *Sprawozdania P. M. A.*, Vol. III 1950, Livr. 1-4, 81-92.

Opozda, Maria, "Dirhem arabski z X w. znaleziony w Tumie k. Łęczycy," *Sprawozdania P. M. A.*, Vol. III, 1950, Livr. 1-4, 109-114.

Riksvyl, Ivar Buxell af, "Polnische Schiffahrtspolitik," *Osteuropa,* Feb., 1952, 9-14.

Rosiński, Bolesław, "Antropologiczna charakterystyka kostnych szczątkow ludzkich wczesnohistorycznego szkieletowego smentarzyska w Radomiu," *Wiadomści Archeologiczne,* Vol. XVII Livr. 4, 1950-1951, 327-340.

Sokolnicki, Michal, "Sprawa Józefa Becka," *Kultura,* Jan. 1952, 94-100.

Tokarski, Jan, "Kościół i wojna," *Kultura,* Feb.-Mar., 1952, 67-77.

RUSSIA

Askew, William C., "An American View of Bloody Sunday," *Russian Rev.,* Jan. 1952, 35-43.

Askew, William C., "Russian Military Strength on the Eve of the Franco-Prussian War," *Slav. & East Eur. Rev.,* Dec., 1951, 185-205.

Baylen, Joseph O., "Madame Olga Novikov, Propagandist," *Amer. Slav. & East Eur. Rev.,* Dec., 1951, 255-271.

Bechtoldt, Heinrich, "Metamorphose des Bolschewismus," *Wort u. Wahrheit,* Jan., 1952, 20-27.

Block, Alexander, "Soviet Housing II," *Soviet Studies,* Jan., 1952, 229-257.

Chamberlin, William H., "Russians Against Stalin," *Russian Rev.,* Jan. 1952, 16-23.

Daniels, Robert V., "The Kronstadt Revolt of 1921: A Study in the Dynamics of Revolution," *Amer. Slav. & East Eur. Rev.,* Dec., 1951, 241-254.

Gibian, George, "Shakespeare in Soviet Russia," *Russian Rev.,* Jan., 1952, 24-34.

Gurian, Waldemar, "Von Lenin zu Stalin," *Schweizer Monatshefte,* Jan., 1952, 591-600.

Hammen, Oscar J., "Free Europe versus Russia 1830-1854," *Amer. Slav. & East Eur. Rev.,* Feb., 1952, 27-41.

Heimann, Rudolf A., "Bücher-Rundschau: Das Land der stummen Millionen," *Schweizer Monatshefte,* Jan., 1952, 633-640.

Herman, L. M., "Russian Manganese and the American Market," *Amer. Slav. & East Eur. Rev.,* Dec., 1951, 272-281.

Holdsworth, M., "Soviet Central Asia, 1917-1940," *Soviet Studies,* Jan., 1952, 258-277.

M., J., "Dzieje 'czerwonej schizmy'," *Kultura,* Jan., 1952, 137-140.

Kirchner, Walther v., "Die Bedeutung Narwas in 16. Jahrhundert," *Hist. Zft.,* Oct. 1951, 265-284.

Koriakov, Mikhail, "Do the Russians Hate America?" *Russian Rev.,* Jan., 1952, 3-15.

Lebeděv, P., "Veliká říjnová revoluce a sovětské uměni," *Slovanský Přehled* 9, XXXVII (1951), 397-402.

Lednicki, Wacław, "Some Doubts about the Identity of Pushkin's Polonophil," *Slav. & East Eur. Rev.,* Dec., 1951, 206-212.

Leites, Nathan, "The Politburo Through Western Eyes," *World Politics,* Jan., 1952, 159-185.

Mehnert, Klaus, "Der Fall Tschakowskij," *Osteuropa,* Feb., 1952, 23-28.

Meissner, Boris, "Shdanow (I)," *Osteuropa,* Feb., 1952, 15-22.

Pachydermus, "Soviet Grain Production," *East Eur.,* Jan. 24, 1952, 6-9.

Rauch, Georg v., "Die Hochschulen der Sowjetunion" *Osteuropa,* Feb., 1952, 1-8.

Ronimois, Hans E., "The Soviet Economic Machine," *Slav. & East Eur. Rev.,* Dec., 1951, 112-138.

Schlesinger, R., "The Kolkhoz System: A Reply," *Soviet Studies,* Jan., 1952, 288-315.

Šerech, Jurij, "Stefan Yavorsky and the Conflict of Ideologies in the Age of Peter the Great," *Slav. & East Eur. Rev.,* Dec., 1951, 40-62.

"Soviet Economic Bloc," *East Eur.*, Jan. 17, 1952, 1-4.
Štambuk, Zdenko, "The Condemnation and Defeat of Aggressive Soviet Policy," *Rev. of Intern. Aff.*, Dec. 5, 1951, 9-10.
Syc, Pavel, "Byelorussia Yesterday and Today," *Eastern Qy.*, Jan.-Apr., 1952, 22-29.
Timasheff, N. S., "Political Power in the Soviet Union," *Rev. of Pol.*, Jan., 1952, 15-24.
Trietjakow, P., "Niektóre zagadnienia o pochodzeniu ludów w świetle dzieł J. W. Stalina o języku i językoznawstwie," *Sprawozdania P. M. A.*, Vol. III 1950, Livr. 1-4, 3-25.
Utis, O., "Generalissimo Stalin and the Art of Government," *For. Aff.*, Jan., 1952 197-214.
Volin, Lazar, "The Turn of the Screw in Soviet Agriculture," *For. Aff.*, Jan., 1952, 277-288.

SCANDINAVIA & BALTIC

Bjerve, Petter Jakob, "Nationale Buchführung und Nationalbudget in Norwegen," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, 1951, (Band 67, Heit 2), 270-297.
Fristrup, Børge, "Danish Expedition to Peary Land, 1947-1950," *Geograph. Rev.*, Jan., 1952, 87-97.
Guerny, Yves du, "Sweden Between East and West," *Intern. Jl.*, Winter, 1951-1952, 48-54.
Just, Arthur W., "Skandinavische Friendensregion," *Aussenpolitik*, Jan., 1952, 47-53.
Leighly, John, "Population and Settlement: Some Recent Swedish Studies," *Geograph. Rev.*, Jan., 1952, 134-137.
Macridis, Roy, "Stalinism and the Meaning of Titoism," *World Pol.*, Jan., 1952, 219-238.
Rupejko, Pranas, "Progress of the Extermination of the Baltic Nations (1940-1950)," *Eastern Qy.*, Jan.-Apr., 1952, 33-40.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Anderson, Eugene N., *Process Versus Power: Studies in Modern Culture,* Lincoln, University of Nebraska, 1952.

Condoide, Mikhail V., *The Soviet Financial System,* Columbus, Ohio State University, 1951.

Documents on the Hostile Activity of the United States Government against the Hungarian People's Republic, Budapest, Hungarian State Publishing House, 1951.

Durković-Jakšić, *La Presse de la Principauté de Serbie,* Beograd, Académie Serbe des Sciences, 1951.

Easum, Chester, *Half-Century of Conflict,* New York, Harper & Brothers, 1952, $6.00.

Ebenstein, William, *Great Political Thinkers,* New York, Rinehart, 1951, $6.40.

Press, 1951, $3.00.

Elezović, Gliša, *Recueil de Matériaux d'Histoire de Littératures Orientales,* Beograd, 1951.

Freymond, Jacques, *Lénine et l'Impérialisme,* Lausanne, Librairie Payot, 1951.

Hallgarten, George W., *Imperialismus vor 1914,* München, Verlag C. H. Beck, 1951.

A letter from Hungary, New York, Foreign News Service, 1952.

Jakšić, Grgur, *Correspondence of Ilya Garashanin,* Beograd, l'Académie Serbe, 1950.

Juliusz Słowacki 1809-1849, London, M. Caplin & Co. Press, 1951.

Khaduri, Majid, *A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1932,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1951, $5.00.

Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Erik, *Liberty or Equality,* Caldwell, Idaho, Caxton Printers, 1952, $6.00.

Lerner, Daniel, *The Nazi Elite,* Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1951, $1.00.

Menshutkin, Boris N., *Russia's Lomonosov,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952, $4.00.

Negley, Glenn & Patrick, J. Max, *The Quest for Utopia,* New York, Henry Schuman, 1952, $6.75.

Neumann, Inge S., *A Bibliography of the European War Crimes Trials,* New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1952, $1.00.

Okun, S. B., *The Russian American Company,* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951, $4.50.

Petrov, Vlaclimir, *My Retreat from Russia,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950, $4.00.

Petrov, Vladimir, *Soviet Gold,* New York, Farrar, Straus & Co., 1949, $4.00.

Reshetar, John S., *The Ukrainian Revolution,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952, $5.00.

Sayegh, Fayez A., *The Palestine Refugees,* Washington, D. C., Amara Press, 1952, $.25.

Stavrianos, L. S., *Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity,* Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1952, $3.25.

Sturm, Heribert, *Eger,* Augsburg, Adam Kraft, 1951.

Tenenbaum, Joseph, *Underground, The Story of a People,* New York, Hallmark-Hubner Press, 1952, $4.50.

Wszelaki, Jan H., *Fuel and Power in Captive Middle Europe,* New York, National Committee for a Free Europe, 1952, $.25.